The Political Career and
Personal Qualities of Richelieu
(a
research paper on Richelieu)
The greatness and admiration of Richelieu do not come only from his ideas on government
comprehensibility, intelligence and progressiveness but also because during his
time as a minister he was able, to great extent, to fulfill his clear-cut plan
to create the strong state and the absolute monarchy. Richelieu
achieved this goal through several courses of action. First-of-all, the central
policy of Richelieu was to preserve and extend the authority of the
government. Richelieu created an
administration apparatus with men completely dependent himself and thus
facilitated tremendously the implementation of his policies. He established a church utterly loyal to the monarchy.
In fact, the French state had far more extensive control over the revenue of
the church than in any other Catholic country. Richelieu
had achieved another goal--neutralizing
the Huguenots. 'As a party' he claimed, the Huguenots had been
ruined but this was not so in the direct sense of the word. He did so by tolerating religious differences in order
to preserve national unity. Although the Premier Minister considered the
noblesse as a vital factor in the state machine, he foresaw the danger of those
nobles that were considering themselves excluded from a share of central power
and thus could revert to territorial independence (Pennington, 266-67).
Contrary to the intention of Richelieu to
consolidate sovereignty, their whole life was a defiance of sovereign law. Richelieu had the skills and intellect to find a way to
deal with the conspiracies and plots against his regime--selective revenge, counter-attacking and finally lse-majest. He
was also able to diminish the role of
the Parliement that was an evident obstacle to centralization and
absolutism. When confronted with the problem of Huguenot aprisings, Richelieu with both his political shrewdness and genuine
humanity advised the King to confirm the Edict of Nantes and pardon the
rebellion. The 'Peace of Grace'
achieved the deserved award for the Huguenots did not disturb the security of
the state the next few decades (Briggs, 98). With the king supreme at home,
Richelieu in 1635 carried France into the
Thirty Years' War. The reason was mostly imbedded in the threat that the Hapsburg states, Austria
and Spain presented to France.
Another motive that lies behind it was that although a risky endeavor the war contributed to the consolidation of
the state.
Richelieu was a man of many personal
qualities. His powerful and analytic intellect was characterized by a reliance
on reason, strong will and ability to govern others. He was, in fact, a born
leader who possessed in abundance the personal qualities that are associated
with effective use of political power. Even before becoming Premier Minister,
the political ideas and concepts of Richelieu
are well-matured. In his early statements, authoritarianism is essential. He
believed in the divine right of the king and adhered to the doctrine of divine right sovereignty. He had a
comprehensive view of well-defined, divinely ordained authority at all levels
of society and was devoted to authoritarianism and legitimacy. Richelieu had a clear view of the way the society was
supposed to function. Everyone played a
specific role in the system, making their contributions--the clergy through
their prayers, the nobles with their arms under the control of the king, and
the peuple, as the Cardinal used to call the common people, through continued
obedience. For him the monarchy was the
divinely appointed mechanism. Its purpose was peace and order in society, every subject contributing to the life of
the whole. The final result that he envisioned was peace for the state, prosperity for the king, and greatness for the
monarchy (Church, 82-85).
The reality was, however, completely different from what Richelieu
was striving towards. As O1Connell put it: 'France
was not an entity, but a congeries of antiquated centres of administrative
gravity'. The provincial governments were the main source of
instability. The provinces were ruled by
governors, who were nominally for the Crown but more often stood against it. some of them used the royal authority to become 'petty
sovereigns'. In certain provinces there were provincial Estates,
duplications of the States General. All the Midi had a vast degree of autonomy, and even the center
and west had not renounced their privileges and were engaged in constant
struggle with the Crown to defend them. Even when the Crown proposed trivial
things it encountered the obstacle of provincial liberties. In addition, the cities, composed of oligarchies of
men of the robe and of trade, had their
liberties. Richelieu followed the
traditional logic of absolute monarchy and reinforced the system of penetration
into the provincial administrative structure by creating officers answerable to the Crown, who would duplicate and
gradually absorb the function of revenue-raising, defense, police and the
courts. Richelieu went much further in
consolidating the role of the Crown in the whole country and created the
so-called intendants. They were
given authority over the justices,
officers and subjects of the Crown, with the power of resolution and decision of 'affairs concerning our service, repose
and security, to receive request, administer
justice, preside over courts and policy, and assist the governors and
lieutenant-generals' (O'Connell, 130). Richelieu had also managed to
create an extensive network of spies,
men of confidence, pamphleteers who disseminated the ideas of Richelieu
before their implementation. All this effectively contributed to a
centralization of authority and reduced the risks of promoting the policies of
state-building.
It is interesting to note that even as a mere Bishop of Luon, Richelieu was
convinced that the state, because of its special purposes and interests, had to
differentiate itself from the code of Christian ethics that prevailed among
individuals and to operate on a different level. The Cardinal always adhered to
the maxim that the means justify the
ends. His religious beliefs, therefore, are quite explainable. Although he
devoutly believed in the Roman Church1s great mission, Richelieu
sought to assign the church a more practical meaning. There was
are distinctive tendency in his policies towards laxism and willingness
to accommodate religious principles to
practical, human reality. Richelieu
realized that reason of state necessitated
a partial autonomy of political affairs from theological determinants. A
more loose religious morality was needed. In his Instruction du chrtien he
repeatedly emphasized the sufficiency of a far less rigorous route to salvation
than it was required by most of the contemporary religious leaders (Church,
86-87). Richelieu used such arguments to
justify his position that the state is above everything and that religion is a
mere instrument to promote the policies of the state. The church,
thus became a mere tool for the promotion of state policies and increasing the
royal power. The Cardinal also considered it to be entirely normal and
appropriate to work for religious objectives through the instrumentality of the
state. He gave his policies a religious justification, usually defining the good of the state in religious
terms. It is clear that to Richelieu the monarchical state and church were
the two great, correlative, interlocking institutions and according to him they
were 'divinely authorized to lead and control humanity in their respective
spheres' (Church, 86). Richelieu did not
use the church to defend his intentions but the Cardinal did not hesitate
infringe on the traditionally established rights of the clergy. When the
treasury was short of money because the involvement of France in the Thirty Years War, Richelieu made it clear that the crown might tax clerical
wealth without the consent of its holders. Thus the administration demanded on
several times subsidies from the clergy and claimed the right to tax them.
Although Pope Urban VIII condemned such attacks upon ecclesiastical property,
the Parlement did not react. As we can see, Richelieu adroitly and extensively used the
potential of the church in realizing his idea of centralized state.
An important obstacle to the solidification of absolutism and
centralization of power was the Parlement, which was conservative, independent
and resistant to pressure. Bernard de La Roche-Flavin in 1617 summed up its
authority as follows: 'It has the function of verifying, ratifying,
limiting or restraining' (O1Connell, 131). In eight provinces there were parlements similar in role and function
to the Parliement in Paris.
This only demonstrates the incongruity of the state system. The Parlement at
the time of Richelieu claimed that all decrees
were of legal effect only if ratified or approved by it. This was true even if
they were made in the presence of the King. Richelieu
had to struggle during his whole career in order to gain control over the
judicial system and finally succeeded when an ordinance was issued in 1641 which forbade the Parlement in future
to occupy itself with political concerns. The
restriction of judicial functions of the Parlement would have been something
unheard of twenty years before and particularly here we can see the
contribution of the Cardinal to the creation of a more centralized authority.
According to Bernard de La Roche-Flavin, France was composed of 'three
sorts of government on the whole, that is to say, the monarchy, aristocracy and republic, so that
one may serve as a brake upon and a counterpoise to the other.' Richelieu put all his effort in undoing this system by
placing as much power as possible in the hands of the monarch. The opposition
of the Parlement to his measures he described as 'altogether beyond the
bounds of reason' (O1Connell, 131).
It is the reason of things that lies behind the logic
of Richelieu1s conceptions of solidifying the central authority. In an age when
there was solid faith in the power of human reason to perceive the true
structure of things, the Cardinal derived his concepts of absolutism on the
basis of a firm belief in the institution of
monarchy as a rational system of government. On the other hand, he assumed
that the monarchy was the necessary
power to restrain the irrational tendencies in men. Richelieu
made every reasonable effort to make the existing system more efficient by
staffing it with his protgs, controlling its operations and adding certain
elements that increased effective power at the center (Church, 174).
When we discuss the consolidation of the French monarchy, the notion of
sovereignty is essential. We cannot talk of Richelieu1s increasing the
effective power of the administrative system and institutions of government
without mentioning his strive for fulfillment of the concept that every Frenchman was equally subject to the
Crown regardless of his position in the hierarchy and ensuring that all
elements of the population were in every sense the king1s loyal subjects
(Church, 174). Although the Cardinal had some religious constraints because of
the mediaeval ideas of Christian morality which was still present to date, he
nevertheless regarded public interest as of primary importance. The idea of
sovereignty was introduced as the keystone and major factor of French political
thinking without which Richelieu would have
undoubtedly found it hard to realize his policy of centralizing authority. Richelieu had to reestablish the balance between
fundamental law and royal sovereignty which had been seriously disturbed. The
work of Cardinal Le Bret in 1632 demonstrates this. Sovereignty, he said 'is a supreme power bestowed on an
individual, which gives him the right to command absolutely, and which has for
its end the repose and advantage of the public'(De la souverainet du roy, 1). The reasoning of Le Bret makes it clear that the
change of institutions and customs by the royal authority is possible, 'for all persons being equally
subjects of the same King, are equally subject to the same law'. Le
Bret also criticizes the anarchic character of the feudal rights and privileges
whose belittlement will become one Richelieu1s main objectives.
Probably the strongest impediment to the policies of Richelieu, aimed at
intensifying the royal power throughout France, were the traditional
privileges, liberties and feudal rights of the nobility. Some of the higher
nobles were constantly involved in conspiracy against the crown and at times
their personal armies were outnumbering that of the crown. Thus in the
beginning of his rule as a Premier Minister, Richelieu1s major problems on the
domestic front consisted of counterattacking the noble conspiracies and
reducing the political power of the Huguenots. On the pretext of combating the
heresy, Richelieu embarked upon hostilities
against the Huguenots. His major concern, however, in both reducing La Rochelle and
restricting the activities of the nobles was the elimination of all resistance
within the monarchy which hampered the expansion and exercise of state power
and to demonstrate that all French citizens, Catholic or Huguenot, noble or
peasant, must be loyal subjects to the Crown (Church, 175). The fact which
proves the Cardinal1s desire was to submit
all elements of French society to the power of the state was the Peace of
Allais (1629). Richelieu succeeded in
reducing the Huguenots to the position of unquestionable obedience. It was
clear to the Cardinal that it was not
the heresy that limited royal absolutism but rebellion and war. The bitter
experience of religious strife that meant undesirable chaos which inevitably
would weaken the power of the ruler was another factor for the peaceful
settlement of the problem with the Huguenots. The words of Louis XIII at the
capitulation of the rebellious La Rochelle
are indicative of this: 'I well know that you have done everything in your
power to throw off the burden of obedience to me. I forgive your rebellions. If
you are my good and faithful subjects, I shall be a good prince to you'
(Church, 196).
Before the Peace of Allais, the reasons for the rebellions of the Huguenots
were very similar to the pretensions of the nobles in general. They maintained
that they were loyal subjects but the privileges that had been conceded them by
earlier royal edicts had been continually violated. The position of Richelieu
however was indisputable. As seen from his work Advis designated for the king,
the primary duty of the king is to wield his power for the benefit of his state
without regard to personal or humanitarian considerations. By winning the king
entirely on his side, Richelieu was ready to
pursue his goal of controlling the great nobles and limiting their seditious
activity. Richelieu who 'gloried in the majesty of Louis XIII'
persisted in explaining the continuing danger from the nobility and stated the
according measures that need to be taken (Church, 198). Here, it is imperative
to mention that the self-effacement of Louis XIII must be counted as not the
least of the causes which contributed to the consolidation of the French state,
for the achievement of the Cardinal was made possible only by the conduct of
the King (Wedgwood, 37). Richelieu insisted
that the King should exert greater effort to enforce his laws, especially those
that touched the nobles, and he specifically mentioned the edict against
dueling. The laws must be applied with extraordinary severity, for otherwise
the state cannot survive. The Cardinal emphasized to the King that he had to
rigorously punish all crimes so as to forestall greater ones. Through such kind
of reasoning, Richelieu sought to provide to his sovereign a rationale for the
harsh rule and occasionally immoral policies that both knew to be requisite to
strengthening the French
State.
The edict against
dueling as well as the royal declaration ordering the destruction of fortresses
that were not on the frontiers were both for the purpose of increasing
royal control over the nobles. There was need for extensive psychological
adjustment before the nobles could view themselves as mere subjects of the
crown. The period was such that for the nobility the king was but the highest
ranking member of the order. The attempt of Richelieu to exclude the nobles
from the government affairs on any level was within the scope of the royal
prerogative but ran counter to many elements of noble1s traditional way of
life, therefore involved the violation not of legal rights but of social
values. The aristocracy had failed to transform itself into a political
oligarchy capable of resisting the intrusion of absolute monarchy. It consumed
itself and the resources of the nation in senseless pursuit of noble values and
honor. In this way it had become an impediment to the centralization of the
state, upon which the grandeur of France depended. The reasonable policy
of Richelieu was to reduce the great nobility to loyalty and to use their energy for
the benefit of the state (O1Connell, 128).
The explanation for the continuous threat to central authority and more
precisely the secret noble conspiracies against Richelieu, whom many regarded
as a tyrant and a menace to their way of life, can be explained by the personal
concept of service that the nobles used to have, their loyalty to the order and
the clientele system. An effective way of dealing with the numerous conspiracies
and secret revolts of the nobles was the accusation of lse-majest. The crime
was considered to consist of overt and covert acts against the person of the
king, members of his family, or the safety of his realm. Richelieu
expanded the definition of lse-majest to include the composition, publication, and
distribution of defamatory libels concerning political matters. Richelieu did not hesitate to accuse the followers of the
Queen Mother and Gaston d'Orleans of lse-majest (Church, 178-79). The idea
appeared that in political affairs a special standard of justice without proofs
of guilt was both necessary and justified. Many opponents of Richelieu,
thus, found themselves in the prison or were sentenced to death because they
were plotting against the state, and disrupting the public peace.
Another device that Richelieu used to diminish
the power of the nobles and respectively aggrandize that of the state was the
practice of selling offices. This
was not merely a device to raise revenue from the proprieted classes but it blocked the formation of grandee clientage
systems within the state. Richelieu stressed in his Testament Politique the
critical sterilizing1 role of the paulette in putting
the whole administrative system beyond the reach of tentacular aristocratic
lineages like that of the House of Guise (Anderson,
52).
After the Day of Dupes when most of Richelieu1s opponents were neutralized, the
ambitious minister realized that the moment has come for a more serious foreign
policy. War was unavoidable according to Richelieu
although he saw war as a needed process before a
all-reaching peace was obtained. War was
also the prime necessity to building state power and prestige of the monarchy. The
emergency of the war also allowed the taking of measures and the implementation
of domestic policies aimed at consolidating the monarchical state which without
this emergency are practically impossible. Aggressive
foreign policy was also the only means of neutralizing threats from abroad and
advancing state interests. It is argued that Richelieu,
following his program of state-building, had been caught in the spiral in which
the survival of the state necessitated armed combat which in turn caused
further rivalry. Others also say that he used the resources of the nation in
vain in order to participate in an useless conflict.
Whatever the sacrifices, the foreign policy of Richelieu
presented, it had promoted and had brought further the
consolidation, power, security,
prestige, and discipline to the monarchical state.
Although the system that Richelieu created can be viewed as artificial because
it did not appear as a natural continuation of the past, his idea of government
from above had its enormously beneficial outcome on the historical development
of France.
By adapting his policies to changing circumstances, with
great flexibility and exploitation of opportunity, enabled Richelieu to achieve
his goal of the integrity and grandeur of France. Richelieu
had found a country with unrealized potential, vigorous but divided people. He
had found France
inefficiently governed and inadequately armed. By involving every subject in
the service of a strong state, Richelieu
opened up more perspectives in front of the people. He saw this tremendous
potential for order, skillful government and military greatness. His whole life
he worked towards this objective and he left contentious nation, a coherent
domain, a political system soon to become the example for the rest of Europe. Richelieu formed
a model upon which the new ideal of Nationalism should frame itself. He centralized political power and worked
towards a more uniform legal system. Richelieu built for France the
stable and powerful monarchy which gave her a long pre-eminence among nations
and contributed to the whole European development. The only factor that was on
his side during his mission as principle minister of the state was the need and
desire in the society for authority and peace after the prolonged disorder of
the past. The energy and will-power of the Cardinal reconstructed the state and
made France
a great power in the face of the most formidable obstruction. founder of French unity as well as the person who released France
from its medieval nature.
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