| CATEGORII DOCUMENTE |
| Arheologie | Istorie | Personalitati | Stiinte politice |
Universitatea din Bucuresti
Facultatea de Stiinte Politice
'The structure of extremist
discourse in pre-2007
(Structura discursului extremist din Romania inainte de 2007)
Dizertatie in specializarea de master Teorie Politica si Politica Comparata
1. Introduction
1.1.Background and intent
This study will investigate the ideological discourse of three political organizations: the Romania Mare Party (P.R.M.), the New Generation Party (P.N.G.) and the Noua Dreapta Christian Forum (N.D.). Elements such as sociological appeal or political marketing will not be touched upon unless they are relevant to the discussion at hand.
At a
cursory glance, the three organizations have few similarities and many
differences. The P.R.M. is a long-standing member of the Romanian Parliament,
having gained seats in every election since 1992. By contrast, George Becali's
P.N.G. is a relative newcomer to the Romanian political scene - sub par results
in the 2004 elections have not allowed it entrance to the Romanian Parliament,
a situation that might repeat for future elections. Furthermore, 'Noua Dreapta'
is not a party per se; it has adopted the tone and strategies of a civil
society organization - albeit of an extremist persuasion; in addition, the N.D.
has publicly denied its' becoming a part of the political spectrum or providing
political support to already existing parties. Thus, the question naturally
arises: what were the criteria which were at the basis of the selection of
these case studies? The answer lies in the fact that in the science of
comparative politics the relevant factor in the development of a scholarly set
of observations is the unity of the issue at hand. By different means, with a
different language or relying on separate sets of values, the three
organizations above tackle the same problems, dilemmas and malaises of the post-1989 Romanian society. Each of the three
movements questions or contradicts some of the fundamental components of
democracy, and in particular of the Romanian democracy. They are also
particular in that they speculate upon the perceived failure of state hello
While
other such lines of endeavor have existed since 1989, the three organizations
listed above are unique in their popular appeal, visibility and mobilization
capabilities. Their lifespan has brought them on a collision with
1.2 Axioms underlying the study
While the subject matter of the study is original, in that no in-depth study has been carried out in the topic, there are a number of publicly recognized statements concerning the tension between democracy and extremism in Romanian political life which helped elaborate the mindset utilized for analysis. They will be listed here, both for the convenience of readers unfamiliar with the history of Romanian political thought and for the aid of a knowledgeable audience that desires a deeper understanding of the study's foundations.
Romanian political scientists such as Stelian Tanase have noticed the existence of three cultures[1] in Romanian political expression:
- The conservative political philosophy in the country evolved from a 19th century critique of modernization as undertaken by the National Liberal Party to a vigorous and prolific set of political doctrines, having at their center 'the cult of the village, autochtonism, anti-Occidentalism'[2]. By a natural extension, the capitalist market and the city - central institutions for a modernizing set of values - were and are mistrusted by significant portions of Romanian population. Thus, the young Romanian intellectuals of the 1930s were stating openly that 'some (.) may defeat the foreigners in the economic field, but they will have been defeated by them spiritually, in their Romanian-ness, because they will impose upon our being customs of doing, of being, of thinking, which are not ours (.) they will have become exchange agents, channels of circulation for international bourgeois values' . The main conflict of Romanian history was seen by extremist forces in the inter-war period as that between 'the Romania of the native spiritual configuration which has lasted in our kind ' and 'the modern Romania of the cities, of comfort and the good life, of the material civilization, of the West, of the industry and of the machine, of the opposition between the middle class and the proletariat, of what is actually the foreign Romania' ;
- Etatism
existed prior to Communist rule and has played an important part in post-1989
political life. In all its forms, this value set claimed that the state alone
had the power to eradicate the existing deficit between
- Thirdly, a liberal agenda, oriented around the development of capitalist institutions and the establishment of a powerful middle class has also been relevant to public discourse , with varying success depending on the political era and regime in power.
Another Romanian intellectual puts forth the thesis of Romanian political evolution as occurring under the mark of a 'catastrophic identity'. Horia-Roman Patapievici begins by stating that, historically, the evolution of the Romanian political stage was shaped by the inescapable diarchy between the 'thin' elite of intellectuals and a silent majority . The fusion between the identity of the elites who created the Romanian state and the mental mindset of the classes empowered by the universal voting act of 1919 represented a massive failure. This failure paralyzed resistance to authoritarianism.
Constructing
and being part of a modern state was visibly easier for the educated
upper-class than for the mass of
Utilizing communism as an ex-machina factor that disrupted
the subtle process of modernization does not explain the resistance of the 80%
to the population to the modernization; indeed, prior to the first world war
modernity became perceived by a portion of the population as alien to the
Romanian self. The State, in the view of such anti-progressivists, had been
implanted in disregard of the structure of the Romanian self. Whether by
attacking individualism (like Nae Ionescu), democracy (the Legion movement) or
'shape without content' (Maiorescu), an influential portion of Romanian
intellectuals constructed their public and intellectual personas by opposing
modernity. It must not be forgotten that the three literary models of Romanian
literature, the most highly-regarded intellectuals of the literary pantheon
(worshipped as such in elementary school manuals) were all opponents of the
country's modernization. Mihai Eminescu idealized a historical, rural past
devoid of the immorality attributed exclusively to modern democracy. Ion
Creanga emphasized the social and psychological attractiveness of rural
communities; I.L. Caragiale pointed out the faults and incoherencies of the
creation of the bourgeoisie. The very state which aimed to transform
In Patapievici's view, the universal vote fully exposed the failure of modernization: '[It] brought into the Romanian political life populism, authoritarianism and the unfortunate idea that the existence of a charismatic leader is indispensable to the development of an efficient political life'. Eventually, Patapievici continues to point out, the morality of political life was perceived as hinging on the weakening of parliamentarism and the arrival of a wise, nation-loving dictator (on the voievod model)[10]. Individualism - a precondition of a capitalist, democratic society - was understood by thinkers such as Nae Ionescu as disorderly, chaotic and infused with selfishness - indeed contrary to the collective nature of the Romanian self: 'Because the social form of individualism is freedom of expression, these critics of liberal societies all agreed that freedom of the press must be limited only to the ideas with which collectivists happened to agree.' Nationalism - in Patapievici's understanding - was the recourse to the intimate community that had been lost via individualism and impersonalized progress.
The two visions are compatible if one takes into
consideration that Tanase himself argued that autochthonic traditionalism and
etatism have been fused together after 1989[12],
thus affirming a collaboration first suggested by Ceausescu's brand of national
communism. Outside observers proposed similar schemes for understanding
As looked
upon in this study, the division between the modernist and the reactionary is
not sociological; while it may be ascribed to political figures, regions or
social strata it figures preeminently in this thesis as a distinction between
currents of expression (i.e. viewpoints). However, metaphors borrowed from the
field of sociology may be utilized for a better understanding of how and why
these viewpoints influence political life and Romanian identity. Such a tool is
the perspective of market sociology, according to which most social phenomena
can be explained in economic terms.
The extreme right thus represents a portion of the political 'marketplace' assaulted by visitors, one in which competitors for attention and vote (the political parties and political movements) try at the same time to fit the characteristics of the seller in that area of the market (i.e. to maintain extremist ideas) and at the same time to identify themselves as an 'seller', incidentally of value superior to that of the nearby competitors. Exactly like in a real market, the tone and volume of the voice, the quality of the wares or the specificity/originality of the goods in the stall play a part in attracting consumers, different elements of individuality or manners of emphasizing these elements attracting (of course) consumers of different factures. What lacks, due to the nature of political interaction, is the price: if the P.R.M. and the P.N.G. ask for votes, the Noua Dreapta appeals to mechanisms specific to the civil society, soliciting time involvement and effort.
For a
valuable understanding of the political narrative of how Romanian extremism
achieved power and voice, one should start with what is, paradoxically enough,
an analysis of the Romanian left. It is clear for a dispassionate observer of
Romanian political history, the left has occupied a disproportionately small
role in the political debates of democracy. Prior to the First World War, the
impetus of the nation lied on development and modernization - the Liberal and
Conservative parties competed in providing visions of how Romania was to become
a capitalist nation. The socio-economic foundation for a leftist doctrine - the
proletariat - slowly came into being while the electoral system in existence
did not have as a particular goal addressing their concerns. Indeed, the
philosophical-moralistic backbone of the left - redistribution, equality and social
rights - was only being developed in
After the First World War, when both the socio-economic and philosophical-moralistic roots of the left had been solidly planted in European consciousness, Romania lagged in the development of a leftist political structure which could hold its own against right- or extreme right-wing forces in the nation's political arena. The Social Democratic Party (P.S.D.) played in a minute role in the politics of the day by comparison with the titans of the parliamentary weltanschauung, the National Liberal Party and the National Peasants' Party. The P.S.D. never formed a government on its own and actually succeeded in obtaining more than 3 % of the votes in 1938 alone. The more extreme version of the Romanian left, the Communist Party (P.M.R./P.C.R.) suffered from international divisions. Its dedication to a Soviet-centered left-wing doctrine ensured that the P.M.R. would remain a minuscule organization, of less than 1,000 members. Thus, the political drives and needs of the Romanian blue-collar working class were partly addressed through illegal strikes (i.e. the Grivita events of 1931).
A somewhat
different pattern of political activity was encountered after the 1989
revolution. Left-wing parties or coalitions have ruled the country for 11 of
The coming to power of the P.S.D. in 2000 signaled the coming of a new generation of Romanian leftists to the forefront of power, such as Adrian Nastase, Miron Mitrea and Dan Ioan Popescu. Slick and business-like, they found themselves in the unenviable position of having to create wealth in order to share it. Wide range social support programs became muddled with corruption charges affecting their political status to the present day. After losing the 2004 elections, the Social Democrats reoriented themselves towards Mircea Geoana, a presentable leader who put forth several unsuccessful programs meant to redefine the Romanian left in European terms. As long as the party's financial and organizational base lies in the businesspeople Nastase promoted - and as long as youths and intellectuals feel attracted to the right - Geoana's endeavors are doomed to fail.
This
historical exposition on the structural inadequacies and deficiencies of the
Romanian left was made in order to emphasize several elements which are
familiar to a knowledgeable Romanian audience, but which do not match the
patterns of classical political theory. These statements - on which the efforts
of the dissertation rests - identify the situation particular to
First, the fundamental conflict in Romanian politics is not the one between the left and the right. As seen above, the left was almost non-existent prior to 1948; after the December Revolution, the Romanian left was either an attenuated continuation of the Romanian Communist Party (P.C.R.) or in a position to provoke substantial social changes by means and with goals closer to those of the right. The Romanian right of the post 1989-years consists of democratic and intellectual segments, who don't have the political know-how or communicational abilities to take power, and extremist, nationalist groups, playing on communist themes. The Democratic Party (P.D.) has made the switch from the left to the right of the spectrum, without its alignment to the European Popular Party having made a change in its attitude towards minorities. The chronic weakness of the Romanian left has been discussed at length by analysts such as Dan Pavel .
Secondly, the fundamental conflict of Romanian politics is the one between progressive and modernist forces (and to a lesser extent between different speeds of progress and modernization). No real debate on how to share the wealth or to define national identity has been ongoing, since there was never enough wealth for a moment of truth to emerge or a focused, steady national identity to be discussed. The sweeping process of modernization is the thread running through modern Romanian history - rather than being a subject of debate within a democratic system, it has led to the creation of such a system, and to the proliferation of debates concerning its pace and manifestations.
Third, the absence of an authentic, dedicated left
has misbalanced the political spectrum, focusing the attention of the populace
on the right wing. The competitor to liberal-capitalist democratic regimes
- with all the fallacies, errors or misappropriations that they commit - is not
found by the Romanian public in a coherent, social-democratic or left-wing
doctrine (not that Romanian political organizations have gone to great lengths
to advertise themselves accurately as such). Symbolically, social unity can
only be utilized by the P.S.D. in relation with the figure of Ion Iliescu, a
political persona whose appeal is about to become meaningless as
Fourth, the current structure of the political and electoral systems aid charismatic figures. The above-stated ambiguities concerning the doctrine of parties made voters orient themselves not around political attitudes and philosophies - which from experience they believe have no cover in fact - but on persona itself ("can he be trusted?"). According to post-1989 opinion polls the political leader 'should be authoritarian and protective, able to stop dissensions. A kind of powerful but good father, who exercises his force on others and his goodness on you. He is capable of solving everyone's problems and assumes this responsibility' .
Fifth, the different strains of political extremism
in
1.3 Sources and methodology
For reasons of space and depth this comparison takes place exclusively at the level of ideological and philosophical discourse. What are the concepts that anti-democratic extremists utilize in their public presences? What are their points of contention with democracy, capitalism or globalization? What are the elements to which these points of contention are leading them? What does the presence of a single element in all these extremist strains prove, and on what aspect of Romanian political life is this shedding light - the interplay between democratic institutions and extremism, a common driving source for extremist energies or something else? If two movements display a certain ideatic characteristic and a third one doesn't, what is this telling us about the political groupings at hand from an ideological perspective?
The scholarly tradition in the study of extremist ideology
falls under two headings. The theoretical approach is preferred by Italian and
French political scientists - the focus lies on ideas and theories ('history seen
from above'[17]).
This method is critiqued by political scientists from outside these two nations
as not being grounded in or connecting with reality: 'Theoreticians and factors
of decision have priority over the masses of militants and anonymous sympathizers
(.) while the distance between institutions and practice is left in shadows' .
A widely different approach is utilized in the study of right-wing
organizations in
During the research and information gathering processes, the keyword has been the localization, utilization and analysis of primary data. This has included:
- a full review of P.R.M.'s official newspaper, 'Tricolorul', from its first to its most recent pre-2007 issue;
- an extensive study of P.R.M.'s 'Romania Mare' newspaper, from 1991 on to 2007;
- press releases, commentaries and informational materials provided by the P.N.G. or the 'Noua Dreapta' organization on their websites (www.png.ro and www.nouadreapta.org respectively);
- interviews realized by local newspapers with leaders of Noua Dreapta organizations;
- George Becali's press statements and impromptus as recorded by the HotNews archive (available at www.hotnews.ro), as well as news items and articles from 20 Romanian newspapers;
- TV appearances made by the political figures being studied in the context of electoral campaigns.
Secondary data consisted mainly of studies and analyses of
1.4. Study structure
The main considerations which influenced the organization of the material were: a logical representation of who the three political forces pretend to be, what they support and what they are against, as well as the manner in which they prepare their public apparitions. Namely, chapter 2 will introduce the three organizations in an objective manner which would make them identifiable to an outside observer of the Romanian political life.
The self-portrayal of the three organizations is presented via relevant material in Chapter 3. The fashion in which they construct their own identity is related both to the circumstances of their emergence (as stated in the previous chapter) and to the values which they consider important. Of high-relevance to unconventional, extremist or populist organizations is the development of an irrational bond between the message carriers and the public. Chapter 3 presents the shared values that are taken as a given by the extremist forces depicted in this study. Special attention has been given to history (chapter 3.4) and religion (chapter 3.5) due to the pre-eminence that they have for the political psyche of the contemporary Romanian right.
What separates the unconventional right from ordinary party politics is the perpetual demonization of its opponents (which in the case of mainstream parties is restricted to electoral campaigns). Such a separation between the 'us' and the 'them' tends to have specific characteristics in the cases of the organizations being studied. Chapter 4 ('The enemies (us and them)') identifies the coordinates of exclusion, the directions of the intolerant rhetoric and analyzes the mechanisms by which intolerance is promoted and defined.
Chapter 5 ('Political packaging') discusses the manner in which the mediums of communication that the P.R.M., the P.N.G. and the N.D. have been using have altered, shaped or drawn their messages.
Chapter 6 ('Conclusions') presents in a condensed form the discoveries that this study has made, as well as a thorough assessment of pre-2007 nationalist discourse under the imperative of comparison and analysis.
2. Extremism in pre-2007
2.1. The "Romania Mare Party" (P.R.M.)
In early 1990, experienced journalists who had been employed by the press corps of the Romanian Army wanted to start a new publication from scratch. 'Romania Mare' ('Greater Romania' - name proposed by former Air Force officer Radu Theodoru) was considered geopolitically inappropriate since it alluded to the annexation of Bassarabia by the U.S.S.R. and would thus create the potential for a diplomatic conflict. Corneliu Vadim Tudor, a poet and publicist who had made himself known for his attachment to Ceausescu's communist regime, was planning to publish a newspaper of his own - potential titles being "Neamul Romanesc" ('The Romanian Kind') or "Natiunea" ('The Nation'). One of Army journalists, discontent with the refusal of the title by his colleagues, leaked the information to Eugen Barbu, one of Vadim Tudor's close friends[20]. In several months Barbu and Vadim Tudor had established the 'Romania Mare' newspaper. Its main traits were:
- xenophobia aimed in particular at Romanians of Hungarian ethnicity and the Hungarian state;
- conspiracy theories suggesting that the fate of
- a cult of historical figures along the patterns established during Ceausescu's rule, with the addition of Mareshal Antonescu, Romania's leader ('Conducator') during the World War Two conflict with the U.S.S.R.
A year later, with sales soaring, two of 'Romania Mare' literati - Radu Theodoru and historian Mircea Musat - reached the conclusion that 'they had created a successful publication for nothing if they didn't utilize this achievement to the maximum by creating a political party'. Vadim acquiesced.[21] In the following years, as Musat and Eugen Barbu died and Radu Theodoru was expelled from the party, the magazine and the party itself became Vadim's domain.
The first years of the P.R.M.'s existence were also its most difficult from a political point of view. One of the premier sources of extremist thinking - anti-Hungarian emotion - was a 'market cornered' by the P.U.N.R. (Partidul Unitatii Natiunii Romane - The Party for the Unity of the Romanian Nation). Yet the P.R.M. joined the government in 1992, together with F.D.S.N. (Frontul Democrat al Salvarii Nationale - The Democratic Front for National Salvation), the P.S.M. (Partidul Socialist al Muncii - The Socialist Workers' Party) and the P.U.N.R. The strong left-wing platform of the government, oriented towards a conservationist attitude towards social protection, democratization and the free market, earned the coalition the name of the 'patrulaterul rosu' ('the red quadrilateral').
In the 1996 elections, the P.R.M. surpassed both the P.U.N.R. and the P.S.M. in terms of votes and parliamentary seats (4.50% of the popular vote[22]), arguably becoming the number one extremist and anti-democratic party in the country. The defection of P.U.N.R.'s most vocal leader, Gheorghe Funar, to the P.R.M., consolidated both the latter's status as the outstanding extremist force in Romanian politics and its Transylvanian voting base, previously uninterested in Vadim's political persona .
The following four years saw a marked increase in the
virulence of Vadim Tudor's attacks on the functioning of state institutions and
on the reputation of individuals from within the public arena; central to the
discourse of the party and its newspaper was the existence of a 'Mafia' with
both Romanian and foreign interests whose aim was to destabilize the economy of
the country. Making a profit from the virtual dissolution of the ruling
coalition and from the political mismanagement of right-wing democratic forces,
the P.R.M. recorded an astounding success in the 2000 elections: it became the
2nd largest party in parliament in terms of seats and its president,
Corneliu Vadim Tudor, reached the 2nd round of the presidential
election (in which he received 33% of the popular vote). Unlike in the case of
the eventual winner, Ion Iliescu, Vadim's support was balanced throughout the
historical regions of
The P.R.M. outnumbered the parliamentary representatives of the democratic opposition single-handedly for the following four years . The hijacking of its anti-corruption discourse by the D.A. alliance in the 2004 elections, its limited coalition potential due to careful E.U. monitoring, the improvement of the country's economic potential and ineffective campaigning led to a decrease in the party's parliamentary representation after 2004. Also, the party has lost a number of key figures, either to more attractive offers from other parts of the political spectrum or because of failed attempts to move the organization away from Vadim's strong hold. Twenty parliament members and hundreds of local electees had migrated by December 2006 ; yet Corneliu Vadim Tudor's vitriolic discourse continued to attract Romanians to a degree that practically guarantees his party entrance into Parliament in future elections: not once since the 2004 elections has the party dipped below 8% of the public's political preference in opinion polls .
2.2. The "Partidul Noua Generatie" (P.N.G.) - a brief presentation
Even more so than the P.R.M., the New Generation Party is
defined by the will and words of one man. George (or Gigi, as he is known to
most Romanians) Becali was born in 1958 in Zagna village,
In 2003, Becali became the sole owner of the Steaua
franchise; one year later, he took over the failing Partidul Noua Generatie,
which had been started off by an ex-mayor of
Becali's image is a unique mixture of businessman, philanthropist and political radical. Becali and the P.N.G. rose to political relevance by utilizing a series of ideological assets, some of which will be discussed later in the paper. The two important co-ordinates to take into consideration are:
- The Steaua football club. Becali's pet investment and top manner for grabbing public attention, Steaua Bucharest has had remarkable success in the last few years, in part because of Becali's investments. For a more detailed discussion, see chapter 5, 'Discourse packaging'.
- A nationalistic public discourse heavily infused with Christian themes, doubled by effectiveness (i.e. the construction of houses for flood refugees at Vadu Rosca). Becali has had success positioning him as a person who not only speaks, but also does the 'right thing', especially by contrast with the weak effort of the state. This trait is analyzed in chapters 3 and 4.
2.3 The Noua Dreapta - a brief presentation
Between the two world wars, Archangel Michael's Legion (or its paramilitary branch, the Iron Guard) represented one of the most vigorous threats to the Romanian democracy. With an extremist right-wing ideological stance resembling fascism, yet claiming to adhere to Christian values, the Legion was particularly popular among college students and the rural intelligentsia. The 1937 death of the organization's founder, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, represented a temporary setback for the Legion. Historical circumstances favored its rise to power in 1940, while under the leadership of Horia Sima; months after beginning to share power with Mareschal Ion Antonescu, the Legion met a bloody fate in a January 1941 rebellion. Legion members were after the end of the war one of the main groups being persecuted by the Communist regime.
In July
1990 Horia Sima, the last leader of the Iron Guard, sent from Spain a political will calling on legionnaires abroad
to organize a party that could gain entry into the Romanian parliament. The
Iron Guard leader recognized that classic legionnaires forms of expression (the
green shirts, weapon use) should be avoided
and that the government should not be attacked verbally or otherwise .
Feeble attempts to reorganize the movement among the aged veterans who had
survived Communist prisons soon led to the creation of two political
organizations, "Noua Romanie Crestina' (pro-Sima) and 'Pentru
Patrie' (anti-Sima). After 1996, the two organizations abandoned most
political activities and dedicated themselves to the 'Prof. Gheorghe
Manu' foundation. Yet, in 2003 the S.R.I.,
'Noua
Dreapta' ('The New Right') is considered the most visible of the neo-Legion
movements of the 2000s .
In a 2003 report made for the Open Society Foundation-Budapest on extremism in
Central and
Comparing the ideology of the 'Noua Dreapta' with that of its pre-1941 predecessor or with other competiting Legion 'descendants' does not represent in and of itself one of the goals of this study. Rather, such similes are mentioned only in as far as they are relevant to the broader subject topic.
The non-existence of a comparison between the current Legion movement and the political force on the extreme right can be related to a series of factors, such as:
- the reduced visibility of a coherent Legion movement (it is only since 2003 that Noua Dreapta's actions were reflected in the mass-media);
- the rapid evolution of the post-1989 political environment in Romania, with an emphasis on the changes in the extreme right (in the years preceding the 2000 elections Corneliu Vadim Tudor was not perceived by either analysts or the public at large as a presidential figure; G. Becali did not exist from a political point of view as late as 2002);
- the lack of participation to political life from the side of the Legion movement.
In addition, it should be statds that a debate of the extremist causes in a society cannot be limited to the electoral stage. Particularly in contemporary Romania, marked by the dissolution of authority in public perception and by a visible, unpunished high-level corruption, movements such as the neo-Legion are important exactly because of the themes they utilize, similar in many ways with those of the politically-active extreme right. More so, if one regards political parties strictly as voices of the civil society, the members of the Noua Dreapta are just as legitimate as Vadim Tudor or Becali.
3. 'Who we are and what we believe in'
- ideological identity management in Romanian extremism -
3.1 Introduction
As Daniel Barbu observes in 'Politica pentru Barbari', an
etatism which shunned civil society mechanisms or individualism was present in
the mindset of essentially all political forces since
On a theoretical level, 'governance for Romanians is simultaneously positive and negative. Romanians expect any new government to give them something and to get them rid of something else'. The feeble state of Romania's democratic values is evaluated by D. Barbu in relation to the psychological profile of political leaders, as represented according to opinion polls: 'the political ideal of the overwhelming majority of Romanians is an authoritarian president, 'a player', omnipresent and omnipotent (.) In other terms, Romanians would still like to be governed by one man [italics in original], not by laws, be they right and European. The same Romanians, coherent with themselves, would be happy to elect their parliamentarians one by one, in uninominal circumscriptions. Even when it comes to Parliament, the people don't want the rule of law, but of people.'
These convictions are not simply the result of a superficial education on what democracy is and should be. The behavior of political forces has led Romanians to perceive that most parties and politicians are not trustworthy. Only 5 politicians were positively regarded by more than half the population[41] at the end of 2006; three did not belong to any party at the time the study was conducted, and one is the leader of a political organization not represented in Parliament. Some observers have labeled the profound process by which state resources and political enterprises are undertaken in Romania a 'partitocracy', namely 'a form of government in which parties have total monopoly over governmental personnel, resources and policies' . According to this framework, the population has blamed economic and moral failures on the partitocracy and thus placed its confidence in political figures unattached to the conventional political specter.
Partitocracy is but one of the components of popular
sympathy for unconventional politicians and unorthodox political organizations
- it is one of the many motifs of the discursive story[43]
that pre-2007 Romanians share and act upon. Especially in the context of a
country and society making the transition from transition to transition, it is
important that 'narratives create order out of disorder and meaning from
meaninglessness' .
Each society has a 'narrative consensus', which 'articulates the fundamental
mythologies of culture in a generally accessible language, a heritage of
stories known by all, a heritage of epical schemes, types, cultural symbols and
epical conventions' .
Overstepping partitocracy is the myth of the Savior ,
one with a solid tradition in
The choice
of right-wing extremists in contemporary
The P.R.M., P.N.G. and N.D. also utilize the main political tools of opposition parties or counter-culture organizations: they speculate on social chasms, governmental lack of efficiency or anomic occurrences in the public arena to instill distrust in the political forces ruling the country. By extension, they present themselves as morally upright (preservers of an a priori significant value code) and socially aware (guarantees of economic justice). But, as the quote in the above paragraph suggests, their effort of identification is built on the premise that the institutions of democracy themselves are inefficient, badly thought out or simply inappropriate for the Romanian psyche. One of the main means of de-legitimizing democracy is to redefine Romanian history and claim its common grounds as points of rendezvous for a revised political consciousness.
While these traits apply to the P.R.M., the P.N.G. and the N.D. alike, the exact coordinates of their proposed identity, as well as the interactions between the elements mentioned above differ. The three groups utilize different vocabularies and juxtapositions of ideas, often even differing in their outlook on one central concept (i.e. religion or the figure of Corneliu Codreanu). This chapter will rely on several basic tenets of political self-representation (fundamental statements, general doctrine, attitude towards history or religion) to key in the specific portrait for each of the organizations under study.
3.2 Fundamental statements of identification
3.2.1. P.R.M.: Fighter for the oppressed
The P.R.M. is first and foremost a nationalistic organization, with the majority of its discourse identifying it as a right-wing party. The leadership has a tradition of presenting itself in the form of brief, incisive statements, organized under the grammatical model of 'We are not X, we are Y'; these self-characterizations have the role of redefining the party's unsuitable attitudes in the context of greater, more important values.
For example, in 1991, the official party newspaper stated that 'we are not extremist nationalists, we are patriots and we want Romanians to be masters of their own home (.) otherwise we will become the servants of Europe, all will maim us, from everywhere, the crime of some Hungarian fascists will carry on and, in a record time, we will disappear from the map of the world' . Eleven years later, a similar attempt at a portrait was provided in the following terms: 'We are not extremists, nor xenophobes, nor anti-Semites - we speak for national dignity, true liberty, the fight against a barbarian and humiliating globalization, that is torturing our peoples'. The differences and similarities between the two statements are summarized below:
Table no. 1: P.R.M.'s self-portrait, 1991 vs. 2002
|
Argument flow/year | ||
|
We are not. |
Extremist nationalists |
Extremist Xenophobic Anti-Semite |
|
We are. |
Patriots |
Spokesmen for national dignity, true freedom, anti-globalization |
|
We want. |
Romanians to be in control of their country | |
|
The danger. |
.. will be felt |
. is being felt |
|
The nature of the threat |
becoming servants of |
globalization ('humbling'; of 'barbarian' origin; ) |
|
If the threat is not attended to, the country will.. |
disappear as a national entity |
be 'tortured' (economically and/or spiritually) |
From 1991 to 2002, the discourse has evidently become more
sophisticated; in 1991 patriotism (understood as vigilance) is an excuse for
the party's radical stances. Ethnic tension and distrust of
In a rather surprising manner for a party and a newspaper
named 'Romania Mare' (Greater Romania), the themes of union with former
Romanian
The P.R.M.
is presenting itself as a fighter for the rights of
3.2.2. P.N.G. - Magnet of Christian patriotic energies
The P.N.G. is remarkable among all right-wing political
parties in
Upon taking control of the P.N.G. from Viorel Lis, Becali hesitated to describe it in the conventional terms of left- and right-wing. Rather, he identified his party as indistinctly but positively Christian: 'when you say Christian you say all the good things'[55]. The party was intended to attract 'all the energies and characters left in this country' around a platform built on nationalism and patriotism : 'We have a rich and beautiful country that was called the garden of the Mother of God, but we didn't have [good] leaders. For 15 years this country has been led by people who swore on the Bible and who did so falsely' . Democracy was an indifferent means for the acquisition of absolute power: 'For me, democracy is a means, and the nation is a goal' .
Throughout his actions since seizing the P.N.G. Becali has proven that, indeed, the party defies traditional definition models: social assistance programs have been blended with statements signaling intolerance. An extreme example of the former was Becali donating money to Ferentari inhabitants in late 2006[60]. Ferentari, one of the poorest neighborhoods in Romania's capital city of Bucharest, recorded such a high level of electrical energy theft that the plug was pulled by the regional energy distribution company - a move to which Becali responded by paying all the existing consumer debt in the area. Most often however Becali disposes of his party's finances to build churches and monasteries , in acts of charity such as helping financially ill children , or setting up 'Caravans of charity' in Romania's cities, which identify needy families and provide them with food on a regular basis .
A populist understanding of Christianity has made leftist and right-wing stances coexist under a single banner - a truce which limited P.N.G.'s appeal as an attractive force for resourceful political and non-political actors.
3.2.3 Noua Dreapta: The moral beacon
According
to the organization's website ,
The Noua Dreapta organization emerged in early 2000 as a response to the rise
of nationalist emotion, and in the absence of a proper nationalist-Christian
organization (it actually labels itself 'the only movement for Christian and
national rebirth in
The organization's 10-step program points out the primary organization aims:
- From the perspective of identity politics, to unify the
- On a social level, the N.D. stands for 'the protection of the traditional family' and combating elements inimical to it (with specific reference to abortion and homosexuality);
- Educational efforts include: the creation of a nationalist Christian spirit; stopping the 'offensive of religious sects'; the maintenance of a heroes cult for those who sacrificed themselves for 'God, Kind[65] and Country'; the elimination of 'manelization' and 'Americanization'.
- Central to foreign policy views is the notion of a Christian Europe of Nations, 'in front of threats exercised by American imperialism, radical Islam and the (..) European centralist super-state'. All these objectives, the N.D. states, are to be fulfilled 'via exclusively LEGAL ways' (capitals in original text)[66]. Other, less publicized viewpoints include the protection of the environment, enforcing economic distributism and a participative democracy, as well as 'solving the gipsy problem' (modalities unspecified).
As in the case of the P.R.M., the Noua Dreapta has had to defend itself from accusations stating that it was operating outside the field of democratic practice. Responding to accusations of racism and xenophobia, organization leaders responded in the media that it 'pointedly rejects Nazi, neo-Nazi and pagan ideology and any theory related to genetic manipulations, considering them incompatible with Christian morality and ethics' . Nazism and fascism are seen by the N.D. as 'foreign to the Romanian space and feeling' . The Celtic cross - a pre-Christian symbol for the sun, which became utilized by the Church and can be seen particularly in Maramures - is the N.D.'s logo, a sign of 'national identity and spiritual revolution'. One of the focal point of the doctrine, nationalism, is defined by Tudor Ionescu, the N.D. leader exclusively as 'being devoted to the specific values created by the people to which one belongs, to cherish them, cultivate them and increase them' .
As long as
an ideological standpoint is rooted in Romanian nationalism it cannot be at
fault in a political environment, the argument of the N.D. seems to point out.
The current international climate creates an opportunity for the N.D. to
present to the public an advanced form of P.R.M.'s xeno- and Europhobia, which
emphasize the cultural legacy of
3.3 General doctrine
3.3.1. P.R.M. - National-Communism revidivus
The genesis of the party is defined by its accession to an ideological field in which other political organizations, wary of association with the deceased Communist Party, feared to step in: 'The party was responding [in 1991] to a real need of the Romanian society (..) some of the main ideas at the basis of this party's doctrine are valid, valuable and dear to any Romanian for whom patriotism isn't an empty word but a lifting sentiment, cultivated in family and school and which you carry, as a shadow, your whole life.' Parties such as the P.S.M. (Socialist Workers' Party), which supported communist patterns of economy management but which didn't utilize a nationalistic discourse faded away in the mid-to-late 1990s. Politicians who supported Vadim at the beginning of his political career labeled the topics touched upon by the P.R.M. newspaper as 'innovative'; typical headings of the 'Romania Mare' newspaper at the time included: 'Love of country and kind', 'The National Interest', 'The Fight against corruption and the mafia', 'The Hungarian danger in Transylvania', 'De-masking the foreigners who rob the country', 'Basarabia - Romanian land' .
After the party's early growth, the focus of the doctrine
shifted to a sociopolitical change which would profoundly alter the
relationship between the individual and the state, removing much of democracy's
institutions and practices in the process. While some elements of the proposed
societal model were borrowed from Communist dogma, others are characteristic to
authoritarian regimes. Thus, the P.R.M. manifesto of the 2000 elections
promoted socialist/communist themes
(confiscating fortunes obtained suspiciously and transferring them into a
National Savings Fund for the poor; a total halt of privatizations; decreasing
prices on food, drinks, medicine and school requisites via state intervention
in the economic sphere[74])
backed by a vigilant police state,
whose first priority would be the elimination of mafias which operate on
Romanian territory, the breaking up of prostitution and drug trafficking
networks. Also as a part of this heading, 'individuals guilty of genocide
against the Romanian people' would be trialed publicly and a Committee for the
Research of Anti-Romanian Activity would seek to expel individuals responsible
for 'sabotage, espionage and propaganda aimed at territorial changes' .
As it is made clear in the manifesto, the Romanian state has to 'reinstitute
its authority in the counties of Harghita and Covasna' (which have a majority
of ethnic Hungarians). Days before the manifesto was published, Anghel Stanciu,
the P.R.M. vice-president, made clear that the P.R.M.'s arrival to power would
lead to concrete changes in the country's social and political fabric:
'journalists who sold out to the West will be sent to labor camps' .
Vadim Tudor emphasized this view with abrupt concision: '[
After the 2000 elections populist themes continued to represent the defining trait of the party's doctrine. But the ingredients failed to produce the same explosive effect as in Vadim's 'finest hour' on the Romanian political stage. By sticking to a standard left-wing populist discourse, the P.R.M. managed to keep a hold on a significant portion of the Romanian electorate: 'In comparison with the incomes of our country [the salary of a member of parliament] is rather high and shouldn't be increased, at least not this year. (..) There is practically no difference between the old and the new forces in power when it comes to money!'
The statist-communist origins of the P.R.M. are visible in
its stances on the economy. Whereas the P.R.M. is characterized by intolerance
and hatred towards sundry minorities (see chapter 4.2) the party does not fit
the profile of neo-fascist organizations in its attitude towards labor (as
Romanian political scientists have noticed)[79].
The P.R.M. does not seek a transcendent solution to the conflict between
capital-owning classes and the proletariat, but most often condemns the capital
(seen as of foreign origin, corrupt or both) and defends labor: 'This
inclination is marked both by its older complicity with miners' labor unions
from Valea Jiului, as well as its electoral and programmatic association with
the National Syndicate Block of 2004' .
Also, the P.R.M. proposed a state-driven model of statist cooperation with
rural
A more direct proof of P.R.M.'s nostalgia for the Communist
state came during the public condemnation of communism issued by President Basescu
on December the 18th, 2006, when the P.R.M. acted quite effectively
with the goal of disturbing the Romanian Parliament session. Both as a sign of
a aggression towards Basescu and the condemnation itself, Vadim organized a
manifestation inside the parliament, donning football-like red cards and
whistles to his supporters, insulting the president during the presentation and
unveiling a banner which presented a caricature of Basescu behind prison bars.
The P.R.M. thus identified itself as the only significant political force in
The economic mechanisms of a powerful state are not emphasized by the P.R.M. simply because of their innate attractiveness for certain sections of the population. For Corneliu Vadim Tudor, the P.R.M. and their supporters, the most significant event of the last fifteen years has been represented not by the rise of democracy and the growth of capitalism, but the downfall of the state. In 1991, the 'Romania Mare' newspapers was publishing broad platforms, generic and bombastic, calling for 'the reawakening of national dignity, the growth of the country though our own forces, getting the most disciplined organism - the Army - to rule the community which would simultaneously ensure the discouragement of all attempts to dismember the Unitary National Romanian State'[83]. As the years have passed, the discourse of the P.R.M. has mellowed, and changed in scope, as will be shown in the following paragraph.
As one turns towards the study of the more obvious right-wing ingredients of P.R.M.'s discourse identity, it must be stated that the P.R.M. was not the only force in Romanian politics aiming to attract the population on the basis of nationalist viewpoints. What is remarkable about the 'Romania Mare Party' is the strength and persistence with which it has always presented itself as a moral solution to the country's evils. Early in the party's existence, its members were presented as dedicated heroes, the only resistance to the violent evils surrounding the country: 'Think that in our Balkanic and beautiful Bucharest there are people who have put on the shirt of death, who have engaged themselves on a road with no return and who know well they will pay too for the supreme courage of being Romanian. These Romanians form the nucleus around the "Romania Mare" ideal (.) around the country there are flames of war, within the country there are 'Trojan horses' who watch, just maybe we will kneel'[84]. Even the foundation of youth movement in 1995 provided the occasion for a leap into quasi-legionnaire rhetoric, aimed to promote the party's image and create an esprit de corps based around a moral-elitist framework: 'You are young, you are beautiful, you are without a moral scar, so no force of evil can stop you' .
In time, as party leaders began to dissociate themselves from Vadim Tudor and informal authority was centralized in his hands, the moral asset of the P.R.M. became Vadim himself. Simultaneously, P.R.M.'s declared belief that it is the only truthful political force in the country has led to the continual development of a intense conspiracy theory, whose main traits are detailed in chapter 3. This struggle represented also a potential for defining P.R.M.'s strengths and ideals around Corneliu Vadim Tudor. In February 1999, as Vadim's parliamentary immunity was under discussion, as well as the possibility of arrest for instigating a coup d'etat, the leader of the P.R.M. mused in the pages of one of his newspapers: 'All I did was to say out loud (..) what millions and millions of Romanians are thinking (.) I am waiting in peace for the parliamentary immunity to be removed and to be arrested in a few days. In a regime of terror, the only honorable place is jail (.) Everything that happens in these horrific days represents an exam for the Romanian People : if it doesn't defend its patriots, if it just stays in front of the T.V. set as a spectator, if it lets itself be humbled, robbed and taken out of history the it deserves its fate. Anyway, I will love it and will give myself away for this People '.
Patriotic populism isn't the only tool utilized by the P.R.M. for legitimation. Religiousness is seen as the gateway between patriotism and moral uprightness. Thus, it was not only patriotism but also religious belief that led to Vadim's 'persecution' - the P.R.M. states - a religious belief which is a radical break from the pattern of everyday politics: 'The time has come for the current political class to get used to consistent, incorruptible people with a clean heart, fighters for truth and justice, who care for the People. I have proved throughout my life as a practicing Christian that I am such a person - inconvenient, that's true, which is why 50 political trials were fabricated by the Mob in the Justice system.'[88] Only such individuals can rescue the State that the P.R.M. worships: 'This country will either remain a foreign colony, mocked and robbed by adventurers with no scruples - or it will be controlled and saved by people who fear God, patriotic and incorruptible' .
As a reply to the emergence of the D.A. Alliance in 2003, Corneliu Vadim Tudor was faced with a serious competitor for the anti-corruption vote. He sought to enhance his own image by promoting himself once more as a religious individual without fault:
'We have proven that we don't fight corruption in general but the corrupt, excluding from the party those who broke the Law and got greedy: [names of former P.R.M. members follow]. (..) In 12 years of leading the P.R.M. I have educated myself and forged my character so that I represent a behavioral model for the members and sympathizers of our political organization. Today, I am the only party leader who has no bank account, in lei or in foreign currency, and this can be checked (..) Although I could have a considerable fortune, I refuse to be a rich man in a poor country. My riches are my children, the books I write, the Bible I study'[90].
Vadim took care to define himself as a special, selfless member of the political class he was attacking: 'I am the only parliamentarian in Romania and, probably, in Europe who donates his salary in full to the poor elderly, month after month, which shows my idealism and disinterest towards the advantages of this job'[91]. Vadim's discourse operates as follows: 'disinterest towards material earnings -> signals a faithful Christian -> a person with strong moral values -> a good leader for the country' or, depending on the subject topic: 'politician who is not wealthy -> not corrupt or corruptible -> a person with strong moral values -> a good leader for the country'.
Throughout its history, the P.R.M. has often blended leftist and right-wing themes for electoral benefit. The perfect case study for P.R.M. identity tactics is represented by the attention it paid to Valea Jiului miners throughout 1999 and 2000. P.R.M.'s media campaign started off with emotional appeals to social justice, some denoting differences between Vadim and the other politicians: 'I have known, since the earliest age, what hunger means, and I cannot assist passively to these nightmarish scenes'[92]. Devices borrowed from Marxist propaganda techniques include the utilization of vivid contrasts: 'While workers (..) look in despair as their children and old people fade away of hunger, of cold, lacking medicines, Emil Constantinescu parties in a revolting set of orgies with his lovers, in all sorts of villas, castles and palaces, both in Bucharest and at Scrovistea or Predeal, bathing them with champaign and practicing revolting sexual aberrations' , or symmetrical justice: 'as Emil Constatinescu placed Miron Cozma in prison, I will jail Emil Constantinescu the same way, in the same prison and same cell' .
The operalization comes to full force with identification
of the aims of those guilty for the situation: to reduce the country's
population in the form of a disguised genocide[96].
The actions of the working class are seen by Vadim as being by default,
guilt-free: 'It is inadmissible that the corrupt and Mafioso power of
3.3.2. P.N.G.: The
Becali's
underlying theme is a denunciation of the premises of democracy and capitalism
and replacing them with an irrational mix of right-wing values and left-wing
socioeconomic actions. As the uniter of the two main foci of Becali's discourse
- patriotism and faith - irrationality is seen as the gateway for national salvation. When
running in 2004 for mayor of
Becali
believes that his qualification for public office include psychological
aspects, such as a strong dislike of injustice. When asked about his faults,
Becali characterized himself as follows: '[I may seem] impossible, volcanic,
insulting (..), but I do that when I see injustice, because when I see
injustice I have a reaction in my heart, I cannot stand it" .
Another important trait that Becali promotes is his love for the Romanian
people, concretely characterized by acts of charity. According to Becali
himself, he is a popular figure because 'I love Romanians, I help them as much
as I can. God says love your neighbor, and I love my people. The people felt
that. I will sacrifice my life for
The two traits of Becali's political portrait - devout,
militant Christianity and a personal morality cult - are united in the current
P.N.G. slogan, 'Faith and honor' (Credinta si onoare)[108],
as well as in the addition of the syntagm 'Christian-Democratic' to the party
name. Also alluding to Becali's recent arrival in the political scene and to
his unorthodox methods of attracting attention, the P.N.G. website promotes
Becali under the headline: 'Becali: a new face for
A very
important component of Becali's doctrine is self-promotion, as hinted above.
Very aware of his public status, Becali proclaimed himself after Steaua qualified in the Champions
League 'the strongest man in
3.3.3 Noua Dreapta: Education and indoctrination
The official Noua Dreapta doctrine[115] is Horia Sima's "Doctrina Legionara", a fundamental component of pre-WW2 Legion ideology; the impact of this writing is evident as one considers that it can be perused at other neo-Legion websites , belong to organizations which are not affiliated to Noua Dreapta. Post-1989 additions or modifications to Sima's work are non-existent, yet in practice the N.D. is closely following some of the structural tenets of pre-WW2 legionarism, while adding contemporary issues to their political toolset as necessary. The following enumeration consists of a summation of Horia Sima's ideas (in italics) and steps that the N.D. has taken in that particular direction:
- the goal of the organization is to create 'a new man', fashioned according to Christian standards. This model, endowed with heroic qualities, will awaken the 'dulled energies' of the country and remove it from 'the state of suffering in which [it] finds itself.' The N.D. aims to attract 'young nationalists' who 'have wandered up to now with no use' and who 'have the force and the enthusiasm of a total militant engagement'[117]. In practice, membership is limited to those aged between 17 and 35, students and intellectuals being preferred for recruitment. The 'heroic qualities' and energy with which to refresh national identity necessitate a low level of social integration (i.e. individuals early in their career, who have not started a family). The Legion's intricate ideatic structure formulates the need for educated members, or members with the capacity to learn rapidly; its counter-culture structure requires enthusiasm; and its core themes create the need for members with strong nationalist impulses.
- the Legion function is educational, and then political. The N.D. is not a party. Attempts to incorporate it within other political movements (such as the P.N.G.) were met with severe condemnations and denials by the N.D. on its website. Noua Dreapta's leaders mention at point 3 that the central feature of the organization is 'fighting for the maintenance and promotion of Romanian national identity with the means specific to the civil society' and that therefore 'the transformation of the organization into a political organization or its inclusion with such an organization are excluded'. Such a stance had been made obvious by the N.D. in the 'Who We Are' section of its website: according to the presentation, the Noua Dreapta is not an electoral enterprise, but 'a center for permanent military formation'[119]. Its primary mission is to 'wake consciences and warn on dangers to the Romanian kind'. Actually the organization's non-political nature increases its propaganda potential ('we are not fighting for material advantages, but for an idea'): by distancing itself from the wealth and influence that presence in the political field could bring, the N.D. can persuade potential members and the public at large that its enterprises are sincerely motivated by the desire to improve the state of the nation.
- modernity is condemned as anti-spiritual, a state of 'conscience opacity', caused by the removal of God from the sphere of contemporary life. According to organization leader, Tudor Ionescu, Noua Dreapta is not an extremist force, but rather the opposite: 'a true voice of the silent majority'[120]. The N.D. combats through its actions and statements extreme attitudes and vices (among those mentioned: prostitution, homosexuality, proselytism, drug use, corruption, a high crime rate among 'a certain portion of the gipsy ethnicity). The values that the N.D. relies on (family, Church, Romanian traditions) are popular and legal, according to the N.D. leadership; this view is in tune with the anti-modernist stance of the pre-WW2 Legion, which was a value-driven reactionary movement.
- the nation is a
spiritual, and then a historical entity - its inception is divine. Few N.D.
leaders go as far as to state this publicly. The leader of the
3.4 Attitudes towards history
3.4.1. PRM: The Medieval-Communist Autarchy
The Romania Mare Party's identity is inexorably linked with
the last decade of the Ceausescu dictatorship, when national-communism became a
state policy and private enterprise was seen as a sign of capitalist decay. A
profound devotion to the pillars of the Communist state - the Army and the
Securitate - is still present in the party's public stances. The latter
(Romania's pre-1989 secret police) is considered by Vadim 'a patriotic
institution, by comparison with the current national disaster'[122].
In 1998, Vadim publicly announced that: 'We should end this informants'
hysteria, because nobody is interested anymore to find out who collaborated with
the Securitate' .
In 2006, Vadim Tudor took pride in proposing to former Securitate officers that
they join his party .
More importantly, in October 2000, the P.R.M. asked the Senate to approve a
motion which applauded former dictator Ceausescu as a 'patriot' and a 'good
diplomat', who had become 'one of the greatest statesmen of the world'.
According to the P.R.M. motion, he had been executed in 1989 in order to halt
him from 'consolidating
'Romania Mare' takes its cues from Ceausescu's propaganda
when defining its stance towards contentious periods from Romania's history. A
staunch anti-monarchist, Corneliu Vadim Tudor holds the opinion that King
Michael 'shamefully' arrested the 'great soldier' Antonescu[127].
In the first years after the revolution pro-monarchist TV shows and press
articles were being carefully monitored by the P.R.M., which remarked
negatively on 'foreign infiltrators' that were supposedly attempting to
re-establish monarchy in
Furthermore, for the P.R.M. there is an internal
consistency in the history of
3.4.2 P.N.G.: Successors of the Legion
Early in the party's existence, George Becali did not fear to
recognize his admiration for the pre-WW2 Legion. During an August 2005 TV show,
he states that 'the legionnaire movement was the most beautiful movement
in this country, with all of the country's elite, priests, university
professors and students!'[130]
'During the actual electoral campaign Becali utilized as a slogan a poetic
concept from the Hymn of the Mota-Marin Heroes, a legionnaire song. Addressing
Codreanu, the original song lyric demanded 'Captain, make a country like the
holy sun in the sky'; Becali's electoral vow undertook the form of a response: 'I
swear in front of God that I will make a
The utilization of the Legion mythology did not limit its effects to a purely discoursive level, but indeed led to practical consequences. Political analyst and scholar Dan Pavel renounced his collaboration with George Becali in December 2004, claiming that the PNG leader was about to promote 'Noua Dreapta' leaders in his own party. Becali admitted that an emissary had set up a meeting with Noua Dreapta leaders at which he participated. Dan Pavel explained the genesis of the collaboration ('Gigi had recognized when we started working together that members of his family had belonged to the Legion') and the extent to which it was about to take place ('people from Noua Dreapta were about to become the P.N.G.'s core')[132].
The negative publicity caused by the incident led Becali to moderate his statements concerning the Legion and to dismiss the slogan which had landed him in so much negative publicity. In effect, Becali's statements have been mostly convergent with the Legion ideals of the Codreanu era. The utilization of 'Michael the Brave' movie clips in his electoral campaign (as shown in chapter 3.3.3) points out that Becali is more likely however to incline towards a statist-dictatorial model of running the country, in many ways similar to the Legion's pre-WW2 aims.
3.4.3 Noua Dreapta: The Romanian Jesus
Through its imagery the N.D. seeks legitimization and irrational approval in a historical context. In accordance with the anthropological view that 'myths have symbolic power. They are constantly repeated, often re-enacted. Myths are, in other words, essentially propagated for their effect rather than their truth value'[133], the N.D. is built around the myth of the pre-war Legion's first leader, a man seen both as personally valuable but also historically and philosophically meaningful. Here is a typical presentation by N.D.'s leadership in a local newspaper: 'Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the martyr of the national revolution (.) Great visionary, catalyzing spirit and Christian hermit, with an immense energy and love for the Romanian Kind, fearless of death, correct and sober, the Captain Corneliu Zelea Codreanu was and is the idol of the Romanian people, the symbol of the Romanian struggle and martyrdom, the embodiment of the urge to fight and sacrifice for future generations of Romanians'.
The cult
has taken many forms: books sold in N.D.'s online shop, a special website, and
an yearly march to the supposed location of Codreanu's death. The latter is a
public occasion for the N.D. to don pre-WW2 garb (green shirts or flags bearing
Codreanu's face always interceded by
Beside the cult of the 'Captain' and a ethnocentric perception of its own history, the N.D. legitimates itself through its doctrinarian identity, presented as claiming a lineage with Eminescu, Nae Ionescu, Codreanu and other legionary figures (Mota and Marin, Cioran, Eliade and Noica). Putting a positive face on the movement's activities and its history is a lait-motif in the N.D.'s presentation of itself: the organization is 'proud of the past, but looking to the future'.
3.5. The political utilisation of religion
3.5.1. PRM: Savior Management
For a
party that has made Christian beliefs part of its very political identity, the
P.R.M. pays surprisingly little attention to Christian rhetoric in occasions
other than religious holidays
(Christmas, Easter) or New Year's Day. These Christian holidays provide ample
opportunity for assessing - in bleak colors - the state of the nation. The
appeal to God - as a restorative force that would lead to the rebirth of the
country - is always mediated by pointing out the value of the P.R.M., and the
regenerative potential that the party and its leader could bring to the
country: 'I beg good God to have pity on us and to take us up from the chasm. Chasm
which now seems deeper than ever. Because the garbage of all times has gathered
now, in this shameful transition from the Fanariot Age to the Mafia Age. But,
for God to receive our prayers, our souls must be clean and we must live in the
worship of His light. That's what I'm trying to do for years: to be with no
fault, after the model of our Teacher, Jesus Christ (.) My dear sisters and my
dear brothers,
Supposed messengers of God, divinely inspired in deed and thought, the P.R.M. and its leader are aiming to format themselves to devout Romanians as the shortcut to a morally clean, prosperous future. It is only in rare occasions, such as when commenting on the intellectual mass-media (i.e. the 'Romania Libera' newspaper) that Corneliu Vadim Tudor's religious language reaches extreme levels: 'These animals can do nothing to me because (..) I am protected by dear God, and their knife, in order to rip my heart, must first go through the Bible at my chest.' By contrast, opposing parties are usually seen as morally defective: 'you have no idea how [the population] will sanction when voting the state-party with no country or God'.
Stances in favor of religious beliefs, mirroring those of a Christian civil society, are usually interlinked with anti-Semitic or conspiracy theories: upon remarking on the broadcast of a documentary named 'The Real Jesus Christ' by Discovery Channel, Corneliu Vadim Tudor announces in a rather threatening manner: 'I am drawing the attention that through such attacks on Jesus Christ - obviously the work of Jewish movie producers - there is a risk of anti-Semitism growing throughout the world. I, personally, will not tolerate by any means the mocking of our Savior!'[141]
Another
typical use of quasi-Christian rhetoric is to attack public figures on basis of
their lifestyle choices (i.e.
Examples of homophobia, as stated in the previous chapter, are rare. More likely, what is occurring is that the P.R.M. occasionally chooses to frame its attack on a Christian framework even though the basis of the attack does not lie in religious convictions of one form or another.
3.5.2. P.N.G. - The Blessed Mouthpiece
Having proclaimed itself a Christian-Democratic party[143]
at its last congress, the PNG has launched a massive campaign that would
identify it as the only - or strongest - Christian party in
But what exactly are the coordinates of P.N.G.'s understanding of Christianity? What is the image of Christian Orthodoxy that the PNG is attempting to identify itself with? Becali's worldview is filtered by a personalized and ubiquous theology. The only danger to the party, he mused in 2006, was for 'the devil to stick its tail into it' . Far from being a metaphor or an exaggeration, this statement is part of Becali's comprehension of daily existence as a continuous communication with the divine realm. When insulted by Vadim Tudor, the P.N.G. leader dismissed his opponent's slander by claiming that 'the devil's spirit' was in his opponent . Although having labeled himself as 'an athlete of God' only as late as Easter 2006, Becali was from the get-go of his political career an individual who attached great importance to the interaction between faith, the public and the private. In 2004 he started the presidential campaign at the Orthodox Church's epicenter, Dealul Mitropoliei, trying to get a blessing from Patriarch Teoctist . What has changed in time is the degree to which he is willing to let his religious emotion to be publicly known.
Becali's medievalism is described by the degree to which he believes that ordinary events are disguised signs from God pointing the right path to take. During the 2004 elections he commented on a incident which had occurred during one of Vadim Tudor's press conferences: 'he wanted to take the Bible out of his pocket and it wouldn't come out - well he couldn't take it out: God's will was there: hey, you cannot come with the Bible, you - never!'
Becali's use of religion for political purposes is not reduced to words and statements. During the 2004 presidential race he mentioned donations of millions of dollars that he had made to the Church[149]. His statement having not sounded veridical for the population, Becali underwent a large philanthropic campaign that would identify him as the most charitable and God-fearing of all Romanian politicians.
3.5.3. Noua Dreapta - Intellectual Christianity
The Noua Dreapta has taken a very applied and practical view on how to (re)implement Christian beliefs in the life of Romanians. Several campaigns on moral issues have been organized by the N.D. In its attempt to halt the legalization of prostitution, the N.D. has benefited from the support of the Initiative Group for the Defense of the Family. This coalition includes - according to the anti-prostitution campaign website ' members of the Bioethics Commission of the Romanian Patriarchy, the Center for Applied Theological Studies, the Association of Orthodox Christian Students of Romania[150]. Other groups who have donated their support were the 'Pro-Vita for the born and unborn' Orthodox-Christian Association . Also drawing the N.D.'s attention was Alina Mungiu-Pippidi's play, 'The Evangelists', seen as 'an insult to Christian values' and a blasphemy' .
In late 2006, the N.D.'s media arm, altermedia.ro, launched a website aiming to promote scientific creationism[153]. A thesis dear to contemporary American conservatives, scientific creationism doubts the reality of evolution and maintains that divine creation of the universe can be made consistent with science. Future plans for the enterprise include: a media campaign, a set of conferences and public debates, as well as printing works popularizing the concept .
One of the main areas of the N.D. discourse, anti-homosexual propaganda, is undertaken from a respective which combined a conservative view of the Biblical message (homosexuality seen as offending God) and a biological outlook (homosexuality seen as unnatural).
On a wider
level the N.D. perceives 'the loss of God', i.e. increase in immoral behavior,
to the main cause of social ills in
3.6 Conclusion
Patriotism, religiousness and a moral rejuvenation of
society are the key elements in the development of a right-wing extremist
identity in
Patriotism is attachment to the nation - but how is that nation defined, and how can patriotism be demonstrated? Rather than limiting the discussion to the ethnic vs. civic nation dichotomy, one should also consider the social aspect as a relevant variable, due to the influence of communist ideology. If the ethnic nation is defined by belonging to a cultural and biological heritage, whereas the civic nation is a community of willing participants to national projects, the social nation is one built around a common lifestyle and cultural values in the economic field. The P.R.M. and the P.N.G. show the influence of communist ideology - their identity is built around the ethnic-social core of a state which provides for its citizens, and from which non-Romanian ethnicities or wealthy Romanians can be excluded. In contrast, the N.D. is a supporter of an ethnic-civic model, in which the community is morally bound by Christian laws and precepts and acting accordingly.
All three organizations show admiration for the
heavy-handed medieval leaders of Romanian provinces . Their resistance to
foreign influence, unchecked decision-making and 'love for the people' were
propagandistic mainstays of Communist and pre-Communist
Turning to the topic of religion, it must be mentioned that
Romanians are the most religious people in Europe - if one considers belief in
God, rather than praxis, to be the most valuable indicator in that respect.
According to a study realized in April 2006 by marketing research company GfK,
97% of Romanians believe in God. When the question turns to actual
participation in religious services, 18% of Romanians actually attend church
services on a regular basis, which would place them on an average spot in the
'religious praxis' standings in Europe[157].
This gap between practice and belief is one of the roots of
At a larger glance, it can be surmised that although religion and faith play an important part in the public discourse of the P.R.M., P.N.G. and N.D. there are significant differences in the frames of perception that they utilize. Restoring moral order through the instatement of a God-fearing figure is central to Vadim Tudor and G. Becali's political views; however, Becali is presenting himself as communicating directly with the divinity, while Vadim portrays the P.R.M. as individuals with a clean moral structure. The N.D., on the other hand, is attempting a strict (re)deployment of religious value codes in the Romanian society. Their educational efforts are aimed at specific groups and, with the exception of homosexuality, target small and elitist audiences. The continuous intellectualization of the N.D.'s religious message shows that the focus of their strategy has moved away from causes which are popular in Romania (like homophobia) and which gather large public support to relatively obscure points of Christian beliefs in the public arena (like scientific creationism).
For the P.R.M. religious references are one of the many components that 'guarantee' that its leadership is composed of just and fair individuals. For the N.D. and the P.N.G., behavior in accordance to religious norms is the foundation for a better and improved Romania - a situation which is understandable given the P.R.M.'s heavy use of the 'statist mindset' in its public discourse, an ideological component which by its nature tends to overweigh other considerations.
4. The enemies of the right: 'Us versus them'
4.1 Introduction: Nationalism and Myth
Transition from communism to a capitalist democracy, doubled by the perspective of E.U. integration, has created massive social, cultural and economic turmoil. This situation was clearly reflected in the actions of extremist political actors who sought to exploit discontent, intolerance and anomie for their own gains. Manufacturing 'enemies', assigning malevolent deeds to them or simply blaming them for anything which malfunctions in Romania have been the components of an effective toolset for the improvement of extremism's visibility, power of persuasion and appeal: as often noted in political science, uniting otherwise unconnected groups cannot be done more efficiently than by creating a fictional body of 'outsiders' against whom action is needed .
Nationalism is one of the keys for understanding the mindset of contemporary extremists in modern-day Romania, in the terms first utilized by Isaiah Berlin: 'the persuasion that primarily human beings belong to a particular group and that the group's lifestyle is different from that of other groups; that the individuals who compose the group have a priori characters that cannot be understood by those outside the group, being defined in the terms of a territory, customs, laws, memories, faiths, artistic language and religious expression, social institutions, common lifestyle, to which some add heredity, kinship, racial characteristics; and that these factors model human beings, their goals and values'[162]. Nationalism can thus be understood in terms of layers of ethnicity, defined fundamentally in a negative fashion (ex. not-Jewish, not-Hungarian, not-Rroma). If one takes as a given historical fact that `national-communism was the common - rather than the exceptional - approach that Communist parties took throughout Eastern Europe` it is clear that exacerbated nationalism is part of the political culture of post-communist Romania; indeed, it is perfectly relevant that a portion of the political class and of the electorate would feel obligated to hail nationalism as their ideal or value set.
However, ascribing the discourse of Romanian extremists exclusively to nationalistic impulses would miss a large part of their priorities, appeal and goals. The representations of reality are built on a nationalistic core, yet they take a separate, elaborated form that cannot be understand exclusively by the common or conventional tools of political analysis. What is needed is an instrument that could define the exaggerations and the irrational deviations in a comprehensive fashion, accounting for social, psychological and cultural challenges brought on by the downfall of communism and E.U. integration. The use of myths as discourse components is quintessential to the Romanian right.
In `Myth', Mythology and 'Myth-demeanors': The Role of Emotions
in Risk and Resilience`, Dr. Kaye Haw from the
Secondly, `myth has the power not only to offer relatively facile explanations for perceived victimhood and failure but also to mobilize, energize, and even instigate large groups into action`[167]. Inherently, 'the function of the myth is to create a state of mind' which can exploited by electoral means or by voluntarism. Vladimir Tismaneanu touched upon the issue when he considered that the main function of post-communist mythologies is to 'unite the public discourse, offering to the citizen an easily recognizable identity as part of a vaguely defined ethnical community' . It is however arguable whether ethnicity alone is at the core of extremism-inspired identity modeling. Emphasis on social behavior that is at variance with religious rules (homosexuality) or the voicing of mistrust in the political establishment (anti-democracy) suggest that the imaginary community mentioned by Tismaneanu is complex in that it contains social, cultural and political elements which, while layered onto the ethnic identity, enrich it to a considerable degree.
4.2. Redesigning reality via myth: the conspiracy theory
4.2.1 Introduction
According to British anthropologists such as Kaye Haw , myths also function as a causal framework by providing inferential and 'illusionary' links between different behaviors. In the case of conspiracy theories is used to provide simplistic causal accounts of complex interactions using narratives based on fantasy and creating normative analyses. Myths simplify and appeal exactly because of their simplifying function, which leads the participant in the mythologisation process to trust them as 'self-evident' .
Conspiracy theories alleviate responsibility for the
unpleasant or defective mechanisms within Romanian politics, economy, etc. and
preserve the sanctity of
4.2.2. P.R.M.: The 'Mafia'
A discussion of conspiracy theories as expressed by three organizations under study helps define both the 'we' with which these groups operate as well as the nature of the threats against which they seek to mobilize society. Operating rather freely with concepts of good and evil, taken to their extreme in assessments, these organizations demonstrate their taste for extremism in their exaggerations. The P.R.M. mythologizes according to simple binomic coordinates, freely recognized as such in party propaganda and which (a few words changed) would be assumed by Becali and the Noua Dreapta:
'In Romania there are two tendencies: those who aim to dismember the country and turn it bankrupt, and their opponents, those who, just like us, want to foreshadow, by any means, the destruction of this country. This division is not new, it has been known [to exist] in our History for hundreds of years'[173].
Specifically,
there are several strains of 'evil' in the geography of conspiracy that the
P.R.M. utilizes. On a primary level, forces located outside the country or in
the case of the U.D.M.R. acting at the order of foreign centers of power aim to
destroy
On a
secondary level, the 'conspirators' utilize Rroma (gypsies), Hungarian ethnics
of Romanian citizenship and Jews. In Vadim Tudor's intricate hierarchy of hate,
the former are more likely to be simply immoral by nature, at most low-level
servants of higher structures. Hungarian Romanians and Jews are, by some traits
never explained in full, more likely to be aware of the role they are playing
in the supposed pillaging of
A special category is represented by P.R.M. members who have left the party, almost always coming up with damaging revelations about the party life and depicting a strongly negative image of its leader, Corneliu Vadim Tudor. The list is too long to be elaborated on, yet it is worth stating that P.R.M.'s visible leaders in late 2006 and early 2007 are fewer in numbers than those who have left the organization. A typical example is that of Radu Theodoru, one of the P.R.M.'s earliest leader, who left in November 1992, accusing Vadim of 'verbal violence (..) exaggerations, denigrations, disloyal ad hominem attacks' that have hurt the party image in the country and abroad[175] and led to a personal dictatorship and a personality cult . Predictably, Vadim portrays such defectors as 'interested in their career alone' , 'mediocre (.) paid by the Social Democratic Party (.) attempting in vain to derail the P.R.M. from its national justice orbit' ; their statements concerning Vadim's attitude and personality are 'sub-human products, pestilential dejections which show the damage rabies can cause' .
By exacerbating the 'enemy', the PRM is augmenting the danger to create the need for drastic, heavy-handed action from an authoritarian figure/force: the Mafia had supposedly turned the country into 'a concentration camp'[180]. Yet, for electoral reasons, the P.R.M. focuses mainly on the middle level of the structure - high-ranking officials. Real cases of corruption as well as a high perception of corruption as afflicting the core of governmental decisions have detrimental effects on democracy since, as noticed by Romanian political scientists, high-level corruption 'makes corrupt dignitaries dependant on extremist movements for whom blackmail is a preferred weapon and affects the confidence of the population in the principles of democracy'
The most powerful diatribes were reserved for the
presidency of Emil Constantinescu (1996-2000), possibly the strongest assaulter
on the P.R.M.'s sensibilities: a centre-right intellectual, culturally
occidental, opposed to Communist values and a supporter of painful economic
reforms which would diminish the power of the state and prepare
The state was, in the P.R.M.'s perception, physically and
economically harmed by Constantinescu-sponsored initiatives - it lost property,
and it lost the symbolic value attached to that property (i.e. provision of
jobs, hegemonic position within the economy, etc.). Given the good perception
that the P.R.M. is having of communist-era economy, the sums were inferior to
the real value of what was sold; in addition the traditional trappings of the
communist era state - the national-communist history cult, the forces of
repression and the collaboration with an obedient church - were also being
removed. Since the P.R.M. the communist state is the only available model, such
changes inevitably lead to the downfall of
As seen above, charges of corruption were central to the P.R.M.'s conspiracy theory. The attacks on Constantinescu relentlessly took the form of unproven accusations at the address of the president, his son and counselors. Some of the changes included sums of money received in exchange for illegal privatization of the cement giant ROMCIM, illegal cigarettes trade, sale of planes and ships, trafficking international adoptions, fraudulent transfers of money abroad, prompting the statement: 'the current power in Romania is associated with mob-like structures!'
In the P.R.M.'s mythology, its own role as a whistleblower warranted special attention from the forces of the government: '[The secret services] have begun an incredible hunt against opposition leaders whose phones, houses and bureaus are tapped 24-7, who are pursued and for whom compromising files are made up. This doesn't look like a democracy, but like a Gestapo!'[189]; between the first and the second round of the 2000 presidential elections, Vadim Tudor complained he 'was being hunted like a war criminal by the servants of the New World Order' . As trials on Corneliu Vadim Tudor on libel charges began to mount in number, the conspiracy theory undertook a twist: the P.R.M. leader was being 'hunted' by a corrupt justice system for having had the courage to present the truth: 'The forces currently in power fear me more than a popular revolt (.) It is only in Romania, who you've run and besmirched that the Opposition is always shown the handcuffs'; addressing Constantinescu directly, Vadim was asking rhetorically: 'Haven't you already understood that I don't fear the lawsuit, I don't fear being followed together with my family and my closest collaborators by the repression mechanism you have created?'
Dehumanization of Constantinescu's regime (in an editorial Vadim Tudor labeled him a 'monster') and its members was utilized simultaneously with the augmentation of the forces aiming to secure his downfall, and implicitly, save Romania: 'For all the wrongdoings they committed, Emil Constantinescu and his gang of ill-doers have but one chance to escape the population's wrath: to commit group suicide, like Hitler and his acolytes in the bunker! Otherwise, a devastating Popular Revolution might take place, one that the lies of European commissars cannot stop. Romanians have all the rights to rise to fight for their survival and the survival of their children'[192].
Similar charges were leveled at the P.S.D. right before the 2000 elections, based upon conveniently forgetting that the last time the Social Democrats had governed P.R.M. had been a member of their alliance. The most important two counter-performances of the Iliescu regime were 'ruining the national economy (.) turning the country into a foreign colony' and 'robbing the National Patrimony mercilessly and devaluing the banks for the use of the political clientele'[193]. More concretely, the traits of the P.S.D. most criticized by the P.R.M. included the massive privatization program undergone between 2001 and 2004; charges ranged from subservience to the Mafia who had supposedly corrupted Constantinescu's reign in power ('mob-like businesses' and 'collecting dirty money' ) to leftist diatribes of social connotation ('aberrant expressions of savage capitalism' ).
The P.S.D. was also represented as a media uber-tycoon, controlling and influencing the Romanian media market with the goal to mislead the population (implicitly restricting Vadim Tudor's access to the population). Two often-quoted examples that the P.R.M. used for demonstrating such a situation were:
- the uncertain situation of the MediaPro trust, whose debts to the budget were prolonged, cited as proof that the Romanian media was not to be trusted[196];
- the temporary closing of OTV, one of
According to P.R.M.'s mythological account of political life in Romania, opinion polls which show the P.R.M. as weakening its position are hand-made by forces inimical to the party and, implicitly, to the destiny of Romania. They are considered part of the same manipulation effort as electoral frauds: 'I am supposedly the last politician [in the popularity standings] even though I have never eroded as being part of any government, I have never made a major error and have never been involved in corruption (.) It is obvious the field is prepared for a great electoral fraud, though which the P.R.M. wouldn't enter Parliament'[199].
On occasion, deeper and harsher conspiracy theories were linked to Vadim's supposed success in political life. State authorities are presumed to have set up plans to eliminate him from the presidential elections, if necessary by murder[200]; the Penal Code, the Constitution and a myriad of others laws are perceived to have been modified strictly in order to bar Vadim from getting to power . A specific case consisted of the 2004 elections, the party's official newspaper publishing details of a conspiracy theory surrounding the elections, the main features of which were the introduction of false data in Central Electoral Bureau computers and electric gridline failures in areas covered by TV cable operators who do not limit the broadcast of networks hostile to the government party . Just like four years before , Vadim Tudor contested the results of the elections, his speeches being focused around a fraud that had halted his success .
The post-2004 election attacks on president Basescu marked a move away from conspiracy theories. Personal insults ('dangerous madman, who has to be totally isolated'[206]), comments on public appearances ('unworthy and profoundly sick individual who, through his deviant behavior, alcoholism, and the way he shows up and expresses himself, has become shameful for Romania' ) and allusions to a supposed criminal background ('the ex-smuggler sailor who sold chewing gum on the streets of Constanta and Securitate informer who destroyed the lives of innocent people' ) took front stage. Including Basescu in the mafia whose aim is to destroy Romania is an undertaking rarely present in the pages of P.R.M.'s newspapers ('through a large electoral fraud and with the aid of irresponsible foreign forces, at the top of the Romanian State the lowest kind of mobster was installed, the one who has robbed the Fleet of Romania, a paranoid with Bokassa-like behavior' ).
In brief, the elaborate nature of the conspiracy theory can be seen as necessary for one or both of the following reasons:
- the pre-1989 propaganda, which enforced the idea of a
rich, self-sustaining
- the need for public visibility: by expanding on the effects of the dissolution of the providential state, the P.R.M. hopes to capture the attention of dissatisfied individuals, the social losers of the transition game.
4.2.3 P.N.G.: The 'Communists'
The conspiracy theory of the PNG is personalized, concrete and of relatively small relevance to the party's discourse, especially by comparison with the other extremist forces present in this study. 'The communists' are Becali's indefinite enemy - they are supposed to have halted the advancement of the country by controlling the power nodes of the Romania's economy and politics: 'I don't want the death of the sinner, I want to turn him around, of course there will be some people who will never be forgiven - I told you who: those who have pillaged the Romanian banks and banking system, because this is why the country is running badly, and those ministers of transports, industry and telecommunications (..) these three cannot get away, these were the strengths of the country's economy' . All who oppose Becali's interests, all who intend to slow down reform or achieve material benefits from it are labeled as 'communists', a catch-all phrase which indicates little about the political or economic beliefs of the targets . Becali is offering a newly-tuned version of the communists vs. anticommunists debate of the early 1990s. Just like on the previous occasion, the debate is false and its purpose is psychological: Becali offers Romanians the perspective to redefine themselves and their role in relation to both transition and the pre-transition era in opposition to 'communists', a term which denotes power and privilege. Conveniently forgetting that communism existed not just through the Party elites, but also through the collaboration of society, he is whitewashing societal blame, labeling himself and his public as 'non-communists' - intrinsically heroic, well-meaning and correct.
In tune with Becali's larger platform, he presents himself as a post-communist figure, released from the bureaucratic, backwards-looking philosophy of those in power. 'Securisti' (technically - employees of the former Securitate) is Becali's second favorite target for attack. 'They' are either involved in unsavory economical maneuvers which border criminality, or in political ventures which, in Becali's view, seek to manipulate the population (such as the break-up of a dissident faction from the National Liberal Party in the autumn of 2006 ).
It should be remarked that Becali does not insist much in his public discourse on enemies, and even less so on conspiracy theories - promoting himself and his achievements is his main goal. Rather, the conspiracy theory is used creatively, through mechanisms such as:
- self-augmentation ('I am currently the most hunted person
in
- attacking temporary political enemies, such as Dan Voiculescu's media chain, which supposedly aims 'to destroy true Romanians, pure Romanians (.) who want to fight for this country'[214];
- explaining the P.N.G.'s reduced appeal ('you have a television channel, a press trust and I have nothing (..) have you ever showed on Antena 1 anything on me, my opinions? You have given all your time to my enemies? (..) [unlike you] I don't have a television station, I have nothing')[215];
- mythologization of the identity of the P.N.G. leader, with an emphasis on the historical context of his family's rise: 'the name of Becali is a name built on blood, sweat and tears'[216].
4.2.4 Noua Dreapta: The '
Noua
Dreapta's conspiracy theory is of foreign influence, resembling to a great
degree the themes of New Right movements across Europe and in the
The N.D. is adept at utilizing multiple avenues of expression for its 'conspiracy theory' message, such as 'Brigada de Asalt' (The Assault Brigade), Noua Dreapta's musical extension, a rock band with nationalistic and neo-Legionnaire lyrics. In the eponymous song, 'Brigada de Asalt' promotes itself as the solution for those opposing the system and its conspiracy to quiet nationalism: 'for those who have had enough', 'for those who fight ceaselessly' 'for those who are not afraid(..) to say we are Romanians', 'for those who still have something to say', 'for those who cannot be tamed' . In brief, the N.D. is calling for the aid of those who do not want communism or globalization (equated, or perhaps reference points: past and future) in classical political counterculture terms, such as a hinted-at hegemony of external forces
In 'Tricolorul Romanesc'[221] (the 'Romanian Tricolore') the band introduces a narrative of transition in conspiracy-theory terms. Starting off with a formula traditionally used in fairy tales ('There was once upon a time a country like in fairy tales/ Beautiful and rich like no other'), the song quickly evolves into a condemnation of the politico-economical climate in contemporary Romania along P.R.M.-like terms ('Yet the people there were unemployed and suffering/ Because all the wealth the mafia stole'). Rather than focusing on the 'mafia' which hurts the population, the narrative expands on attacking the European Union and Western European financial interests, details of which are being provided in chapter 3.3.2.
The N.D.
itself focus on the more day-to-day influences of globalization. 'Valentine's
Day' is for the N.D. a symbol of globalization ('foreign and artificial',
'encouraging kitsch, conformity and superficiality'), a 'cultural import' that
endangers 'authentic Romanian traditions' . The common frame throughout the actions of the N.D. and
its affiliates is resistance to interactions with political or cultural models
of Western origin. The European Union or the culture of the
4.2.5. The conspiracy theory - conclusion
Publicly revealing a conspiracy mobilizes the ones against whom the conspiracy was to be perpetuated, re-educates them as to the moral worth of the revealed conspirators and creates the need for a 'savior' or a salvation mechanism that could halt the conspiracy from succeeding. Larger the conspiracy (high levels of government and international institutions) stronger the need for a mighty vigilante mechanism that could punish those responsible and act as a watchful guard.
Given
4.3 Europhobia
4.3.1 Introduction
Due to historical circumstances, the Romanian political spectrum does not possess a strongly visible euro-skeptic movement. Integration within the European Union is seen by the vast majority of the population as being necessary for the improvement of the country's living standards. Until the early 2000s, rejecting this view implied an anti-occidental point of view and, for some, geopolitical orientation towards other hegemonic forces on the world stage.
Of course, the integration period will create the need for a euro-skeptic organization which could mobilize the energy of the dissatisfied and displaced. Organizational linkage with the senior members of the European Parliament makes it unlikely for mainstream parties to object in strong terms to the influence of the European Union. It is extremist organizations - masters of populist nationalism, as seen in chapter 3 - who will be at the forefront of the euro-skeptic movement, especially when one considers that the areas of society most affected by the integration process will be the rural and uneducated urban demographic areas.
Of course, before such a message can be widely broadcasted and distributed, the political force involved needs to prepare the potential public for its role as a carrier of euro-skeptic messages. The role of this chapter is to present traces of Europhobia in the discourse of the Greater Romania Party, the New Generation Party and the New Right.
4.3.2 P.R.M. A pragmatic evolution
The P.R.M.'s doctrine towards international matters has evolved throughout the years. For much of the early 1990s, foreign influence of any kind was resented. Two in particular were the fields of focus for P.R.M.'s nationalistic wrath:
- the economy ('Far from helping us recover, external loans feudalize us and make us dependent of multinational organisms, whose goals are very clear'[223]) and
- conspiracy theories hatched abroad and aimed at making Romania suffer (alluding to the ethnic wars in Yugoslavia, Vadim Tudor was stating in 1992: 'Today it is no longer a secret that in certain circles of world politics a shameful plot has been planned against Romania since 1989'[224]).
The P.R.M. condemned the NATO bombings of
- as providing security from a geopolitically unpredictable
- to reduce the handicap of
The European Union occupies a decidedly more mixed place in PRM rhetoric. Sometimes they are presented as decisive factors in influencing Romanian politics, halting for instance president Basescu from promoting before-term elections due to an alarming rise of the P.R.M. in opinion polls . On other occasions they are considered impartial democrats, undeceived by the political and economical machinations of the ruling parties: 'It is of course the European Commission who is right and not the team of adventurers who lead Romania, impostors who cannot fight corruption for the simple reason they are among the most corrupt. The Romania Mare Party considers that, unless the mafia-type political regime is changed via elections before-term, the Country Report from the spring of 2006 will be a catastrophe and Romania will leave the orbit of the E.U. enlargement process completely' .
On occasion, integration provides the opportunity for
pointing out the deficits and handicaps of
Anti-integration discourse is rare but significant,
probably preparing a swift post-2007 passage to euro-skepticism and to a
revised form of the diatribes of the early 1990s: [once we integrate, we would
like]'foreigners who come here to treat us as hosts, not as slaves on a
plantation'[231].
More general conspiracy theories based on foreign infiltration are live and
well after 2000 as well: they are blamed for the conflicts within the
Gymnastics Federation ,
for the floods in the spring and summer of 2005 :
after stating the progress made by the United States, China, Russia and Israel
in developing atmosphere-altering military capabilities, party leader Funar
declares: 'In 2005 a metheorological war experiment was
realized in our country. The water in the Black Sea was recicled so that the
catastrophic floods in
Often accused of displaying extremist viewpoints that would
harm Romania's chances of accession into the E.U., the P.R.M. holds a negative
perception of the European Union for that very reason: 'Absolutely all the
regimes that came to power after December 22nd, 1989 practiced the
most sinister form of population torture: blackmail by mentioning the people
abroad! Nobody can open their mouths and show dissent - they are immediately
accused of spoiling
Since January 2007, the P.R.M. is the member of new European Parliament political group, which reunites extremist right-wing parties from across the E.U.[236]
4.3.3. P.N.G.: The impossibilities of euro-skepticism
The P.N.G. leadership's statements on foreign policy are few and far between. In the summer of 2006, when prime-minister Tariceanu proposed to withdraw Romanian troops from Iraq, Becali accused him of populism: 'If we respect an engagement, then let's be mindful and take it to the very end'[237]. This view is relevant in the context of Becali's value system (i.e. promoting himself as a serious character with a strong morality) than with the matter at hand.
Revealing is also the fact that, in an interview with the
Hunedoara Gazette (a regional Romanian newspaper) Becali declared in his
quality as a presidential candidate: 'My
nationalism does not lead to extremes. I don't know too much about foreign
affairs, I am not very educated or extraordinarily well-read. What I care about
is
It is significant to mention that Becali faces significant
obstacles in proclaiming himself a euro-skeptic. Due to Steaua's reputation in
4.3.4 Noua Dreapta - The Catastrophic Integration
Since 2005 the N.D. has become the premier euro-skeptical force in Romanian society. Perceiving that 'after 2007 Romania will be swallowed and incorporated in a gigantic suprastate structure, a politico-economical suprastructure which has defined its objectives and means to get to them'[239], the N.D.'s media arm, the Altermedia Association has started a massive media undertaking labeled 'Proiectul Eurosceptic' (The Euroskeptic Project). Defining itself as a means of providing information on the E.U., the Project has as a basis the notion that 'Romanians have a superficial and most often distorted image about what the European Union is and what Romania's entrance into the E.U. presupposes. Many have the feeling that, after admission, their life will automatically change for the better - when things really aren't like that' . Politicians are blamed for having presented the situation in rosy colors; the Project is introduced as the first opportunity for a real debate on the costs and disadvantages of integration. The mission of the Project is to be a 'true center of alternative resources in fields such as: E.U. laws and bureaucracy, the unique currency, multiculturalism and identity, Romania and the E.U.' .
The N.D.'s main argument
against Romania's integration into the E.U. is that the Union is a
'confederation of states with its own government and administrative apparatus,
and promoting its own agenda with doesn't always coincide with the interests of
its component states'. Consequently, the N.D. is skeptical towards both E.U.'s
objectives and future. A more detailed argument was
presented by the Iasi branch of the N.D. in May 2006, in a flyer whose main
graphical feature was the European Union flag
with a hammer and sickle in the center, or in N.D.'s winter of 2006/07
campaign, 'From the 1st of January you will remain country-less'
(the last words surrounded by stars in an imitation of the E.U. flag). After
mentioning that fact that
- 'Every state which adheres to the E.U. gives up a part of its independence and sovereignty.' In particular: 'E.U. laws will have priority over Romanian laws'. Romania will de facto be annexed, 'because [Western countries] need an educated work force, natural resources and markets for their goods[245]'. Thus, 'Romania will lose a significant part of its independence and sovereignty, conquered and defended with great sacrifices by our ancestors' ;
- 'The country will be invaded by immigrants from Asia and Africa (.) they will be our work colleagues and our neighbors, their children will be classmates with ours, and we will be forced to respect their traditions and customs, pull down our Christian icons and stop decorating the Christmas tree in public, so that they don't feel offended'. Additionally, 'a new political ideology will be imposed, multiculturalism (the dictatorship of minorities) through which national values will be considered generators of hatred and destroyed. Romanian history will be rewritten, so that Romanian get incriminated for crimes they supposedly have committed across the centuries and for which we will pay reparations and compensations';
- 'Under the pretext of the fight against terrorism, the press, radio, television and even the Internet will be censored, telephone calls and correspondence monitored (.) and all contrary opinions forbidden. Those who speak freely will be intimidated, thrown out of work, have their houses searched and will be called to the police station and courts, just like the Securitate did with anti-communist dissidents'.
- As a concrete consequence, 'the majority of the norms we will have to respect will be dictated to us from outside' - for instance 'in the field of agriculture, integration presupposes impossibly high standards for Romanian peasants'[246].
- The European Commission is under attack as 'an unrepresentative organism, which de facto answers to nobody'[247] .
- Working abroad will not be possible for Romanians authomatically, with several exceptions.
- Prices and unemployment rates went up after admission in the ten states which entered the Union in 2004. Without quoting a source or explaining the underlying causes, the flier states that the unemployment rate in Romania will rise to 16% after integration.
- The E.U. is 'an atheist structure whose principles contradict the Christian faith'. Arguments brought in favor of this idea include the elimination of Christianity from the text of the E.U. constitution as well as the rejection of Rocco Buttiglione's candidacy for a comissar position due to his religious beliefs
The campaign poster ends with the statement: 'It is not for this <<integration>> that youths died in December 1989'
In 'Tricolorul Romanesc' (a 'Brigada de Asalt' song) the
European Union is represented by 'the greedy bankers' who provide a 'solution'
for
The focus
of the song lies not on opposing the Romanian 'mob' (i.e. the political class and
its associated businessmen) to the European Union, but rather on eliciting a
negative response to the integration campaign. The chorus opposes the 'Nation'
(capital letters in original) to the 'Union': 'The Nation is ancient, the
4.3.5 Europhobia - conclusion
The
standard methodological division of internal vs. external enemies is not
functional in the case of pre-2007 Romanian extremism. The P.R.M. and the
P.N.G. are unprepared for the E.U. accession process; while they are very
likely to capture the euro-skeptical vote after 2007, they have done little to
prepare their potential constituencies for such a stance. The N.D., on the
other hand, finds its potential public - educated individuals and college
students - at odds with its vision of a malevolent E.U. engulfing the Romanian
state and psyche. These are the reasons for which one cannot speak of
euro-skepticism, but rather euro-phobia: an altered form of the conspiracy
theory which places foreigners at the top of schemes aiming to hurt, destroy or
lessen
4.4. The Stranger: the anatomy of abjection
4.4.1. Introduction
According to the view of Georg Simmel, the stranger is not an absolute other, but rather a reference point due to the similarities and distances between him and us[251]. He is a puzzling element because of the normative order which he represents and which is alien to the local or individual social environment - the 'over here'. By unsettling the ontological security, the stranger is a vibrant vector of anxiety - right-populism viewing the stranger as a threat . By transforming diffuse and multiple forms of often scarcely definable anxiety into the fear of the stranger, right-populist discourse accomplishes two things simultaneously: first, it transforms the social stranger from a debating partner or an economic competitor into the political 'enemy"; secondly, it is able simultaneously to define the identity of the 'people.'
The enemy, as Carl Schmitt wrote in his influential book 'The Concept of the Political', is he who represents a danger to a collectivity's "whole way of life".[255] According to Schmitt the opposition between "stranger/enemy" and "us" is similar to the aesthetic opposition between "the beautiful and the ugly," the moral opposition
between "the good and the evil," and the religious opposition of "the sacred and the profane." The mechanism through which the social stranger becomes transformed into the political enemy, thus suggesting the list of oppositions mentioned above is what Kristeva calls "abjection."[256] A term borrowed from psychoanalysis, abjection in the sense of political mythology is the re-establishment of borders that have somehow been threatened by the appearance of that which should have remained hidden away but now has come out into the open. Such a re-establishment of borders comes about by way of an act of repulsion and exclusion. According to Gandesha, contemporary right-populism can be understood in terms of an abjection, an expulsion, of the stranger precisely because of
the stranger's inherent ambiguity. Thus, 'it is not lack of cleanliness or health that causes
abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order, what does not respect borders,
positions, rules, the in-between, the ambiguous, the composite'[257]. Lack of communication and desire thereof is the engine at the hard of populist abjection.
4.4.2 P.N.G. and Noua Dreapta: Homophobia
The PNG and the N.D. have a predilection for targeting the homosexual community as 'strangers'. Visible only through GayFest parades (in 2005 and 2006), the community has led to verbal condemnation from Becali and to acts of violence from the N.D. The two actually joined forces in May 2006, sending a letter to the Government in which asked a ban on the 2006 GayFest parade . However, this identification of the stranger takes place within the strict boundaries of the abjection mechanism. Homophobia is a relatively small component of Becali's public discourse; the N.D. has yet to commit acts of violence targeted at individual homosexuals or locations such as restaurants or clubs with a predominantly or exclusively homosexual clientele. The N.D. discourse includes labeling homosexuality as a component of 'the culture of death', together with abortion; chastising homosexual behavior as against nature, and a threat to the family . Yet, other than attempting to lobby against the decriminalization of homosexuality in 2000, the organization has focused on raising signatures for a law that would forbid public gay pride-type demonstrations and 'the propaganda of the homosexuals' . The stranger is not threatening or even worthy of consideration - except on a theoretical level - unless he or she exits the private space and enters the public arena: the leader of the Noua Dreapta Arges branch 'considers N.D. members and sympathizers as not homophobic, but doesn't accept public homosexual showing because they harm the education of children: Think of parents walking their children through Trivale Park and meeting a gay couple not embarrassed to kiss. How would that child react, but especially what would he understand upon seeing such a thing?'
Homophobia is motivated by a peculiar mix of scientism and
religiousness: 'Dan Badea [the leader of Noua Dreapta branch in the
Becali's discourse is equally guarded on practical
propositions and equally bold on theoretical statements ('If they were 2 for
every thousand, 20 for every thousand, it would be a problem for the Romanian
nation'[264]).
The P.N.G. leader seems wary of stating his position in terms of definite
condemnation of the homosexual community, although he did allude to the social
dimension as defined by Daniel Barbu: 'let them do as they want in their
houses, but not on the street. They are abusing their rights. That's
proselytism' .
In a 2004 electoral debate, when asked to define his homophobia, Becali
circumvented the issue by a parody of the 'don't ask, don't tell' policy of the
4.4.3. P.R.M.: Hungarophobia
By
contrast the discourse of the P.R.M. rarely if ever touches on the homosexual
community. While homophobia is present, the 'stranger' is codified according to
different coordinates: those of the perceived contestants of the ethnic,
omnipotent and centralized state that the P.R.M. cherishes. The viewpoint of
the P.R.M. towards ethnic Hungarians is relatively simple: most of them, and
practically all the leaders of their political party, the U.D.M.R., are
plotting for a return of Transylvania to
Anti-Hungarian rhetoric has been a fundamental component of
the early P.R.M. In October 1991, with no ethnic conflict in the near past or
foreseeable in the near future, the readers of 'Romania Mare' were inflamed
with statements such as: 'Romanian brothers, please wait quietly, weapon at the
ready, and see how events develop. We have the hope everything will be solved
peacefully and legally. Otherwise, get ready! Romanians have been to
The anti-Hungarian offensive of the P.R.M. takes cultural forms, inspired by the need to prove the inferiority of Hungarians to Romanians via historical and cultural criteria: 'Speaking of the descendants of those barbarians, I don't think we are insulting the Hungarian nation, quite the opposite, we're circulating authentic historical texts, which show that at their origins they were primitive, which Romanians never were' .
The P.R.M.
was never at the forefront of anti-Hungarian rhetoric in Romanian politics.
Occasional inflammatory statements from the P.D.S.R., and in particular the
rhetoric of the Transylvania-based P.U.N.R. stole the spotlight from P.R.M.'s
xenophobic discourse. When the P.U.N.R.'s leader, Gheorghe Funar, joined the
P.R.M. in 1999, he brought along with him the votes of Transylvanians. But the
P.R.M.'s rhetoric was already focused on the 'Mafia' ruling the country;
insults and unproved allegations towards the Hungarian minority in
Any concession made to the Hungarian minority by the government, any initiative that includes among its promoters or beneficiaries the said minority is classified as an act of treason to national interests. Practical examples include:
- The C.D.R. government allowing primary and elementary school courses to be taught in Hungarian in regions with a majority Hungarian population, seen as an action that would destabilize the Romanian schooling system, seen as one of 'the three pillars of society'[270];
- Tolerating the existence of the U.D.M.R., despite it being 'illegal and separatist'[271];
- 'Losing control' of Covasna and Harghita counties[272] - a general, unclear statement for which no evidence is given;
- Providing rights for minorities in the Law of Local Public Administration, seen as a 'act of betrayal[273]', which was aiding the 'chauvinistic and anti-European' UDMR .
By comparison, the P.N.G. and the N.D. regard the Hungarian minority as a threat to the stability of the Romanian state, but given the quasi-religious orientation of their doctrine do not make xenophobia their main point of focus. Becali's only foray into anti-Hungarian emotion came into the context of football, as a referee of a Hungarian ethnicity was considered by the Steaua owner to have disadvantaged his team in an important league match. Alluding to the fact that the owner of one of Steaua's counter candidates to the title (CFR Cluj) was an ethnic Hungarian, Becali declared publicly: 'When we played Dinamo a Hungarian stole [the game] from me. I'm telling you he did it so that C.F.R. Cluj would win the championship. To have Hungarians win in our country, to make us a laughing stock'[275] or 'a Hungarian team to steal a purely Romanian one with the aid of referees would be the last cowardice and lack of human dignity a referee could show' (Becali conveniently forgot that Hungarian Romanians are a minority on the C.F.R. Cluj team and that the 'purely' Romanian Steaua has three foreign players on its roster).
When the
topic of the Hungarian minority in Romania emerges, Noua Dreapta studiously mentions
the historical circumstances which have led to conflict between Romania and
Hungary, with a complimentary twist towards the former: 'Some Hungarians are
animated by expansionism and greedily desire what does not belong to them (.)
Unlike the Hungarians, we are a country born and raised on its land, on which
the first of Christ's apostles once walked. We know that Romanians are the only
nation not to have conquered their country through combat. Romanians never
undertook a war of conquest against other nations' land. Quite the opposite,
they sought brotherhood and good understanding with the neighbors, and the wars
they had to fight were exclusively to defend their own' .
But just as in the case of Becali, 'Noua Dreapta' does not see the issue of
ethnic Hungarians as one of its primary topics of discussion, debate and
persuasion. On rare occasions, such as attempts to secede from the side of the
'secui' population in
4.5 The pariah: what we are not
Myths function also as a justification of group norms and behaviors. By re-coding group norms a mythology serves to strengthen the cohesion and integrity of society and through the use of traditional or changed images they enable a framework to be marked out that sets these narratives apart from other 'stories'. Myths have a bonding function that has been hinted at throughout this chapter - participation in the myth is a pathway to socialization and social (re-)validation.[279]
Rroma (usually referred to in
The PRM perceives the existence of the rroma exclusively in terms of law-breaking activities and thus as a sign of the state's failure to control the population and act as a guardian of the law. In the late 1990s the party proposed the isolation of gypsies in special colonies[283] and/or sending those unwilling to work in work camps ; when Rroma NGOs protested, Tudor asserted: 'we are not interested in what the gypsies want. All should be sent to prison. There is no other solution' .
The Rroma community was P.R.M.'s target of preference particularly during the 2000 campaign; during the live TV presidential debates Vadim focused on what he called 'the typology of the gipsy mob': 'Attacking as a group, controlling the markets but not raping their children and parents, because they are busy raping ours.'[286]. Several years later the P.R.M. accused the P.S.D. (Social Democratic Party) of not having paid attention to the level of crime in the nation, in particular those committed by gypsies , which made cooperation between the P.S.D. and representatives of the Rroma community for the 2004 elections more dubious.
The Noua Dreapta is taking a more elaborate approach to intolerance towards gypsies. On one hand, in official statements they claim that the main problem of the Rroma community is crime and that it should be solved via long-term educational programs. They consider the gypsies to be a 'social danger' and that integration should be attempted. The failure of such programs - the N.D. is hinting - should be leading to a harsher attitude towards gypsies: 'It's true that gypsies were released from slavery rather late, in 1852 by Alexandru Ioan Cuza. But in the 153 years that have passed they have had enough time to adapt. If they won't do it through the current programs, it means that they have this disobedience in their blood, and it is this disobedience that pushes them towards anarchic behavior' In an interview, N.D. leader Tudor Ionescu equated the Rroma community with the 'Jewish Problem' discussed by the Legion in the 1920s and 1930s: 'We are confronting a gipsy problem, due to the demographic explosion of this ethnicity but also due to the anti-social acts and criminality which constitutes for many gypsies a regrettable modus vivendi.'[290] The focus lies on demographics and crime, rather than culture and ethnicity.
The N.D. is simultaneously running a massive media-guerilla campaign, focused around the www.antimanele.sapte.ro website. University cities throughout the country have been plastered throughout 2006 with posters containing the slogans: 'Don't act like them/Don't do what they do/Don't let gypsies destroy our country' and advertising a website run by the Noua Dreapta. The favorite posting place for these posters were posters advertising 'manele' concerts, a type of music currently associated with Rroma singers and bands. Suspected of having been behind the campaign, N.D. leaders declared
'The massive presence of manele on the music market represents but a segment of the general decay and perversion within the Romanian society and culture'[292]. The statement can be read as a condemnation of all foreign cultural influences ('manele' are not part of Gypsy culture, but a mix of Gipsy and Near-Eastern musical patterns) or as an attack on a channel of wide-spread interaction between the gypsy culture and the majority culture.
The P.N.G. has taken no official stance as to the gipsy community. A documented pattern of racism exists in regards to Steaua club, fined numerous times for its players, gallery and stadium speaker leading anti-gipsy cheers[293]. Team representatives tried to explain the manifestations as being a part of the verbal conflict with Rapid Bucharest, a team which hails from a predominantly Gipsy neighborhood, or tried to point out that Steaua has several players of Gipsy origin. At the very least, Steaua and Becali are maintaining Gipsy discrimination and partaking in discriminatory attitudes towards this ethnicity. Given their status in the public arena, this aspect is very damaging and influential.
From this enumeration of intolerant acts and attitudes, it is evident that the P.R.M. and the N.D. share in the outlook of Rroma Romanians representing a threat to the stability of the state via criminality. The N.D. is also keen on manifesting awareness for a 'clean', de-manelized culture, a topic that has not received much attention from the P.R.M. For the Noua Dreapta, the secondary guilt of the Rroma (after criminal behavior) is cultural contact and expansionism; for the P.R.M., this secondary fault consists in patterns of joblessness or work which do not fit community standards - see the many references to 'work', 'work camps' and 'prison' in P.R.M.'s anti-Rroma discourse. According to the statist mindset that the P.R.M. is utilizing, such camps would both separate the Rroma population from the rest of the community and supposedly educate them on these values.
4.6. Revealing case study: anti-Semitism
Anti-Semitism
is an important issue for determining the coordinates of Romanian extremism in
the pre-2007 era. The relevance of anti-Semitic rhetoric is low: the Jewish
community in
The P.R.M.
has been for many years at the forefront of anti-Semitism in
According to the Romania Mare newspaper
the Israeli embassy in
Similarly to Vadim, Becali utilizes the word 'Jew' as an oath on occasion - in particular in regards to press representatives. During a televisioned exchange with ProSport journalists, whom he labeled 'bastard, parrots, Jews' (as if labeling them Jewish was inherently insulting), Becali continued: 'I'll kill Banciu too, look at his Jewish face. He's definitely a Jew, I'm betting on it!'[299]. On the level of more carefully crafted public statements, Becali said that he was ready to help any religious organization except for Jews, who allegedly were well infiltrated in Romanian politics . When asked to confirm the anti-Semitic statements of a regional party leader, Becali mingled religious tolerance ('You cannot be Christian if you hate a nation, so I don't hate Jews' ) with proselytism ('I don't hate them, I have nothing to do with them, but if I could I would convince them to get baptized, to become Christians too' ). It is deviance from the cultural norms of the Romanian/Orthodox majority that represents a point of interest for Becali. However, in the summer of 2005, when football player George Ogararu left Steaua for a Dutch football club, Steaua's management didn't hesitate to sign Klemi Saban, an Israeli player, whom they presumably saw as the best option for the team. Becali, who had a virtual veto right over any Steaua transfers, didn't interfere - which may suggest that he is leaving the team management to his employees (unlikely, since Steaua was his vehicle to public opinion and the enterprise with which he is most identified with), or that he is careful not to expose his grudges over the issue publicly.
Somewhat paradoxically it is the N.D., the organization which most closely connects to the anti-Semitic legacy of pre-WW2 Romania, that is the least interested in stating, acting upon and promoting its anti-Semitism. Tudor Ionescu, the organization leader, was closely questioned in 2004 by the media on anti-Semitism and the N.D. His discourse strategy is remarkable in that it reveals the anti-Semitic principles of the N.D. but also the relative lack of interest in the matter. He began by quoting anti-Semitic statements (or statements construed to be so) from Romanian intellectuals and politicians from the 19th and 20th centuries, such as Vasile Conta, Vasile Alecsandri, Mihail Kogalniceanu or Nicolae Iorga. He continued by bringing the issue to the present day: 'Nowadays one cannot talk of the existence of a 'Jewish problem', in part also because of the mass emigration of Romanian Jews to Israel from 1948 to 1989' .
The notion that anti-Semitism is a matter of historical heritage and organizational identity for the N.D. rather than a topic on which to act is pointed out by a regional N.D. leader, Goran Mrakici, who considers that 'Anti-Semitism is now in Romania a waste of time, since the number of Jews in the country is under ten thousand'[305]. He was careful to legitimize himself and the N.D. in the historical framework of the Legion: 'I cannot say that I am a sympathizer of Jews!' .
4.7. Conclusion
Ontological security consists of the coherence, continuity and dependability of the relation between the self and world[307]. The two levels on which ontological security is important are self-identity and the relationship with others. Giddens contends that while these patterns of behavior have a practical dimension, their real significance lies in the fact that they become deeply invested with emotional commitments.
For Wittgensteinian reasons, ontological security requires the sublimation of fundamental questions about the self, the others and the world. In Giddens' own words:
'To be ontologically secure is to possess at the level of the unconscious and practical
consciousness, 'answers' to fundamental questions which all human life in some way
addresses'[308]. According to Heidegger, ontological security is frail by its very nature: it does not rely on objective or a priori observations about the world, but rather rests on interaction; when a tear occurs in the fabric of social interaction, the fundamental questions of life (those about the nature of existence, death, relationships with others and self identity) can no longer be contained. It is one of the premises of this study that the radical changes effected in post-communist Eastern Europe have torn this very fabric; the capacity to transmit elements that would infuse ontological security into the weltanschauung of the population was lost and misappropriated; thus, the youth - in a fashion similar to the rest of society - are seeking for means of restoring this ontological security.
According to a practical application of Haw's Paradigm[310], myths function as a means of overcoming apparent contradictions by bringing about an emotional transformation. Myths are engines of emotion - driven by and creating psychological bonds between fellow participants in the mythologisation process. More importantly energy is channeled towards the enforcer of the myth (in some cases (s)he could be labeled the producer of the myth or its 'master of ceremonies'). Due to the nature of the interaction this political figure enjoys a deeper and more overwhelming support than that gathered by traditional political means.
The quintessential trait of mythological thinking is its capacity to transform and redefine reality (`the function of myth is to empty reality: it is literally a ceaseless flowing out, a hemorrhage, or perhaps an evaporation, in short a perceptible absence'[311]) . In politics, two additional traits are added: evangelization (normative calls for public infamy) and ideological mobilization (some content is introduced with the goal of causing political action). `Myths express and deal with a people's reality postulates about the world` . They re-explain the current reality in a digestible form; they reinforce and redefine values. The way reality is transformed, analyzed and packaged by Romanian extremism can only be understood if one understands their creative effort to the meaning that `mythic truths pertain more to a moral universe of meaning than to a 'natural' one` . All political endeavors built on mythology seek to provide answers to a state of facts detrimental to the individual members of the intended audience. In the case of the P.R.M. the message is justice-driven and reparatory: social inequalities, the corruption (perceived and real) within the state structures and the lack of a coherent understanding between the political class and the population (as proven by the low confidence in the Parliament and political parties ).
For the P.N.G.
and the P.R.M. the moral universe of meaning is more clearly defined - not just
as a vindication of ills via quasi-legal punishment - but in the direction of a
Christian society and (in the case of the P.N.G.) a Christian state. Sin,
immorality and irregularity would vanish if
Both the statist justice morality of the P.R.M. and the Christian-revolutionary ethos of the P.N.G. and N.D. exclude tolerance. Vladimir Tismaneanu defines these moralities in philosophical terms: the radical mythologies of post-communism are seen as combining the 'jacobine-Leninist logic of vigilance and intransigence with the themes of the xenophobic right-wing extremists of the inter-war period' .
Fundamentally,
right-wing extremism in
5. Discourse packaging
5.1. Introduction
No sensible discussion of a political organization's public appearances can focus on the ideological grammar alone. In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the message's effect, one must analyze the medium through which the message is transmitted, as well as factors inherent to the medium and which shape its content.
This
portion of the study will focus exactly on the discourse packaging techniques
used by the unconventional right in pre-2007
The context in which political debate is occurring in the Romanian public arena is particular in the way charismatic leadership is of greater relevance for the public than debates on given issues: 'As to what concerns the voters, they 'like' a party or a candidate and they 'don't like' another one. This spontaneous and most often irrational distinction is a form of complicity with the complete absence of public debates around major societal themes and of ethical, political or judicial values considered important enough to create unsurpassable partisan cleavages' . One may complete the above observation by noticing that Becali's radical Christian message, Vadim Tudor's violent nationalism or the Noua Dreapta's message, which combines the two albeit with retrograde nuances, fill in for 'value talk' in Romania's media-shaped political psyche.
5.2. Avenues of expression
As mentioned previously in this study, the Romanian society has been undergoing multiple stresses since 1990. The proliferation of media outlets has kept pace with the preferences and needs of the emerging social groups. T.V. stations and newspapers compete along mostly capitalistic lines, constantly adapting to consumer needs for advertising money. However, few risk extinction; the capital behind media enterprises is invested with the goal of acquiring a space in the public arena, rather than the production of profits. The influence of the Romanian media is decisive for the national psyche: not only are Romanians the biggest consumers of television in Europe, spending more time in front of the T.V. set than any other country in the continent, but they also have the highest level of confidence in television programming among all European television consumers .
Other
specific phenomena in the field of communication include a proliferation of
information, both in quantity and in means of transmission (ads, billboards).
Also of importance is the high integration of
This chapter will identify the ways the organizations under consideration have chosen for attracting public attention by utilizing the strengths of the Romanian media environment through the 1990s and early 00's.
5.2.1. P.R.M.: The party newspaper or the newspaper party?
For many political analysts, the Romanian press is not a reflection of societal debates, but their very source: 'In practice, the Romanian press functions as a substitute of public opinion. It is not a medium of rationalization and classification of dominating tendencies within society, but the very place where currents of opinion attributed to society are produced, along with the social problems as such. It seems that, in effect, public opinion does not even exist as such, with the status of a natural and spontaneous social object '. An example of such a situation is P.R.M.'s daily, 'Romania Mare', whose readership ebbed and flowed in tune with the party's popularity: in the summer of 2000 the 'Romania Mare' newspaper had a readership of 400,000 - its largest ever and a foreboding of the spectacular P.R.M. showing in that year's November elections.
Party insiders describe Vadim Tudor's views on the relationship between the political organization and the newspaper as emphasizing the bonding of the two: 'The readers of the newspaper must automatically become members of the P.R.M. (.) Vadim believes he can become president of Romania only through the aid of his newspaper' . The emphasis on the media arm of the P.R.M. does not come only from the fact that the newspaper emerged one year before the party itself, but rather because Vadim is aware of the potency of public opinion in a media democracy: 'The party, with its central and local structures, is a complication [for Vadim] (..) he repeats this view in several occasions. He did it for instance during the P.R.M. congress in November 2001, stating quite clearly that the party is a complication for him, since he has better and nobler things to do than to control 250,000 members' . By contrast, it may presumed that the newspaper is a more effective and less cumbersome tool for drawing public attention to the P.R.M. or shaping of public opinion in the direction seen fit by Vadim.
What are
then the elements of the 'Romania Mare' newspaper which shed light on the
political activity of the party as a whole? A few observations are in order
concerning the editorial content. The sections are constant in both name and
focus: 'Romania Mare' stands out in the Romanian media by being the only
newspaper to approach in each issue the topic of 'Hungarians' and 'Bassarabia
and Bucovina'; attacks on individuals and phenomena form the largest party of
the newspaper content (with headings such as 'Polemics', 'Controversies',
'Dossier files', 'War on Corruption', 'The War in Iraq'). 'Romania Mare' also
presents educational content, aimed at reinforcing the cultural values on which
the party propaganda rests: under headings such as '
An integral part of 'Romania Mare' is the constant and perpetual attacks on personalities which has raised Vadim's ire. A typical example is the media feud between Becali and Vadim Tudor , concretely presented in the pages of 'Romania Mare' in a first page bearing Becali's photo under the title: 'Death to the bandit Gigi Becali' with the mention 'of course, from a political point of view', accompanied by a Vadim Tudor editorial calling Becali 'the monkey from Pipera' (Becali's area of residence in Bucharest), 'mentally deranged' and 'Gigi the mosquito'.
The 'Romania Mare' newspaper also serves an important role by enforcing the personality cult around the figure of Vadim: it publishes Vadim's speeches in Parliament or press conferences word for word . However, the P.R.M. official newspaper is not 'Romania Mare' itself but a daily called the 'Tricolorul' (alluding to the three colors of the Romanian flag). In the latter, relatively small space is saved for official party events, and even then the emphasis lies on the ideas presented by the speakers rather than the event itself; rather, 'Tricolorul' functions as a collector of sensational news and 'investigations', in many ways doubling unnecessarily the 'Romania Mare'. Examples of 'Tricolorul' news stories include:
- 'real' opinion polls which mainstream political forces attempt to hide from the public and which purportedly show P.R.M.'s success ;
- constant features, such as 'The tablet of Wisdom' (quotes from the bible); 'Letters written with the ink of one's eyes' (presentations of individuals in difficult social situation); 'Photo of the day' (erotica), 'The mockery at the TVR' (attacks on the actions of the management of Romania's public television network); 'The page of combat' (attacks on individuals who have raised Vadim's ire);
- special features which appeared in 'Tricolorul' during the 2004 electoral campaign, some in tune with P.R.M.'s greater themes of social upheaval ('The great change', 'The preyed-upon country'), others borrowing Ceausescu-era methods of praising Vadim ('The people are with Vadim', 'On Sunday, we have one option: Vadim' , 'Messages of congratulation adressed to Mr. President Corneliu Vadim Tudor, on the occasion of reaching a beautiful age'
It is indubitable that the P.R.M. cannot be considered without relating it to and indeed defining it through the media endeavors which it sponsors. The fusion between the party and the newspaper is fundamental to the fortunes of the ideas proliferated by Vadim. The 'Romania Mare' and the 'Tricolorul' reinforce in a direct way the central themes of Vadim's discourse: the conspiracy dangers threatening Romania, Vadim's own uniqueness on the Romanian political scene and the relevance of a nationalist/Christian doctrine to the public debates of the day.
5.2.2. P.N.G.: Football as a notoriety building block
According to a 2003
How
is this social phenomena linked to Becali? Despite World Cup achievements in the 1990s, the single
most prestigious honor attained by a Romanian soccer team was in 1986, when
Steaua Bucharest won the European Champions' Cup, thus gaining the title of the
best soccer franchise in
In July 2004, Gigi Becali decided to effect a partial change the team colors. On the trademark red-and-blue jerseys the player's name and number would be printed in yellow, as opposed to the traditional silver. Since red, yellow and blue are the colors of the Romanian flag, the addition of yellow (as opposed to, for instance, green or black) had the immediate role of associating the club with the prestige of the national team and secondly assuming Steaua's role as the premier representative of Romanian soccer (and indeed Romania) on the international stage.
Becali's policies on the franchise's image management led to a conflict with Victor Piturca, the team coach. Becali's reply to Piturca's accusations of over-interference were swift and honest - after mentioning the name of a player on whose value Pitzurca and Becali had different views, the owner of the franchise added: 'The fans have to know the truth (.) I wanted the names on the jerseys to be written in yellow. I told him that I am in politics now and that it would be good to reunite the colors of the national flag on Steaua's jerseys. He didn't want that!'
Becali integrated Steaua into his 2004
electoral campaign to a large extent: the team's players were shuttled by bus
around the country in concordance with the P.N.G.'s electoral needs ,
as well as asked to join the party and even run on its list for Parliament .
The implications of the electoral were clear: since red, blue and yellow were
the colors of the national team, Steaua was aiming to replace in the
sentimental horizon of the soccer fans the Romanian national team, who had
failed to achieve noteworthy success since 2000. To a certain extent, Becali
was hoping that the following transference of frames would take place:
Becali->Steaua AND Steaua->
Steaua plays a complex role in Becali's political strategy; all the elements below were necessary but, if considered separately, not sufficient for guaranteeing Becali's success as a public persona:
- the club is a gateway to public opinion (a goal which malfunctioned in the case of other team owners involved in politics, i.e. the unpopular owner of Rapid, George Copos);
- national pride (Romanian citizens, as members of the national in-group, want reasons to be proud of their group membership, a tactic made even more successful by the fading success of Romania's national team);
- Steaua proves Becali's success as a manager, somebody who
achieves visible success (unlike other capitalist oligarchs in pre-2007
As a vector for garnishing the attention of the Romanian public opinion, ownership of Steaua has produced innumerable benefits for Becali, the most important of which are public visibility and identification with success. The importance of Steaua should, however, not be over-emphasized: without a consistent political discourse, Becali's transition from the sports world to political life would not have been successful.
5.2.3. P.R.M. and P.N.G.: OTV, the novel agora
OTV is a Romanian television station built on attracting the attention of Romanians disappointed with 'standard' television programming. OTV offers no movies or TV series; it rarely has newscasts, but rather introduces and becomes the news itself; its live showings are not football games, but live broadcasts from the weddings of the rich and influential. Central to the OTV concept is the 'Dan Diaconescu Show', a multi-hour anti-extravaganza in which Dan Diaconescu, the station owner, invites one or several disputed figures for a 'discussion' in his studio. The discussion is actually a monologue from the part of the interviewee, rarely interrupted by Diaconescu. Conspiracy theorists, 'witches', mistreated individuals or extremist politicians such as Becali or Vadim are usually the guests of the show.
Becali and Vadim utilize OTV freely because it functions fundamentally as a public ritual : presenting their public ideas is an action, rather than a mental process; their public appearance is a performance for the public; it holds some non-recreational content; is a collective phenomenon; it expresses social relationships; it is partly subjunctive ('not about what is, but about what should be'); and it is regular. OTV's viewership - the Romanian underprivileged, individuals of little or no education but with high interest in non-progressive agendas - is a boon for extremists who seek rapid legitimation and appreciation.
OTV's mission led to its having to choose sides between Becali and Vadim when the two began a fierce conflict for popularity. After Becali's proliferation of insults against Vadim in late 2005 on OTV, the P.R.M. issued a statement which considered that 'Diaconescu's behavior is unqualifiable', permanently halting OTV's accreditation to party events and halting the appearance of P.R.M. members to the station. OTV, one of P.R.M.'s few TV outlets, was also sued by the party for 600,000 euros . Rather than stopping here, the P.R.M. has decided to launch its own TV station in 2007, 'Cosmos TV' (labeling itself 'the most important and bravest TV station'). Its logo would be the Christian Cross, super-imposed on the human body; the editorial format copies freely from OTV, in that the heart of Cosmos TV would be a 4-times a week interactive show, called 'God, Protect Romanians!', which would be hosted by Vadim Tudor himself and address the problems of Romanians ('Health, Justice, Education, Unemployment, Pensions, Salaries'). Citizens 'with love of Country and Christ' were asked to buy stocks in the new TV station, which was characterized as 'popular and revolutionary, a means of fighting the Mafia and leading to the rebirth of the Romanian people' .
While after 2004 Vadim Tudor faced an almost impregnable media embargo, Becali has been invited on many occasions to other talk shows, usually belonging to 2nd rank TV stations (National TV, B1TV) which were sagging in the ratings. Even more so than in the case of traditional politicians, extremists benefit from public exposure via the TV medium: their qualities, such as verbal abruptness or directness draw attention away from the theoretical skeleton of their beliefs and enforce the perception of sincerity. Other, more mainstream media networks over-exploited Becali not only because they considered him an interesting topic, but also because of complicated schemes through which Becali renounced cashing in debts in exchange for media coverage .
5.2.4. N.D.: More than just the weapons of civil society
The 'Noua Dreapta' movement is one of the most adroit
organizations on the Romanian political scene in terms of its penetrating
message and rapid rise to notoriety. The organization's website is presented in
six languages; a online radio network (
The N.D. webpage serves a complex function: it draws attention to the movement's portrayal in the media, it underlines its public initiatives (such as rallies, leafleting, etc.) as well as member-only events (such as visits to Codreanu's grave, work camps or the launching of regional branches). The narrative of the website's evolution is complex, and the following two tables will mark the relevant elements of this evolution:
Table no.2: Noua Dreapta's activities from its foundation to 2006
|
Event |
Total |
|||||||
|
Participation to international events | ||||||||
|
Commemorations | ||||||||
|
Anti-gay rallies | ||||||||
|
The launch of a newspaper/CD | ||||||||
|
Appearances of the N.D. in the local and national press (excludes coverage of N.D. rallies) | ||||||||
|
Anti-Valentine's Day/pro-Dragobete activities | ||||||||
|
Anti-abortion rallies | ||||||||
|
Anti-Bolyai/ anti-Hungarian autonomy events | ||||||||
|
Work camps for N.D. members | ||||||||
|
Anti-E.U./anti-globalization | ||||||||
|
Bassarabia | ||||||||
|
Anti-Irak war | ||||||||
|
Propaganda at the Sighisoara folk festival | ||||||||
|
Rosia | ||||||||
|
Anti-sectarian activities |
|
|||||||
|
Meetings with political science students/ participation to conferences | ||||||||
|
Other (anti-manele, the Teo Peter case, the Bastroe Channel issue) | ||||||||
|
Total |
There is a relatively simple observation to be made: the number of recorded events grows yearly, reaching in 2006 a pace of 3 reported events per month. The following table groups the above events by category, thus positing the possibility of deeper analysis:
Table 3: Noua Dreapta's activities (condensed form).
|
Event type |
Total |
|||||||
|
Internal events (commemorations, work camps, recruitment propaganda) | ||||||||
|
Public points of view and enterprises | ||||||||
|
Participation to international events | ||||||||
|
Media coverage | ||||||||
|
Total |
The above table points out the transformation of the N.D. website from an Internet bulletin board, informing members of organization events, into a propaganda tool which draws attention to the movement's proactive pursuit of its ideals and to its continued legitimation into the media. The marked change occurs starting in 2005: the increase of posts explaining the N.D.'s philosophy and public enterprises from 3 in 2004 to 13 in 2005 and then to 17.5 the following year is almost fully accountable for the increase in number of postings on the N.D. as a whole from 26 to 37 and then 42.
Of course, the facts could also be read backwards, which is to say that since 2005 the N.D. has increased its public presence (with internal events and participation to international events remaining relatively similar in brute numbers), and that the website is reflective of that organizational decision.
The remarkable increase of 'internal events' and participation to international meetings and conferences which occurs in 2004 must be related to management causes and thus falls outside the boundaries of this study.
The N.D. is also running AlterMedia, an alternate news source which functions under the heading: 'World Wide News for People of European Descent'. In practical terms, Altermedia broadcasts anti-Israel or anti-Semitic news and editorials("The Israeli Parliament is marking arab workers" - 10.3.2004) or conspiracy theories ("Do antibiotics favor cancer?" - 10.3.2004). In more general terms, Altermedia functions on the basis that a New World Order, closely linked to big business, masonry and the Jewish communities, is seeking to limit individual freedoms. Any person with an Internet connection can received Altermedia news on their PC via RSS feeds.
Altermedia
has its own radio station. While the goals are similar to that of
The N.D.'s Internet footprint is not limited to Altermedia-related activities. The NGO also maintains sites such as www.codreanu.ro, a memorial to the pre-WW2 leader of the Legion which contains quotes, opinion pieces and articles of praise. The N.D. is also running an Internet shop, 'Magazinul Nationalist' ('The Nationalist Shop') which contains a wide variety of goods that can be ordered via the Internet and delivered via postal courier. The 'Nationalist Shop' contains hats, caps and T-shirts with the N.D. logo, Romanian nationalist music (such as 'Brigada de Asalt') in CD format; political theory books, with an inclination to Amerophobic or anti-capitalist, yet non-Marxist content - including such surprising names George Soros, Francis Fukuyama, Noah Chomsky, Nicolo Macchiavelli's 'The Principe', but also memoirs of pre-1941 Legion activists; mediocre conspiracy literature (exemplifying titles: 'Who rules the world'; 'The conjuncture of the Illuminati and modern secret organizations'). One of the highlights of the site is the 'Marturii Legionare' ('The Confessions of Legion Members') DVD collection - fourteen hours of video interviews with pre-1941 legionnaires.
Other sites crosslinked with those above are www.homosexualitate.ro - a site presenting scientific theories and debates against the view that homosexual behavior as natural or www.eurosceptic.ro, which have already been discussed in chapter 3.
The aforementioned 'Brigada de Asalt' is one of the N.D.'s strongest and most influential vectors of publicity. A rock band which has among its members the leader of the N.D., Tudor Ionescu, the band characterizes itself on its website as 'a form of contestation', and 'spontaneous'; it describes itself by contrast to 'artificial, decadent, message-less rock bands, who are simple products of consumerism' as one who proposes to 'spread the nationalist message among youths'. The band's music and lyrics are 'weapons'; its aims are coherent with those of the N.D.: 'denouncing the power of money, the desacralization of the Romanian society, the lack of culture among the young, the explosion of crime, social misery and generalized corruption' . The band identifies itself as part of 'the aware and active minority, determined to keep on fighting' against these challenges to which 'most Romanians have capitulated'
The mental origin for the 'Brigada de Asalt' is clear both from its name, suggesting the legacy of World War Two, as well as from its logo for 1st album ('O Romanie Nationalista' - 'A Nationalist Romania'): two individuals giving a Nazi salute to an image of Romania Mare, with the Celtic cross in the middle.[349]
In the context of a disillusioned, cynical youth, heading
en-masse towards the stereotypical capitalist middle-class, the N.D. is
technologically speaking positioned in the 21st century. The radical
points of view that they hold detract their political appeal - yet the fact
remains that out of all political or quasi-political forces in
5.2.5. Avenues of expression - conclusion
The TV medium, the written press or the Internet posses certain strengths and weaknesses specific to their nature. The utilization of the newspaper by the P.R.M. betrays both traits of the target group that they aim to attract - the inhabitants of the urban environment who possess an average level of education (able to read a newspaper filled with long, wordy articles) but also filled with a psychological vacuum, easily populated by anger, intolerance and worship for an individual commander-figure, such as Vadim. The N.D.'s reliance on the Internet, while relying on groups of individuals of a higher intellectual caliber, and with a more defined appetite for brief and incisive information, also manifests reliance on the written word. What do the P.R.M. and the N.D. have in common that would explain their reliance on readers rather than viewers? One simple explanation would be that their schemes of understanding or their political ideologies are too complex to be transmitted effectively and completely in other mediums. The P.R.M.'s phantasmagoric conspiracy schemes, or the N.D.'s subtle positioning between neo-Iron Guardism and anti-New World Order contemporary extremism need space, attention and consistency to be explained in writing or understood via reading. Another reason consists of the Romanian mass media's behavior towards the two organizations. The N.D. is presented occasionally in the local media but finds itself in newscasts on national T.V. stations only in the context of anti-homosexual demonstrations. Starting with the second round of the 2000 elections, Vadim Tudor has been practically shut off from main T.V. channels, who perhaps fear that bringing attention to him would improve his electoral performance in current or future elections.
OTV, as an
extreme example of the television environment as a means of expression friendly
to all and helpful for extremists to get their message across, represented a
big electoral stake for both Becali and Vadim. It is unclear why and how Vadim
gave up on utilizing this channel of communication: perhaps competition with a
more likeable Becali made the P.R.M. leader uneasy, or the P.N.G.'s financial
contribution to the station pushed Vadim to the background. Either way, Vadim -
once the master of T.V. extremism in
Becali possessed a competitive advantage in the perpetual struggle for notoriety which accompanies pre-2007 Romanian extremism. He has made the quick and successful transition from football club owner with juicy quotes to be reported in the 'Sports' section of primetime newscasts to a political figure invited to talk shows of all sorts and calibers. His pattern of communication - of which more will be said in chapter 5.3.2 - assures that a large audience will back his media apparitions, and given Steaua's seemingly perpetual presence in the news media coverage of Becali and Becali's statements is inextinguishable.
5.3. Patterns of communication
5.3.1. P.R.M. - The Social Demagogue
The P.R.M. is recognizable in the Romanian political sphere by its use of rhetorical devices, effective in that they both took into account the national-communist propaganda of Ceausescu's dictatorship but also the novel changes in the country's socio-economical environment. One of Vadim's contesters, a former member of the P.R.M., concedes Vadim's communicational skills: 'There were moments when some of Vadim's patriotic speeches caressed my soul. Actually, I believe that Vadim gained adepts not through prose, or poetry or journalism, but through the oratorical content of his speeches. Vadim made a maximum profit from this uncontestable talent of his (..) His speeches were minutely prepared, with several dictionaries on the table, and touched the sensible chord of the miserable, of the old, even of some young people who don't hear these words anymore in the speeches of national political leaders'[350].
Vadim is targeting his speeches at a select audience. In writing, he is using the ancient, pre-1989 orthography ("i" instead of "a") because he knows that his audience unconsciously associates the ancient writing style with the Communist era from which they derived so many (perceived) benefits. On some occasions he utilizes poetic devices to appeal to sundry social categories: the blue-collar worker ('your hands are deformed by work (.) you smoke cheap, bad cigarettes'), the peasant ('you've made the most sacrifices in History and you are now looking powerlessly at the earth, because you have nothing to work it with'), the intellectual ('the agile wings of your youth were broken and you couldn't fulfill your destiny, although your brain and heart are much richer than those of other glories in the West'), the soldier ('you were given to guard a flag, and an iron law, that is mounting inside your being for millennia demands that you stay, and obey and be happy that because you are protecting the country it is not wasting away, and the dear ones at home are not going to be trampled by damned hordes') .
Similarly
heated imagery is utilized in the case of anti-government speeches. The
populist nature of P.R.M. messages is evident in the way in which it seeks to
label itself the avangarde of a
national, social revolution: 'For all the crimes they've committed, [president]
Emil Constantinescu and his gang of criminals have but only chance to escape
the population's wrath: to commit a group suicide, like Hitler and his acolytes
in a bunker! Otherwise, a devastating Popular Revolution might occur, that the
lying promises of
Let's take the discussion beyond attacks on government authorities and into the nature of the invectives Vadim utilizes. Drawing on a statistically neutral sample (N=201) provided by Sever Mecsa[353] i.e. individuals and institutions whose names started with "A" and "Z", one can make the following observations on Vadim's insult methods and methodology:
- most characterizations are built on one or two traits, covering at least 50% of the total number of characterizations provided for the individual (i.e. Horia Alexandru's skin tone is alluded to in 11 of the 21 invectives); as a sub-phenomenon, women are defined mostly in terms of prostitution and promiscuous behavior (Gabriela Adamesteanu is referred to in this context for 7 of the 14 occasions she was mentioned in the pages of 'Romania Mare');
- when referred to as a group (i.e. 'The journalists of Libertatea' newspaper[354]), journalists face invectives stressing on the active (political analysts 'have eyes injected with hate'; Romania Libera journalists are a 'a gang of dog catchers'; journalists who supported Emil Constantinescu are 'a team of well-paid barks, paralyzed with all sorts of dossiers');
- newspapers are defined in terms relating to dirt ('Ziua' - 'the only real epidemic danger in Romania'; 'the pestilential latrine of the Romanian press') or to the ubiquous term 'anti-Romanian' inevitably linked up with true or invented non-Romanian ownership('Evenimentul Zilei', '22').
Table 4: Insults
utilized by the
|
Invective category [examples of invectives from text] |
No. of such invectives in sample |
% of total |
|
Minority [jidan, homosexual, tigan, cioara] | ||
|
Imorality through deeds [borfas, criminal, bisnitar, spagari, santajisti, fripturist] | ||
|
Social inferiority [aurolaci, vagabonzi, prostituate] | ||
|
Dirtiness [jeg, murdarie, cloaca, pestilential] | ||
|
Imorality through nature [lichea, ticalos, nemernic] | ||
|
Disease [leper, tuberculosis, etc.] | ||
|
Failure to live to expectations [ratat, diletanti, netalentat] | ||
|
Stupidity and ineptness [prost, idiot, tembel] | ||
|
Dehumanization [bou, porc, magar] | ||
|
Insanity [delir, nebun, isterica] | ||
|
Metaphysical [nenorociti, amanti ai mortii, spalatori de morti] | ||
|
Hyperactivity [obraznici, bagatori de seama, intriganta] | ||
|
Dismissable [milogi, fomisti, marionete] | ||
|
Foreign influence [antiromaneasca, venetici] | ||
|
Communist past [de la Scanteia, securisti] | ||
|
Over-intelectualized [sclifosit] | ||
|
Others*: | ||
|
Total |
* Others = Physical traits [cu ochii beliti, vesnic tarcata la par]; Social ascension [analfabet miliardar, mic gainar transformat in mafiot de anvergura]; Under-educated [analfabet]; Financially inept [falit].
Another method of analyzing the invectives relies on the fields that the invective touches upon:
Table 5: Insults utilized by the Romania Mare newspaper (1991-2003) - (condensed form).
|
Deficient by |
No. of such invectives in sample |
% of total |
|
Immorality and unlawfulness [immorality through deeds, immorality through nature, lawlessness, foreign influence, communist past] | ||
|
Nature [dirtiness, disease, dehumanization, metaphysical] | ||
|
Birth [minority] | ||
|
Social position [social inferiority, dismissible] | ||
|
Intellectual status [failure to live to expectations, stupidity and ineptness, overintelectualized] | ||
|
Total |
In conclusion, the following statements can be made about how and why Vadim utilizes insulting imagery to categorize his opponents:
- Rather than using a random approach to the assignment of invectives, Vadim is thorough in his categorization of individuals according to certain traits.
- On a general level, Vadim shows no specific preference to one specific field of categorization (four of the general categories of invectives are utilized at least 15% of the time).
- As natural for a party which thrives on perceived corruption and government inefficiency, moral failings are the most often used fault that Vadim criticizes in his opponents (most utilized field, 27% of insults).
- At the same time, more than 50% of the invectives deal with social mores (supposedly being part of an ethnic or sexual minority, having a low social position). This attitude is useful in that it gives Vadim's readers the perception that they are, in effect, superior to several social groups and not the losers of the transition period. In this way, the invectives under these headings have a strong positive aspect for the typical 'Romania Mare' or 'Tricolorul' reader.
Turning to the positive messages of P.R.M. propaganda machine, it is clear that, traditionally, the P.R.M. focuses its propaganda on Vadim Tudor himself. The party receives occasional merit, but for its organizational merit rather than for its qualities as in 1991. Political and organizational power, rather than moral strength are emphasized: 'Through the 107 senators and deputies that it has and through the 250 000 party members the P.R.M. is the one political force affecting Romanian politics in a decisive manner. No future governmental formula can be viable without taking into consideration the existence of the Greater Romania Party, which currently represents the aspirations of more than 1/3 of the country's population. While all the other parties make politics, the P.R.M. is making History' .
The party has taken a backseat to Vadim in P.R.M.'s public identity management not only because of Vadim's attempt to centralize power but also because of the various scandals affecting party members:
- a corruption scandal which led to a radical change in the
- the departure of many P.R.M. parliament members to the P.S.D.;
- the 2005 break-away of Corneliu Ciontu, a senior party figure, and his supporters.
Thus, the P.R.M. has become after 2002, more so than at any time in its history, a one-man party (image-wise). The weaknesses inherent to this stance is Corneliu Vadim Tudor himself, whose appeal might be reduced by other, more potent imagological operations aimed at uplifting a political persona to public praise.
5.3.2. P.N.G. - The radical next door
'Gigi' is the Romanian diminutive for the more official sounding 'George' - the former suggests closeness and familiarity. When Becali entered politics he found this first name to be a useful tool in gaining capital. But when, in the middle of 2006, Becali appealed to the more-official sounding 'George' in official party communiques, the press noted the dissonance between the character's behavior and his intended change: 'The road from 'Gigi' to 'George' will be harder than buying a palace in cash or reaching third place among Romanian personalities. For instance, if 'Gigi' could scream to a woman: 'You tart!', 'George' will have to be more careful: 'Dear missis, you are a tart!'. Upon reaching the target, 'Gigi' will have discovered he has been spinning in a circle. 'George' is a chimera in official papers, and the only possible first name is, in fact, the one he is running away from'[357].
The complex interplay of familiarity and demand for respect is at work in every single one of Becali's public appearances. Even if show titles always try their best to present the Steaua owner in a dramatic light (i.e. 'George Becali and the nation's spiritual rebirth' ), Becali utilizes an everyday language that has rarely found its way in Romanian politics: de-intellectualized and informal, often filled with grammar mistakes, emotional interjections and oaths. Through his authenticity, Becali reaches a different type of hypnotic attractiveness than Vadim - it is relatively easy to get stolen by the wide gestures, the suddenly rising tone, the rapid stares at the camera and the familiar/conversational attitude ('bai', 'mai'). Becali is particularly interesting as an unbridled psychological case of egocentrism or, in Freudian terms, id-centered individual: the discussion is always focused on himself ('eu am facut' - 'I did' the party or the football club) or matters which affect him directly, such as 'Communist conspirators'. On occasion he launches suburban attacks against political opponents with P.R.M.-like tools: '[The Prime Minister] dirtied the leadership of the country. How could he lead us, he who has had four wives, the fourth of which he took from a disco? (.) he is a miserable bastard (.) a Very Important Parrot" . A comprehensive analysis of Becali's vocabulary was provided at the end of 2005 by a media monitoring company . During that year the five words that Becali had pronounced most often in T.V. and press appearances were: 'me' (210 times), 'Romanian' (123), 'money' (121), 'euro' (70) and 'dollars' (64). Becali averaged more than one insult or oath per appearance. It is noticeable that in 2006 Becali made a strong effort to mention the divinity far more in his public appearances.
A pattern in Becali's political expression is that he claims to be perpetually harmed by conspiracies (sometimes elaborating and n naming the guilty parties) but forgiving/apologizing eventually to those he has attacked. Rather than decreasing his credibility, this tactic serves to introduce him to the population as a flexible person, one who 'just like us' may make mistakes and take a rash course of action. This is, after all, one of the main traits of populism - decrypting the ways in which the political leader is 'just like us' rather than endowed with special responsibilities or hindsight.
The P.N.G. party website adopts a completely different
attitude. It can actually be described as an awkward mixture of triumphant
presentations of opinion polls which record Becali's popularity, a thorough
catalogue of charity enterprises undertaken by the party's local branches and
an announcement board for organizational matters. Aimed at the media and the
Internet-savvy public, the website utilizes a lofty tone to praise Becali's
charitable deeds. Usually bold statements are made concerning Becali's skills
and capacity, often contrasted with the inefficient behavior of the state: 'In
the current political system, which drives the nation towards the 'dump of
national of desperation', the P.N.G. was born from the despair of the many. PNG
represents and fights for those who are in need of support and help, the poor
population in a rich
The P.N.G. attempts to be unique in the Romanian political landscape through unusual propaganda efforts: organizing elaborate town parties on the 8th of March for women[369], offering CDs and tapes of national anthem for free , parties commemorating historical figures or religious events of significance in the Christian Orthodox calendar . All these enterprises fit the identity axis of the party as shaped by a populist integration of Christian and quasi-Christian beliefs into politics.
5.3.3. Noua Dreapta - Victors by Association
The N.D.
falls under the pattern of modern extreme right wing organizations in Western
Europe: political sociologists noticed recently that 'neo-Nazi activities lift
the bar too high - wearing a uniform, public actions, frictions with the police
- for some youths, even tempted by the political option and its use of
violence, to marginalize themselves in such a way' .
The N.D. is using violence as a means of legitimation and publicity in relation
to gay rights marches in
The N.D. faces additional difficulties in getting its message across. Much of the organization's arguments can only appeal to an intellectual elite, a difficult task in a nation with less than 10% of its population being holders of college diplomas.
In a
fashion symptomatic to the N.D.'s notoriety-gaining initiatives and
difficulties, all the movement's communiques end with a remark as to the media
coverage on the movement's actions. The 2006 Gay Parade represented a premier
opportunity for the 'Noua Dreapta' organization to raise its popularity and
public awareness of its existence. If a year before the response of the
neo-legionnaire organization to the gay rights event had come in the form of
isolated acts of violence (with only several counter protestors arrested by the
police), in 2006 'Noua Dreapta' organized a 'March for Normality' which
previewed the homosexuality rights' organizations. Symbolically, the 'March for
Normality' started from Patriarchy Hill, the seat of
Legitimation
via association is a potent tool for the N.D., especially considering that it
claims to be the inheritor of fascist traditions in
The N.D.'s
most spectacular success in the field of public legitimation and approval was
the 'Basarabia pamant romanesc' ('Basarabia Romanian land) campaign, which
ended with a concert in
By labeling themselves in official manifestos 'Noii Golani' ('the New Wretches'), the N.D. also sought legitimation by association with the anti-Communist manifestations in the spring and summer of 1990, 'golani' being the term used by the president of Romania at that time to demean the civil society effort of those demonstrations.
The N.D. is trying to shed any accusations of extremism encouraged by its worship of Legion-era cultural artifacts. At the level of public appearances and demonstrations the N.D. is indeed somewhat successful in its attempts to collaborate on sundry issues with legitimate actors of the Romanian civil society. However, the existence of commemorative members-only events, such as marches to the burial place of Codreanu (as noted in chapter 2.4.2) demonstrate that initiatives such as those described in this chapter are part of the organization's marketing and PR campaign, rather than a sign of the break from neo-Legion patterns of thought.
5.3.4 Patterns of communication - conclusion
It is technically impossible to develop a comprehensive study of communication patterns in the case of all the three organizations under study. Becali's TV appearances in 2005 alone cover hundreds if not thousands of hours and P.R.M. publications since 1991 have produced several billion words.
After an in-depth study of what is being said by the Romanian extremist forces and how, it is clear that patterns emerge. Vadim Tudor is often appealing to communication techniques borrowed from the toolkit of Communist Romania: his refusal to adopt the new orthography or the sudden derailing into social ballads sounds familiar to an audience that grew up during an intense national Communist indoctrination period. Vadim's own position in the communication game is that of 'revealer', a 'prophet of the past' who uncovers malevolent deeds committed by those in power. Not only a provider of information, but also a vigilante-type 'corrector' who will bring normality to a country beset by evildoers, Vadim relies on the power of this status to wipe all his mistakes from the consciousness of his constituency.
Becali is
addressing or trying to become likeable to a different constituency: his
pattern of communication often borrows elements from rural
The N.D.
is feeding on both sources of anxiety - corruption in a transition country and
religiousness - to elicit the attention of a media-driven youth. Use of
alternative means of communication (leaflets, postings and web-based
initiatives) mingles with a profound effort for legitimation (by associating
the N.D. with Christian N.G.O.s or authorities or with patriotic ideals such as
the unification of Bassarabia and
5.4. Conclusion
It is an axiomatic statement that mass parties, that can mobilize dozens of thousands of adherents are disadvantaged in the context of a media democracy by comparison with 'political parties with a flexible organization, with dynamic activists and militants, who can answer the dense political and social provocations of the current context quickly'[374]. In the pre-2007 Romanian context, this statement must be quantified and extended. Romania is indeed a 'media democracy' in that political participation is limited in the population as a whole; the attractiveness of information-providing outlets has quickly turned the electorate into spectators rather than participants, a jury asked to deliver every four years rather than conscious debaters of, and participants in the political process.
It is particularly true for the P.R.M. and the P.N.G. that a political statement or action which does not receive media coverage does not exist at all. The tactics and strategies utilized by the two parties differ: Vadim Tudor limits his media influence to one newspaper chain which he holds; thus he can guarantee a perfect and total personality cult. Vadim's withdrawal from OTV points out his fear of channels of communication that he cannot fully control. The disadvantage of this tactic is that Vadim Tudor consciously restricts his political appeal to a select group of electorate members: those purchasing his magazine and sympathetic to his rare media appearances.
Becali on the other hand is more adept at playing the media game; without holding any outlets of his own, he has managed to capture the attention of traditional and non-traditional news channels. His populism is a mix of public Christianity and outbursts of anger, a composition milder than Vadim's sentencing of political figures. By doing away (at least at a surface level) with nationalist-Communist themes, Becali is offering a new identity to Romanians, removing them from the myth of the providential state and instead banking on more fundamental political themes, such as the ruler endowed by God with virtue and the charismatic, benevolent dictator.
The N.D. is seeking alternate means of legitimation and publicity. Its goals are to gain sympathy and approval; it is unclear whether its 'guerilla marketing' campaigns, constructed around flyers, concerts or rallies will have as effect the mobilization of an otherwise calm youth in the direction of a Christian, anti-capitalist, intolerant platform. While the means of communication are plausibly attractive - use of technology and marketing techniques above those of the P.N.G. or P.R.M. - the endeavor of the 'Noua Dreapta' may be hurt by the very ideas it is promoting, which are by nature running against the historical course envisaged by its young potential constituency.
6. Conclusion
As far as it can be ascertained, this study is the first to incorporate the N.D. and the P.N.G. in a meaningful analysis of extremist discourse, either in the 1989-2007 timeframe or as part of a broader understanding of the themes and values of anti-modernism in Romanian political history. While the focus of the study has been on the former, it has led to sensible conclusions on the latter. Natural companions to this study would be:
- a sociological analysis of the appeal
of
- an in-depth portrayal of Romanian anti-modernism, seeking to elaborate and refine the points mentioned at the beginning of this chapter and thus provide an ahistorical framework for the understanding of political and social resistance to modernization;
- an analysis of mainstream political discourse as it sought to present modernization in a favorable light in the pre-2007 period;
- a study of post-2007 extremism in the Romanian political arena, with an emphasis on the strategies utilized to garner public support via a euro-skeptical value set.
The differences between the organizations which have been studied can be attributed to genetic causes: the context of their formation and the biography of their seminal leaders has led to their touching upon the themes above with differing strength and in differing contexts.
The 'Romania Mare' Party has proved to be
a successful successor to the national-communism of the Romanian Communist
Party's later years. Its nationalist themes are unashamed country-worship,
intolerance and distrust of 'the foreigner(s)', in all his interventions and
actions. It sees the state as the guarantee of economic safety, an
administrative behemoth which trades social consensus for the citizens'
liberty. Its future seems limited to the lifespan of the constituency which has
been educated by the deceased national-communist state. One must remark,
however, that the success of either radical left-wing or right-wing
organizations will, in the future, depend on their capacity to blend the two
themes together. Cohesive, coherent and well-spoken extremist organizations can
only emerge in a modern society; the existence and performance of political
groups which mix politically contradictory values is guaranteed as long as
'Partidul Noua Generatie' represents in many ways the natural counter-weight to the P.R.M. At a first look, the similarities are astounding: both are led by charismatic leaders who are not ashamed to promote their own moral righteousness; they seem to be fighting for the same constituency of disendowed, disappointed social groups which have lost the most from the fall of communism; and they are addressing in similar tones the issues of 'The Nation', religion and social protection. Yet the angle utilized by Becali in his public discourse is in many ways inherited from the pre-Communist era, and somewhat paradoxically more capable of capturing the imagination of Romanians. Religion is the fundamental axis of values for Becali; the economic intervention of the providential yet impersonal state bureaucracy is replaced by individual and individualized acts of charity, more appealing through their directness to Romanians who never got fully attached to the narrative of modernity proposed by the Communist state. As a person who publicly seeks to restore the economic balance between the rich and the poor, Becali is likely to gain popular support in the post-2007 era as well; his rejection of communism as one of the greatest evils to have hit the Romanian society is also a refreshing feature for the electorate fatigued by Vadim Tudor's association with Nicolae Ceausescu.
The 'Noua Dreapta', perhaps the single
most representative right-wing extremist organization in pre-2007
However, the existing differences cannot overshadow the
elements which the three organizations have in common. In a broad sense, Romanian
extremism has certain traits which have remained relatively stable throughout
the country's modern history. Either while marginalized in democratic status-quos or assumed willingly by
authoritarian leaders or totalitarian regimes seeking to connect with the
populace, the core of the nationalist discourse has maintained a recognizable
identity, defined by a number of views and approaches to the national problems
which are characteristic and unique. The
In
identifying the shapes and contours of what Romanian extremism stands for,
foreign observers have focused excessively on the ethnic nature of its ideals.
The values of extremism have been seen as rooted in an obsolete form of
national identity. The same Martyn Rady considered that "Romanian nationalism is unmitigated by
civic notions of national identity. It is rooted in ethnicity rather than in a
concept of citizenship and rights."[376]
Probably due to the country's muddled involvement in the Holocaust or due to
the closeness of former
Yet
extremist organizations in
- the disjunction between the us and the them, a difference which is almost always made in moral and
economic terms. In a democratic regime, extremists remark the power distance
between the mainstream political class (through its appendage, the Parliament)
and the population at large. In the totalitarian
- the recovery of
- the forces of modernization pose a continual and thorough threat to fundamental social values, such as the family, through initiatives such as decriminalizing abortion, homosexuality, etc. Extremist forces introduce themselves as the guardians of the Romanian weltanschauung, usually against the innovative initiatives of the Romanian state. No link is usually provided; the values of tolerance and individual decision-making are seen by default as less relevant than the inherited modus operandi of the mythologized Romanian community (most often a redefinition of the rural world);
- the values of religion, usually
understand in the narrow frameset of submission, tradition and public displays,
are another point of coagulation for the Romanian extremist discourse. The
country's 'perpetual' modernization has as a side-effect the
proliferation of values which make religion - as understood by conservatives -
less of a mental and social force than it was. Thus, the conflict which ensures
the existence of a radical force or several at the fringes of
- the influence of the foreigners and foreign enterprises is always doubted. The sense of historical and geographical remoteness from the West, while still being in the influence of Western ideas and actions, has created in the mind of some Romanians this paradoxical and paranoid view of what 'the outsider' can bring to the community. The intentions and initiatives of the non-Romanian are to be mistrusted first, and critiqued next. Be it in the inter-war form of the Legion's Russophobia and Westophobia, or under the contemporary mask of anti-globalism and the myth of the New World Order, distrust of foreign influence is an element that extremist forces can count on in obtaining the attention of the Romanian population;
- reliance on the individual and not on the institutions when it comes to is a central matter for Romanian extremists. Good-hearted authoritarians, stronger versions of the 'enlightened despot' are seen as the magical solution to the country's numerous ills; their Christian values and self-proclaimed morality are justified by reference to the medieval Romanian kings, unwisely promoted by the Romanian state in its own quest for legitimacy;
- the role of the state as a provider is
a substitute for the above proposal: the state should give, but not encourage;
provide, but not embolden; hand out, but not arbiter. This perverted definition
of the welfare state has become relevant after the fall of communism, when the
ideals of individual action and initiative proved unnerving for much of
- no extremist organization in Romanian history can achieve public awareness without inventing a conflict between it and the state, usually on the grounds of public modernization efforts. The legal systems, opinion polls or parliamentary initiatives to curb extremism are seen as attacks on the true Romanian self, and often as initiatives inspired by malevolent circles abroad;
- undivided worship of the country (usually spelled with a capital C). This attitude is usually backed by strong resistance to measures that would seek to improve the economic or social situation without a political counterpart: how can one improve on something which is divine?
7. Bibliography
7.1 Field literature
ANDREESCU, Gabriel, Extremismul de dreapta in Romania, Cluj-Napoca: Fundatia CRDE (Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate etnoculturala), 2003.
BARBU, Daniel, Politica pentru barbari, Bucuresti: Nemira & Co., 2005.
BARBU, Daniel, Republica Absenta, Nemira, Bucuresti, 1999.
BARTHES, Roland, Mythologies, Vintage, 2000.
BERLIN, Isaiah, Adevaratul studiu al omenirii. Antologie de eseuri, editie ingrijita de Henry Hardy si Roger Hausheer, Editura Meridiane, Bucuresti, 2001.
BETZ, Hans Georg and Stefan IMMERFALL, The New Politics of
the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies, St.
Marti's Press,
BOIA, Lucian, Istorie si mit in constiinta romaneasca, Humanitas, Bucuresti, 1997.
BOTEZ, Mihai, Lumea a doua, Editura Du Style, Bucuresti, 1997.
CARREY, James (coord), Media, Myths and Naratives, Sage Publishing London, 1988.
COMAN, Mihai, 'Mass Media si Ritual', Polirom, 2003.
DE WAELE, Jean Michel, Partide politice si democratie in Europa centrala si de est, Humanitas, 2002.
DURANTON CRABOL, Anne Marie, Europa extremei drepte, din 1945 pana in zilele noastre, Institutul European, 2002.
FRIDENSON, Patrick, Les organisations, un nouvel sujet, Annales ESC, 6, nov.-dec. 1989.
GALLAGHER, Tom, Furtul unei natiuni, Humanitas, 2004.
GANDESHA, Samir, `The Political Semiosis of Populism`, The Semiotic Review of Books, volume 13 (3).
GAVRILESCU, Adrian and
Marius TUDOR, Democratia la pachet. Elita
politica in
GIDDENS, Anthony, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late
Modern Age, Polity Press,
GIRARDET, Raoul, Mythes et mythologies politique, Ed. De Seuil, 1986.
HAW, Kaye, 'Myth, Mythology and 'Myth-demeanors': The Role of Emotions in Risk and Resilience', in Talking Across Paradigms: Debating risk and protection in late modern society', Pennsylvania State University Conference, 2004.
HEIDEGGER, Martin, Being and Time,
HOBSBAWM, Eric, Nations and Nationalisms since 1780,
HOLMES, Leslie, Postcommunism. An Introduction, Duke
University Press,
HOSKING, Geoffrey, SCHOPFLIN George (editors), Myth &
Nationhood,
HUIU, Iulia and Dan
PAVEL, Nu putem reusi decat impreuna. O istorie analitica a Conventiei
Democratice, 1989-2000. Polirom,
HUME, David, Essays. Moral, political and literary, edited by Eugene F. Miller, Liberty Fund, Indiannapolis, 1987.
IONETE, Constantin, Clasa politica postdecembrista, Editura Expert, Bucuresti, 2003.
KRISTEVA, Julia, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, Columbia University Press, New York, 1982.
KYMLICKA, Will, 'Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights',
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996.
MECSA, Sever and Ilie NEACSU Ilie, intre presedintie si ospiciu, Editura Universul, 2002.
MUNGIU-PIPPIDI Alina (editor), Doctrine Politice. Concepte Universale si Realitati Romanesti, Polirom, Iasi, 1998.
NEUMANN Franz, 'Angst und Politik', in Demokratischer und autoritrer Staat,
Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 1986.
PATAPIEVICI, Horia-Roman, Politice, Humanitas, 1996.
POP-ELECHES, Grigore, Whither Democracy? The Politics of Dejection in the 2000 Romanian Elections, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, 2001.
RADY, Martyn, Romania in Turmoil: A Contemporary History, IB Tauris, 1992.
Rothenbuhler, Eric, Ritual Communication: from Everyday conversation to mediated ceremony, Sage Publishing, London, 1998.
SALATTI ,Alessandra, Hatred and Nationalism in Romania: Explaining Anti-Roma Violence, Stanford's Student Journal of Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies, p.1, Volume 1, Spring 2005.
SCHMITT, Carl, The Concept of the Political, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996.
SEILER, Daniel, Partidele politice din Europa, Institutul European, Iasi, 1999.
SIMMEL, Georg, 'The Stranger' in On Individuality and Social Forms, editor
Donald Levine, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1971.
TANASIOU, Cosmina, Post-Communist Political Symbolism: New Myths - Same Old Stories? An Analysis of Romanian Political Mythology, Political Studies Association-UK 50th Annual Conference, London, 10-13 April 2000.
TANASE, Stelian, Revolutia ca esec - elite & societate, Polirom, Iasi, 1996.
TISMANEANU, Vladimir, Fantasies of Salvation. Democracy, Nationalism and Myth in Post-Communist Europe, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1998.
TISMANEANU, Vladimir, Fantasmele salvarii; democratie, nationalism si mit in Europa post-comunista, Polirom 1999.
VADIM TUDOR Corneliu, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005
VALENAS, Liviu, Miscarea Legionara intre adevar si mistificare, Ed. Marineasa, 2000.
VOICU George, Zeii cei rai. Cultura conspiratiei in Romania postcomunista, Polirom, Bucuresti, 2000.
VULCANESCU, Mircea, Tendintele tinerei generatii, Univers, Bucuresti, 1934
ZAMFIR, Catalin, Politici sociale in Romania, Editura Expert, 1999, Bucuresti
7.2 Newspapers and written media
22, no. 41(244), 12-18 October 1994, p.13 and 42(245), 19-25 October 1994,
Adevarul, 2nd of September 2004; 9th of October 2004; 3rd of September, 2006.
Atac, 6th of April 2006.
Averea, 30th of May 2005; 17th of April 2006; 27th of September 2006.
Banateanul, 28th of September 2004.
Bihoreanul, September 19th, 2005.
Cotidianul, 16th of November 2005; 9th of February 2006; 11th of February 2006; 18th of April 2006; 22nd of April 2006; 4th of June 2006; 25th of October 2006
Cronica Romana, 22nd of August 1998
Evenimentul Zilei, 20-21st of June 1998; 6th of December 2000; 23rd of November 2005
26th of May 2006; 19th of October 2006.
Gandul, 25th of August 2006; 14th of November 2006.
Gazeta Sporturilor, 2nd of March 2005; 13th of July 2005; 18th of August 2006; 20th of September 2006; 10th of October 2006; 27th of November 2006; 9th of February 2007.
Impact de Pitesti, year III no. 15, 14-20 February 2005.
Informatia, 11th of August 2006.
Libertatea, 18th of August 1998.
Monitorul Expres, 6th of October 2006.
Nine O'clock, 4th of December 2000.
Obiectiv, 22nd of April 2005.
Politica, nr. 11, 25th of April 1992; nr. 25, 8th of August 1992; nr. 26, 15th of August 1992; no. 67, 5th of June 1993; no. 84, 2nd of October 1993; no. 190, 21st of October 1995; no. 360, 20th of February 1999; no. 411, 12th of February 2000; no. 412, 19th of February 2000; no. 418, 8th of April 2000; no. 419, 15th of April 2000.
Romania Libera, 29th of January 1999.
Romania Mare, no. 68, 18th of October 1991; no. 78, 27th of December 1991; no. 126, 4th of December 1992; no. 147, 30th of April 1993; no. 180, 17th of December 1993; no. 241, 17th of February 1995; no. 275, 13th of October 1995; no. 389, 26th of December 1997; no. 407, 1st of May 1998; no. 467, 25th of June 1999; no. 474, 21st of August 1998; no. 475, 29th of August 1998; no. 426, 11th of September 1998; no. 485, 29th of October 1999; no. 555, 2nd of March 2001; no. 560, 6th of April 2001; no. 567, 25th of May 2001; no. 576, 27th of July 2001; no. 581, 31st of August 2001; no. 600, 11th of January 2002; no. 615, 26th of April 2002; no. 619, 24th of May 2002; no. 627, 19th of July 2002; no. 636, 20th of September 2002; no. 646, 29th of November 2002; no. 651, 3rd of January 2003; no. 655, 31st of January 2003; no. 685, 29th of August 2003; no. 704, 9th of January 2004; no. 741, 24th of September 2004; no. 757, 14th of January 2005; no. 760, 4th of February 2005; no. 774, 13th of May 2005; no. 779, 17th of June 2005; no. 780, 24th of June 2005; no. 783, 15th of July 2005; no. 784, 22nd of July 2005.
Tricolorul, no. 11, 8th of April 2004; no. 150, 20th of September 2004; no. 206, 24th of November 2004; no. 207, 25th of November 2004; no. 215, 4th of December 2005; no. 241, 8th of January 2005; no. 261, 1st of February 2005; no. 262, 2nd of February 2005; no. 270, 11th of February 2005; no. 337, 30th of April 2005; no. 341, 7th of May 2005; no. 361, 31st of May 2005; no. 369, 9th of June 2005; no. 399, 14th of July 2005; no. 488, 26th of October 2005; no. 658, 24th of May 2006; no. 688, 29th of June 2006; no. 843, 8th of September 2006.
Ziarul, 31st of May 2006.
Ziua, 17th of August 1998; 5th of January 2007.
7.3 Websites (all checked and valid on the 6th of March 2007)
https://antimanele.sapte.ro/?cmd=stiri&id=17
https://new.themoneychannel.ro/stiri/Economic/Romanii-_mari_consumatori_de_TV.htm.
https://www.antiprostutie.ro.
https://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/12/08/tudor.profile/
https://www.altermedia.ro/radio/
https://www.becali.ro/?section=interviews&page=interviews_items
https://www.brigadadeasalt.ro/index.htm
https://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/presa.site.revista_data?dt=17-01-2004
https://www.creationism-stiintific.ro/
https://www.curs.ro
https://www.dezvaluiri.ro/site/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=51
https://www.eurosceptic.ro
https://www.fcsteaua.ro/index/section/articles/article/884
https://www.fgmanu.net/doctrina.htm
https://www.gallup.ro/romana/poll_ro/releases_ro/pr040108_ro/pr040108_ro.htm.
www.gazetasporturilor.ro/index.php?a=2878&shift=1
https://www.gigibecali.bro.ro/biografie.htm
https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_15368-Cei-sase-candidati-pentru-Primaria-Capitalei.htm
https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_15675-Becali-a-intrat-in-razboi-cu-presa.htm
https://www.jurnalul.ro/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article& sid=16482 &mode=thread&order=0&thold=0.
https://www.mediafax.ro/articole/Comunicat-al-Partidului-Noua-Genera--355-ie-142641-8.html
https://www.nouadreapta.org/cinesuntem.php
https://www.onlinesport.ro/Html/Fotbal/Romania/Statistici/campionate/index.shtm[377] https://www.ournet.md/~sobo/lei.htm
https://www.png.ro
https://www.prosport.ro/index.php?c=92&pg=6&a=27976.
https://www.protv.ro/stiri/social/top-story-becali-a-achitat-datoriile-rau-platnicilor-din-cartierul.html
https://www.radionouadreapta.com
https://www.realitatea.net/18074_BECALI-INCREZATOR--Francezii-au-aflat-cum-e-cu-becalizarea-Romaniei.html
https://www.regionalanalysis.org/aboutus/articles/shmarg.pdf
https://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/12/468a2a20-b5b5-41db-8066-96737eaeb8ce.html
https://www.ziarultricolorul.ro.
7.4 TV broadcasts
'Cursa spre Cotroceni', TVR1, November 2004.
'Doresc sa fiu Presedinte', PRO TV, Bucuresti, 14th of November 2000.
'Gigi Becali', 10th of September 2006, 23:00, OTV.
'Miezul Problemei Electorale', National TV, Gigi Becali Dezlantuit, 26th of November 2004.
'Observator', Antena 1, 6th of October 2004.
'Romania Mea' de Emil Hurezeanu, Antena 1, January 2004.
7.5 Radio broadcasts
Radio Europa Libera, South-East Europe Newsline, 16th October 2000.
Stelian TANASE, 'Revolutia ca esec - elite & societate', Polirom, Iasi, 1996, p. 96, apud Sfera Politicii nr. 28, iunie 1995.
Horia-Roman PATAPIEVICI, Politice, Humanitas, 1996, p. 66-67, apud The Anatomy of a Catastrophe, '22' magazine, nr. 41(244), 12-18 oct. 1994, p.13 and 42(245), 19-25 october 1994, p.11.
Stelian TANASE, Revolutia ca esec - elite & societate, Polirom, Iasi, 1996, p. 96, apud Sfera Politicii no. 28, June 1995.
Daniel L. SEILER,
Partidele politice din Europa, Institutul European, Iasi, 1999, p.135-145 and
Adrian GAVRILESCU, Marius TUDOR, Democratia la pachet. Elita politica in
Dan PAVEL, Legionarismul, in Alina MUNGIU-PIPPIDI (editor), Doctrine Politice. Concepte Universale si Realitati Romanesti, Polirom, Iasi, 1998, p.213-226.
Stelian TANASE, Revolutia ca esec - elite & societate, Polirom, Iasi, 1996, p. 17, apud Sfera Politicii, Anul I, nr. 2, ianuarie 1993.
Anne-Marie DURANTON CRABOL, Europa extremei drepte, din 1945 pana in zilele noastre, Institutul European, 2002, p.36.
Gabriel ANDREESCU, Extremismul de dreapta in Romania, Cluj-Napoca: Fundatia CRDE (Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate etnoculturala), 2003, p.32.
Grigore POP-ELECHES, Whither Democracy? The Politics of Dejection in the 2000 Romanian Elections, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, available at https://socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/publications.html, p.12-13.
Cotidianul, 9th of February 2006, available at https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_42436-Vadim-jignit-de-Becali-tradat-de-OTV-si-parasit-de-doamna-Lari.htm
https://www.curs.ro/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=30 &mode=thread&order=0&thold=0
Becali Increzator - Becali interviewed by TF1 journalist
Daniel Riolo on
Generatia Asteptata urca in Top 300, Cotidianul, Alexandru Gugoasa, 16th of November 2005.
Mihai Razvan ROTARU, 'Gigi Becali sponsorizeaza miscarea legionara', https://www.dezvaluiri.ro/site/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=51; quoting Mircea Nicolau si Gheorghe Jijie.
Gabriel ANDREESCU, Extremismul de Dreapta in Romania, Cluj-Napoca: Fundaþia CRDE (Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate etnoculturala), 2003, p.14.
www.curs.ro Dinamica popularitatii unor personalitati politice din Romania, October 2006.
Mauro CALISE, The Italian Particracy: Beyond President and Parliament, Political Science Quarterly 109, nr. 3, 1994, quoted in Daniel BARBU, De la Partid unic la partitocratie in Jean-Michel DE WAELE, Partide politice si democratie in Europa centrala si de est, Humanitas, 2002.
Bob ANDERSON, Robert DARDENNE, George KILLENBERG, The
Conversation of Journalism: Communication, Community and News, Praeger
Publishing,
Dan THOMBURN, Television as an aesthetic medium in James W. CARREY (coord), Media, Myths and Naratives, Sage Publishing London, 1988, p. 57.
Cosmina TANASIOU, Post-Communist Political Symbolism: New Myths - Same Old Stories? An Analysis of Romanian Political Mythology, Political Studies Association-UK 50th Annual Conference, London, 10-13 April 2000, p.7, available at https://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/2000/Tanasiou%20Cosmina.pdf.
David HUME, Essays. Moral, political and literary, edited by Eugene F. Miller, Liberty Fund, Indiannapolis, 1987, p. 14-16.
'Mesaj de Anul Nou adresat Poporului Roman', 'Romania Mare', no. 78, 27th of December 1991 apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.178.
'La alegerile prezidentiale din Franta Jean-Marie Le Pen a repurtat un triumf istoric', 'Romania Mare', no. 615, 26th of April 2002 apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p. 532.
'Mesaj de Anul Nou adresat Poporului Roman', Romania Mare, nr. 78, 27 decembrie 1991 apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.178.
'De ce a fost condamnat la moarte Ilie Ilascu.', Romania Mare, nr. 180, 17 decembrie 1993 apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.
228 ; 'Pentru eliberarea imediata a deputatului roman Ilie Ilascu', Romania Mare, nr. 426, 11 septembrie 1998 apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.
330; 'Kremlinul nu poate sa taca la infinit', 'Romania Mare', nr. 555, 2 martie 2001 apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.427.
https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_15368-Cei-sase-candidati-pentru-Primaria-Capitalei.htm
C.M. , Corina DRAGOTESCU, Ion M. IONITA, I.R.A. , Mediafax , Razvan POPA, Adevarul, 17 feb 2005.
' Becali a achitat datoriile rau-platnicilor din cartierul Ferentari',
https://www.protv.ro/stiri/social/top-story-becali-a-achitat-datoriile-rau-platnicilor-din-cartierul.html, 15th of November 2006.
George Becali la Sfintirea Bisericii ,,Sf. Mina', 28th of June 2006; Proiectul de Construire a bisericii, 18th of July 2006, www.png.ro.
Istoria la Extreme, Bihoreanul,
Sever MECSA and Ilie NEACSU, Vadim, intre presedintie si ospiciu,
Universul Publishing House, Bucuresti, 2002, p.125-126.
'Guvernarea PRM va cumpara de la tarani, pentru rezervele de stat, cel putin 1 milion de tone de greu', Tricolorul, no. 206, 24th of November 2004.
Mesaj de Anul Nou adresat Poporului Roman, 'Romania Mare', nr. 78, 27 decembrie 1991 apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p. 178.
'Mesaj adresat Miscarii Studentesti 'Romania Mare', Politica, no. 190, 21st of October 1995 apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.262.
'Circul Basescu', Tricolorul, nr. 394, 8 iulie 2005, Romania Mare, nr.783, 15 iulie 2005, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.755.
'Theodor Stolojan nu va ajunge, niciodata, presedintele Romaniei', Romania Mare, no. 685, 29th of August 2003 apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.612.
'Manifest pentru minerii din Valea Jiului', Romania Mare, nr. 444, 15th of January 1999 apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.341.
'Manifest pentru minerii din Valea Jiului', Romania Mare, nr. 444, 15th of January 1999 apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.341.
Sever MECSA and Ilie NEACSU, Vadim, intre presedintie si ospiciu, Universul Publishing House, 2002, p.320.
'Manifest pentru minerii din Valea Jiului', Romania Mare, nr. 444, 15th of January 1999, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p. 341, words capitalized as per original text.
Cei sase candidate pentru Primaria Capitalei, C.M. , Corina DRAGOTESCU, Ion M. IONITA, I.R.A. , Mediafax , Razvan POPA, Adevarul, 17 feb 2005, available at https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_15368-Cei-sase-candidati-pentru-Primaria-Capitalei.htm
'Sa nu-mi amintesc ce facea ea in tinerete', Ziarul, 31st of May 2006, available at
https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_49344-Becali-Sa-nu-mi-amintesc-ce-facea-ea-in-tinerete.htm.
'Domn Becali, usor cu victoria pe scari', Marius Nitu, Gandul, 25th of August 2006, also available at https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_54770-Domn%27-Becali-usor-cu-victoria-pe-scari-de-Marius-Nitu.htm
'Consiliul National al PNG', Averea, 17th of April 2006, https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_46736-Consiliul-National-al-PNG.htm.
Cei sase candidate pentru Primaria Capitalei, C.M. , Corina DRAGOTESCU, Ion M. IONITA, I.R.A. , Mediafax , Razvan POPA, Adevarul, 17 feb 2005, available at https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_15368-Cei-sase-candidati-pentru-Primaria-Capitalei.htm
'Ajunsesem sa cred ca filmul 'Mihai Viteazul' s-a facut in anul 1600', Evenimentul Zilei, 23rd of November 2005, available at https://www.onlinenews.ro/stiri/2005/11/ gigi_becali_ajunsesem_sa_cred_ca_filmul_mihaiviteazul_s-a_facut_in_anul_1600.htm.
'O miscare legionara tanara a prins radacini in Arges', Impact de Pitesti, year III no. 15, 14-20 February 2005, also available at https://www.nouadreapta.org/actiuni_prezentare.php?idx=61.
Istoria la Extreme, 'Bihoreanul',
Evenimentul Zilei, 20-21st of June 1998, apud Tom Gallagher, Furtul unei natiuni, Humanitas, Bucuresti, 2004, p.322.
Radio Europa Libera, South-East Europe Newsline,
'E vremea ca detinutii politici din CPEx sa fie eliberati', Politica, nr. 84, 2nd of October 1993, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.225; 'Protest fata de pedepsele ilegale aplicate fostilor conducatori ai tarii', Politica, nr. 11, 25th of April 1992, signed by C.V. Tudor, Eugen Barbu, Mircea Musat, Radu Theodoru, Theodor Paraschiv, Gheorghita Lupau, Nicolae Negoescu, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.190.
'Protest impotriva abuzurilor monarhiste ale Televiziunii Romane', Politica, nr. 25, 8th of August 1992, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.194.
'Prin favorizarea, pe fata, a organizatiei
teroriste UDMR, Michael Guest a devenit indezirabil in
'Gigi Becali acuzat de fascism', Gazeta Sporturilor, 2nd of March 2005, also available at
https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_16329-Gigi-Becali-acuzat-de-fascism.htm
Mary FULBROOK, "Myth-Making and National
Identity: the case of
Istoria la Extreme, 'Bihoreanul',
https://www.brigadadeasalt.ro/index.htm, under the MP3 heading.
Istoria la Extreme, 'Bihoreanul',
'Domnule Ion Iliescu, cand ati tinut in mina, ultima oara, Biblia?', Romania Mare, nr. 275, 13 octombrie 1995, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.254.
'Liderii-locomotiva', Romania Mare, nr. 655, 31 ianuarie 2003, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.585.
'Prin favorizarea, pe fata, a organizatiei teroriste UDMR, Michael Guest a devenit indezirabil in Romania', Romania Mare, nr. 627, 19th of July 2002, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.545.
Consiliul National al PNG, Averea, 17th of April 2006, also available at
https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_46736-Consiliul-National-al-PNG.htm.
Gigi 1 si Gigi 2 ne distreaza ei pe noi, Simona Tache, Cotidianul, 11th of February 2006, also available at https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_42592-Gigi-1-si-Gigi-2-ne-distreaza-ei-pe-noi.htm.
Gigi Becali si trufia credintei, Cristian Patrasconiu, Cotidianul, 18th of April 2006, also available at
https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_46797-Gigi-Becali-si-trufia-credintei-de-Cristian-Patrasconiu.htm
Gigi Becali si-a lansat candidature pentru Cotroceni, Alin Bogdan, Adevarul, th of October 2004, also available at https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_6902-Gigi-Becali-si-a-lansat-candidatura-pentru-Cotroceni.htm
https://www.brigadadeasalt.ro/, under the 'MP3' heading.
Vladimir TISMANEANU, Fantasmele salvarii; democratie, nationalism si mit in Europa post-comunista, Polirom 1999, p.45.
'Romanii conduc in topul evlaviei din Europa', Gabriela Cociasi, Cotidianul, 22nd of April 2006.
Eric HOBSBAWM, Nations and Nationalisms
since 1780,
Isaiah
Kaye HAW, `Myth, Mythology and 'Myth-demeanors': The Role of
Emotions in Risk and Resilience`, p.2, available at https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/pathways-into-and-out-of-crime/conferences/nottingham_paper.pdf .
Vladimir TISMANEANU, Fantasmele salvarii; democratie, nationalism si mit in Europa post-comunista, Polirom, 1999, p.18.
Vladimir TISMANEANU, Fantasies of
Salvation. Democracy, Nationalism and Myth in Post-Communist Europe, Princeton
University Press,
Isaiah
Vladimir TISMANEANU, Fantasmele salvarii; democratie, nationalism si mit in Europa post-comunista
Polirom, 1999, p.18.
Kaye HAW, `Myth, Mythology and 'Myth-demeanors': The Role of
Emotions in Risk and Resilience`, p.2, available at https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/pathways-into-and-out-of-crime/conferences/nottingham_paper.pdf.
Hans Georg BETZ and Stefan IMMERFALL, The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist
Parties and Movements in Established
Democracies, St. Marti's Press,
'
'Becali - seful opozitiei', Monitorul Expres, 6th of October 2006, quoting a October 2006 INSOMAR poll, available at https://www.monitorulexpres.ro/ ?mod=monitorulexpres&a=citeste&p=politic&s_id=30652.
'Escrocul Radu Theodoru n-a tradat P.R.M.-ul, ci a tradat Romania!', Romania Mare nr. 126, 4th of December 1992 apud Sever MECSA, Ilie NEACSU, Vadim, intre presedintie si ospiciu, Editura Universul, 2002, p.249-250.
'Autorii tentativei de puci, Cornel Ciontu si Anghel Stanciu, au fost dati afara din PRM!', C.V. Tudor, Gh. Funar, Lucian Bolcas, Mitzura Arghezi, Lia Olguta Vasilescu, Tricolorul, no. 361, 31st of May 2005.
'Ilie Neacsu si Sever Mesca - doi aurolaci politici, care vor sfarsi in puscarie', Romania Mare, no. 619, 24th of May 2002.
'Inchiderea postului OTV, sau de ce imi dau demisia din Adunarea Parlamentara a Consiliului Europei', Romania Mare, no. 636, 20th of September 2002.
Gabriel ANDREESCU, Extremismul de Dreapta in Romania, Cluj-Napoca: Fundatia CRDE (Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate etnoculturala), 2003, p.66.
'Lasati tara sa respire!', Romania Mare, no. 389, 26 decembrie 1997, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.290.
'Vanzarea Sidex - jaful secolului XXI', Romania Mare, no. 576, 27th of July 2001, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.451.
'N-am nimic cu mama dvs., d-le Emil Constantinescu, chiar daca a nascut un monstru!', Romania Mare, no. 485, 29th of October 1999, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.363.
'Regimul Constantinescu mi-a fabricat aproape 50 de procese', Romania Mare, no. 467, 25th of June 1999 (capitalization according to original).
'Aroganta bolnava a PDSR-ului', Politica, no. 419, 15th of April 2000, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.401.
'Hemoragia Patrimoniului National', Romania Mare, no. 581, 31st of August 2001, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.480.
'Un repetent: Ralu Filip', Tricolorul, no. 369, 9 iunie 2005, Romania Mare, no. 779, 17th of June 2005, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.741.
'CNA ori se democratizeaza - ori dispare!', Romania Mare, no. 780, 24th of June 2005 apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p. 747 and 'Un repetent: Ralu Filip', Tricolorul, no. 369, 9th of June 2005 and Romania Mare, no. 779, 17th of June 2005, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.741.
'Mafia sondajelor', Tricolorul, no. 341, 7th of May 2005 and Romania Mare, no. 774, 13th of May 2005, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.736.
'Este adevarat ca Ilie Sarbu a fost impuscat chiar de catre Adrian Nastase?', Romania Mare, no. 704, 9th of January 2004, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.633.
'Liderii-locomotiva', Romania Mare, no. 655, 31st of January 2003, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.585.
'Romania este un Irak al coruptiei', Tricolorul, no. 150, 20th of September 2004 and Romania Mare, no. 741, 24th of September 2004, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.684.
'Incredibil, dar se intampla in Europa anului 2004: Guvernul PSD a declansat o campanie electorala murdara, pentru fraudarea alegerilor', Tricolorul, no. 11, 8th of April 2004, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.662.
'Traian Basescu trebuie izolat total, ca un nebun periculos!', Tricolorul, no. 270, 11th of February 2005, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.722.
Becali injura pe bani, Cotidianul, 25th of October 2006, available at https://www.cotidianul.ro/index.php?id=7594&art=19356&cHash=3c012437fe.
'Gigi Becali: Limbaj porno', Gazeta Sporturilor, 13th of July 2005, also available at https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_26641-Gigi-Becali-limbaj-porno.htm.
https://www.brigadadeasalt.ro/index.htm, MP3 heading.
https://www.brigadadeasalt.ro/index.htm, MP3 heading.
https://www.brigadadeasalt.ro/index.htm, MP3 heading.
'Mesaj de Anul Nou adresat Poporului Roman', Romania Mare, no. 78, 27th of December 1991, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.178.
'Romania a intrat intr-o fundatura istorica', Politica, no. 26, 15th of August 1992, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.197.
Iulia HUIU, Dan PAVEL, Nu putem reusi decat impreuna. O istorie analitica a Conventiei Democratice, 1989-2000. Polirom, Iasi, 2003, p.447.
'Cum a devenit Romania un stat de tip mafiot', Romania Mare, no. 560, 6th of April 2001, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.433.
'Romania are iesire la Oceanul Atlantic', Romania Mare, no. 646, 29th of November 2002, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.577.
'Traian Basescu iar a cazut in capcana Serviciilor Secrete', Tricolorul, no. 399, 14th of July 2005 and Romania Mare, no. 784, 22nd of July 2005, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.756.
'Un Raport de Tara demn de campioana Europei la coruptie', Tricolorul, no. 488, 26th of October 2005, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.780.
'Cum a devenit Romania un stat de tip mafiot', Romania Mare, no. 560, 6th of April 2001, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.433.
'Inchiderea postului OTV, sau de ce imi dau demisia din Adunarea Parlamentara a Consiliului Europei', Romania Mare, no. 636, 20th of September 2002, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.563.
'Jos labele de pe sportul romanesc, tovarase colonel Dan Voiculescu', Tricolorul, no. 261, 1st of February 2005 and Romania Mare, no. 760, 4th of February 2005, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.715.
'Inchiderea postului OTV, sau de ce imi dau demisia din Adunarea Parlamentara a Consiliului Europei', Romania Mare, no. 636, 20th of September 2002, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.563.
https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_62607-Cadoul-Romaniei-pentru-UE-infiintarea-grupului-de-extrema-dreapta-in-PE.htm.
'Presedintele George Becali il acuza pe Calin Popescu Tariceanu de
populism', www.png.ro, posted on
'Istoria la Extreme', Bihoreanul,
'De la 1 ianuarie vei ramane fara tara', https://www.nouadreapta.org/actiuni_prezentare.php?idx=135
De la 1 ianuarie vei ramane fara tara, https://www.nouadreapta.org/actiuni_prezentare.php?idx=135
https://www.brigadadeasalt.ro/index.htm, MP3 heading.
Georg SIMMEL, 'The Stranger' in 'On Individuality and Social Forms', editor
Donald Levine,
Will KYMLICKA, 'Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights',
Samir GANDESHA, `The Political Semiosis of Populism`, The Semiotic Review of Books, volume 13 (3), page 10.
Franz NEUMANN, "Angst und Politik," in `Demokratischer und autoritrer Staat`.
Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 1986, p.261.
Julia KRISTEVA, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection,
Columbia University Press,
Gay Pride - de la timiditate la cafteala, Averea, 30th of May 2005, available at https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_23460-Gay-Parade-de-la-timiditate-la-cafteala.htm
'Partide respinse (III)', Ziua, 5th of January 2007, available at https://stiri.kappa.ro/actualitate/partide-respinse-iii/stire_71228.html.
'Istoria la Extreme', Bihoreanul,
'O miscare legionara tanara a prins radacini in Arges', Impact de Pitesti, year III no. 15, 14-20 February 2005, also available at https://www.nouadreapta.org/actiuni_prezentare.php?idx=61.
'Partide respinse (III)', Ziua, 5th of January 2007, available at https://stiri.kappa.ro/actualitate/partide-respinse-iii/stire_71228.html.
'Atentie la Ungaria!', Romania Mare, no. 68, 18th of October 1991, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.173.
'Corneliu Vadim Tudor, senator, presedinte al PRM, Cuvantare rostita la 7 februarie
1995, la intalnirea de lucru a PDSR, PUNR, PRM si PSM', Romania Mare, no. 241, 17th of February 1995.
'Desemnarea prefectilor UDMR-isti ai judetelor Covasna, Maramures, Mehedinti si Caras-Severin este un act de inalta tradare de tara', Tricolorul, no. 241, 8th of January 2005 and Romania Mare, no. 757, 14th of January 2005, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.705.
'Lasati tara sa respire!, Romania Mare, no. 389, 26th of December 1997, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.290.
'Aroganta bolnava a PDSR-ului', Politica, no. 419, 15th of April 2000, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.401.
'Cum a devenit Romania un stat de tip mafiot', Romania Mare, no. 560, 6th of April 2001, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.433.
'Istoria la Extreme', Bihoreanul,
Kaye HAW, `Myth, Mythology and 'Myth-demeanors': The Role of
Emotions in Risk and Resilience`, p.2, available at https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/pathways-into-and-out-of-crime/conferences/nottingham_paper.pdf.
Alessandra SALATTI, 'Hatred and Nationalism in Romania: Explaining Anti-Roma Violence', p.1, Stanford's Student Journal of Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies, Volume 1, Spring 2005, available at https://zhe.stanford.edu/spring05/roma2.pdf.
Romii nu-l iarta pe C.V. Tudor, dar nici el nu se lasa intimidat, Cronica Romana, 22nd of August 1998.
'O miscare legionara tanara a prins radacini in Arges', Impact de Pitesti, year III no. 15, 14-20 February 2005, also available at https://www.nouadreapta.org/actiuni_prezentare.php?idx=61.
'Istoria la Extreme', Bihoreanul,
Scandal la Liga lui Mitica Evenimentul Zilei, 26th of May 2006, and 'Becali nu plateste amenzile primite de Steaua pentru manifestari rasiste', Obiectiv, 22nd of April 2005, available at https://www.obiectivbr.ro/date/2005_04_22/Z_sport.htm
'Domnule Ion Iliescu, sinteti pe un drum gresit, diametral opus Doctrinei Nationale', Romania Mare, no. 147, 30th of April 1993, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.211.
Sever MECSA, Ilie NEACSU, Vadim, intre presedintie si ospiciu, Universul Publishing House, Bucuresti, 2002, p.149-150.
Michael SHAFIR, Marginalization or Mainstream? The Extreme Right in Post-Communist Romania, available at https://www.regionalanalysis.org/aboutus/articles/shmarg.pdf, p.12.
apud Romania Mare, No. 282,
'Nu-mi plac glumele macabre despre evrei', Romania Mare, no. 567, 25th of May 2001, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.445.
'Becali a intrat in razboi cu presa', HotNews.ro, 22nd of February 2005, available at https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_15675-Becali-a-intrat-in-razboi-cu-presa.htm
'Profile: Gigi Becali', by Michael Shafir, Radio Free Europe, December 2004, available at
https://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/12/468a2a20-b5b5-41db-8066-96737eaeb8ce.html
'C.V. Tudor are un demn continuator: Becali, politicianul de Dambovita, ar vrea sa-i crestineze pe toti evreii', Adevarul, 2nd of September 2004.
'Istoria la Extreme', Bihoreanul,
'Istoria la Extreme', Bihoreanul,
Anthony GIDDENS, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late
Modern Age, Polity Press,
Kaye HAW, `Myth, Mythology and 'Myth-demeanors': The Role of
Emotions in Risk and Resilience`, p.2, available at https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/pathways-into-and-out-of-crime/conferences/nottingham_paper.pdf.
Joanna OVERING, 'The Role of Myth: an Anthropological
Perspective, or : The Reality of the Really Made-Up", in ' Myth &
Nationhood' (editors: Geoffrey HOSKING, George SCHOPFLIN) , Hurst & Co,
Vladimir TISMANEANU, Fantasmele salvarii; democratie, nationalism si mit in Europa post-comunista
Polirom, 1999, p.18.
'Romanii, mari consumatori de TV', Money Channel, December 2006, available at https://new.themoneychannel.ro/stiri/Economic/Romanii-_mari_consumatori_de_TV.htm.
George VOICU, Zeii cei rai. Cultura conspiratiei in Romania postcomunista, Polirom, Bucuresti, 2000, p. 212.
Sever MECSA, Ilie NEACSU, Vadim, intre presedintie si ospiciu, Editura Universul, Bucuresti, 2002, p.234.
'Vadim jignit de Becali, tradat de OTV si parasit de doamna Lari', Cotidianul, 9th of February 2006, also available at https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_42436-Vadim-jignit-de-Becali-tradat-de-OTV-si-parasit-de-doamna-Lari.htm
https://www.onlinesport.ro/Html/Fotbal/Romania/Statistici/campionate/index.shtm (note: until 1961, Steaua played under the name of CCA).
https://www.jurnalul.ro/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article& sid=16482 &mode=thread&order=0&thold=0.
Eric W. Rothenbuhler,
Ritual Communication: from Everyday conversation to mediated ceremony, Sage
Publishing,
'Vadim jignit de Becali, tradat de OTV si parasit de doamna Lari', Cotidianul, 9th of February 2006, also available at https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_42436-Vadim-jignit-de-Becali-tradat-de-OTV-si-parasit-de-doamna-Lari.htm.
'In curind, va incepe sa emita postul crestin si national COSMOS TV!', Tricolorul, No. 843, 8th of September 2006.
'Afacerea', Gazeta Sporturilor, 9th of February 2007, available at https://www.gsp.ro/index.php?a=71165&shift=1.
One of the listings under this heading belongs both to the 'Paper magazine/CD launch' category and to the 'Bassarabia' category.
https://www.brigadadeasalt.ro/index.htm, 'Manifest' heading.
https://www.brigadadeasalt.ro/index.htm, 'Manifest' heading.
https://www.brigadadeasalt.ro/index.htm, 'Discografie' heading.
Sever MECSA, Ilie NEACSU, 'Vadim, intre presedintie si ospiciu', Editura Universul, 2002, p.300-301.
'Mesaj de Anul Nou adresat Poporului Roman', Romania Mare, no. 78, 27th of December 1991, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.178.
'Regimul Constantinescu mi-a fabricat aproape 50 de procese', Romania Mare, no. 467, 25th of June 1999.
'Theodor Stolojan nu va ajunge, niciodata, presedintele Romaniei', Romania Mare, no. 685, 29th of August 2003, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.612.
'In PRM nu sunt tolerati hotii', Politica, no. 411, 12th of February 2000, apud Corneliu VADIM TUDOR, Scrisori Deschise, Editura Fundatiei Romania Mare, 2005, p.386.
'Drumul catre George', Adrian Georgescu, Gazeta Sporturilor, 18th of August 2006, available at www.blogsport.ro/georgescu.
'Ce-l roade pe Becali', Evenimentul Zilei, 19th of October 2006, available at https://www.hotnews.ro/articol_34778-Lista-lui-Becali.htm.
George Becali, locul 1 in topul " Marilor Romani" :
Scleroza Guvernamentala :
Peter DUDEK and Hans Gerd JASCHKE, Entsehung und Entwicklung des Reichextremismus in der Bundesrepublik, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984, vol. 1, p. 166, quoted by Anne-Marie DURANTON CRABOL, 'Europa extremei drepte, din 1945 pana in zilele noastre', the European Institute Publishing House, 2002.
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